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INTRODUCTION
By Morten Balling
Ernest Gnan and Catherine Lubochinsky
Turmoil in financial markets causes reflection. Is monetary policy conducted 
in the most efficient way? Are regulatory and supervisory arrangements 
adequate when market volatility increases and financial institutions come 
under stress? In the present SUERF Study, we have collected the reflections 
by an outstanding group of top officials, researchers and observers. The 
editors are proud to be able to present their joint insights to SUERF readers. 
The papers were presented at the 27
th SUERF Colloquium in Munich in 
June 2008: New trends in asset management: Exploring the implications. 
In the first paper, Axel A. Weber, President of the Deutsche Bundesbank asks 
if the far-reaching structural changes in global financial markets in recent 
years have also changed the financial markets’ reaction to monetary policy. 
Monetary policy is transmitted through an interest rate channel, a balance 
sheet channel and a banking lending channel. Increased competition between 
banks has led to a closer relationship between market and bank interest 
rates. This has strengthened the interest rate channel. The increasing role 
of mortgage markets and mark-to-market accounting has strengthened the 
balance sheet channel, while the broadening of banks’ and borrowers’ options 
has weakened the banking lending channel. On balance, monetary policy 
remains a powerful tool for delivering price stability.
The author defines financial stability as the ability of the financial system 
to perform its key functions efficiently, namely, the allocation of capital and 
risks and the settlement of payments and securities transactions. Financial 
stability analysis and monetary policy analysis are closely interrelated. 
A standard analytical model of financial stability has not yet been developed, 
but improvement in the framework for financial stability analysis is a very 
high priority for central banks. During the 2007–2008 financial turmoil, 
central banks from all over the world have acted as liquidity providers of 
last resort to the banking system. In free market economies, central banks’ 
liquidity support must, however, always be confined to a transitional period.
Financial integration can help individual EMU member states to absorb 
country-specific shocks more easily. Financial integration also strengthens the 8 Introduction
stability of the euro area financial system. Risks tend to be more diversified 
on a cross-border scale which should lead to financial intermediaries, markets 
and infrastructure becoming more resilient to idiosyncratic shocks. Financial 
integration is most advanced in those market segments which are closest 
to the single monetary policy. Financial integration has progressed most in 
government bond markets and is least advanced in equity markets. Integration 
in the retail banking markets has remained limited. The president concluded 
by saying that the Eurosystem contributes to safeguarding financial stability 
by maintaining price stability in the euro area in the medium term.
In the second paper, Sushil Wadhwani, CEO, Wadhwani Asset Management 
revisits the debate on whether monetary policy should respond to asset price 
misalignments. The author starts by summarizing the case for “Leaning 
against the wind.” He argues that central banks seeking to smooth output and 
inflation fluctuations can improve macroeconomic performance. Moderating 
changes in asset prices diminishes fluctuations in economic activity so long 
as the underlying reason for the asset price movement can be traced to 
a disturbance in the demand and/or the supply of the asset in question. Taking 
asset price misalignments into account in the normal course of determining 
monetary policy may impact on expected inflation and contribute to avoiding 
unnecessarily large business cycle fluctuations.
Many central bankers and academics have argued that the difficulties 
associated with identifying a bubble makes leaning against the wind 
impractical. The author does, however, not see any significant difference 
between the informational requirements of any form of monetary policy 
rule that requires a reasonably accurate aggregate demand forecast, versus 
a leaning against the wind rule. Substituting monetary policy with a leaning 
against the wind tilt by going for inflation forecast-targeting assuming 
financial market efficiency is, in the view of the author, likely to lead to 
poor monetary policy. The author also argues against relying on mopping up 
after bubble bursts. If the monetary authorities in the UK want the financial 
framework to be less procyclical, the Monetary Policy Committee should, at 
a minimum, explicitly say that they will look at asset price misalignments in 
addition to a fixed horizon inflation target.
Countercyclical elements could be built into the regulatory framework by 
linking capital adequacy requirements to “excessive” growth of the value of 
bank assets or by varying maximum loan-to-value ratios. In his conclusion, 
the author expresses the hope that he has persuaded the readers of the 9 Introduction
theoretical and empirical case for considering a leaning against the wind tilt 
to the way monetary policy is run.
In the third paper, Andrea Vivoli, Researcher, Banca d’Italia looks with 
critical eyes at the current EU regulation of collective investment schemes 
and proposes an alternative approach based on risk budgeting. In order to 
protect investors in collective investment schemes, the regulation in force 
at European and national levels provides for asset allocation risk-spreading 
rules. Limits are set to counterparty risk, investments in non-listed securities, 
the degree of leverage, and exposure to derivative instruments. The UCITS 
Directive contains information requirements regarding a simplified prospectus 
that should guide investors’ decisions. The document is, however according 
to the author too long and not understood by its intended readers. The risk 
descriptions applied are useless.
A cluster analysis is carried out in order to assess if the asset allocation 
approach applied in the EU Regulation allows an effective discrimination of 
Italian mutual funds’ risk profiles. It shows that there is no perfect matching 
between asset allocation classes and risk-based clusters.
As an alternative type of regulation, the author suggests risk budgeting in 
which a risk comfort level is identified first and an asset allocation consistent 
with that risk level is determined afterwards. Regulation of risk budget funds 
should provide minimum criteria regarding liquidity of shares, portfolio 
diversification, leverage and short selling of eligible assets, risk indicators 
and organisational requirements. The new approach could – together with 
Basel II and the MiFID Directive – provide significant advantages to all 
parties and start a movement away from rule based compliance enforcement 
to a more flexible and comprehensive risk-based supervisory framework. 
In the fourth paper, Jesper Ulriksen Thuesen, Adviser, Danmarks Nationalbank, 
discusses the feasibility of regulating hedge funds. Many analyses indicate 
that hedge funds have so far generally had a positive impact on financial 
stability by contributing to better price formation and spreading of risk in 
global financial markets. However, the increasing importance of hedge funds 
is also associated with a number of potential risks. The author provides an 
overview of the largest hedge-fund crises from the 1998 Long-Term Capital 
Management Crisis to the beginning of the 2007 financial market turmoil. 
None of these events gave rise to systemic crises in the financial markets.10 Introduction
As regards regulation of hedge funds, an overall distinction can be made 
between direct, indirect and market-based regulation. Direct regulation would 
imply risk-based requirements for capital adequacy and risk management 
systems. Indirect regulation would involve requirements to hedge fund 
counterparties like brokers and financial investors. Market-based regulation 
relies on a considerable degree of market transparency so that all market 
participants are able to take the relevant risks into account. It is in any 
case essential that the financial institutions that are, in one way or another, 
counterparties to hedge funds have the necessary risk management tools and 
information at their disposal to be able to manage portfolios that include 
hedge funds. The author finds it not advisable to let consumer protection 
issues set the agenda for regulation of hedge funds. The focus should be on 
financial stability issues. 
In the fifth paper, Fernando Restoy, Comisión Nacional del Mercado de 
Valores, attempts to provide an overview of the main lessons for financial 
supervisors to be learned from the 2007 market turmoil that followed the 
sub-prime mortgage crisis in the US. The paper is organised around four 
key words: transparency, credit rating agencies, liquidity and organizational 
arrangements. The sub-prime crisis initiated a crisis of confidence in financial 
markets worldwide. The best way to address this is to ensure an appropriate 
degree of transparency. Disclosures on exposure to off-balance sheet vehicles 
must be improved. The author criticizes proposals for abandoning fair 
value accounting. We should not “shoot the messenger.” Using prudential 
policy tools is a more efficient way to address financial stability concerns 
than distorting the criteria used to report financial information. Structured 
financial products have contributed to the efficiency of the global financial 
system. The phenomenon may, however, have gone too far, too quickly. The 
rapid increase in the issuance of structured products is especially due to the 
significant acceleration of CDOs, collateralized debt obligations. CDOs do, 
however, not represent new investment opportunities; just the repackaging of 
already existing risk-return profiles. The practice of generating investment 
grade securities through CDOs has been particularly dubious. The author 
argues convincingly that there is a transparency deficit in structured products 
that calls for strengthening of information requirements. The current EU 
regulation introduces demanding criteria for pre and post-trade transparency 
in regulated stock markets, but establishes no requirements for other 
instruments. The author recommends that transparency requirements should 
be extended to some non-equity markets and as a first step be imposed on 
markets in relatively liquid instruments – such as some corporate and covered 
bonds – and subsequently applied to other more complex assets.11 Introduction
Credit rating agencies have played a key role in the developments following the 
sub-prime crisis in the US. The agencies offered investors risk evaluations of 
the different tranches of highly complex structured products. The developing 
sub-prime crisis in the summer of 2007 triggered an intense downgrading 
wave that affected a wide range of structured products. Subsequently, the 
methodologies, procedures and transparency of the credit rating agencies 
have been heavily criticized. Obviously, investors may have attached too 
much weight to credit ratings. IOSCO has recently released a new code of 
conduct which incorporates more stringent requirements on the agencies’ 
methodologies, transparency and organization. To establish a system of 
official regulation and supervision of credit rating agencies is a difficult task. 
Official agencies do not normally have the means and expertise to supervise 
complex assessment methodologies. At the same time, extensive monitoring 
by a public agency may generate the perception of public responsibility for 
the accuracy of the work done by the rating agencies.
Following the sub-prime crisis there was a substantial reduction in financial 
market liquidity. The author discusses the possibility for regulators and 
managers of market infrastructures to improve liquidity in wholesale markets 
and the treatment of liquidity risk in current regulations.
The spill-over effects from the US sub-prime crisis have revealed a number 
of deficiencies in the functioning of the financial system which have 
a genuinely global character. The global nature of the problems calls for 
global solutions. The author argues that there is a need for faster convergence 
on the financial information standards applied in different jurisdictions, that 
regulatory differences vis-à-vis credit rating agencies and non bank financial 
intermediaries should be reduced, and that market transparency requirements 
should become more homogeneous. With reference to potential conflicts 
between transparency and financial system stability, the author endorses the 
idea of assigning responsibilities for market conduct and prudential oversight 
to two different institutions (the twin peaks model).
In the sixth paper, John P. Calverley, Head of Research, North America, 
Standard Chartered Group, evaluates the interaction between the US housing 
bubble, the sub-prime crisis, liquidity, and the global financial turmoil in 
2007–2008. He argues that the US housing bubble was the main cause of the 
financial crisis not merely the trigger. The author points out that financial 
innovation reinforced the house price boom. Sub-prime lending, adjustable 
rate mortgages, interest only mortgages, option mortgages, and mortgage 
bundling all played a role. Another key factor was the so-called “bubble 12 Introduction
mentality.” During the upturn, people were prepared to borrow more and 
more because they believed that house prices would never fall. Higher house 
prices meant that house owners felt wealthier and increased their spending in 
general. When in 2007 house prices began to fall, the bubble mentality was 
replaced by the feeling of uncertainty. House buyers became very cautious 
and home owners reduced their expenditures and borrowing. Consumer 
spending in general slowed down. Falling stock prices contributed to the 
negative impact of the declining household wealth. So did the increasing oil 
prices. The author gives an overview of the debate whether the authorities 
should attempt to limit house price declines. He concludes that the authorities 
have limited options. A gentle “leaning against the wind” in the form of 
low interest rate policy may be worth contemplating but this may conflict 
with the central bank’s inflation objective. Government guarantees to the 
mortgage sector can keep mortgage markets open and ensure that spreads and 
terms are not too onerous. Finally, the authorities can try to limit the flood of 
foreclosures in cooperation with the banking sector. Monetary policy can do 
little on its own.
Together, the papers in the present SUERF Study give the readers an 
outstanding opportunity to understand the important monetary policy and 
regulatory and supervisory perspectives of the 2007–2008 turmoil in financial 
markets.15
FINANCIAL MARKETS AND THE CENTRAL BANK
Axel A. Weber
President of the Deutsche Bundesbank
Wilhelm-Epstein-Straße 14
D-60431 Frankfurt am Main
GERMANY
1. Introduction
In recent years, we have seen far-reaching structural changes in global 
financial markets. Financial innovation has manifested itself in various ways, 
the most prominent being the growing importance of new and complex 
financial instruments, the increasing significance of new business models, 
especially in the realm of securitisation and disintermediation, and intensifying 
competition, partly owing to the consolidation process in the banking sector, 
partly owing to the rising importance of relatively new, largely unregulated 
players, such as hedge funds, private equity firms, conduits and SIVs.
These remarkable financial developments are bound to alter the range of 
activities financial market participants pursue. But are they also changing 
financial markets’ reaction to monetary policy?
The starting point for answering this question is easy to find: the monetary 
policy transmission process. This term describes the long, variable and 
uncertain process by which a change in a central bank’s official interest 
rate impacts first on financial markets and is ultimately transmitted to the 
economy in general and the price level in particular. As a significant part of 
this monetary policy transmission process takes place in financial markets, it 
goes without saying that the recent trends in global financial markets are of 
special interest to central bankers – and it would not have needed the recent 
financial market turmoil to drive home that point.
Against this backdrop, I will focus my remarks today on the following three 
issues. First, have the recent structural changes in the global financial system 16 Introduction
altered the transmission process of monetary policy – and, if so, do these 
changes make a central banker’s life more – or les s – difficult? Second, how 
can central banks help avoid disturbances in the financial system? This is 
a crucial question because financial stability is a precondition for the effective 
transmission of monetary policy decisions to the real economy. Third, how 
does financial integration affect monetary policy transmission? Specifically, 
what is the current state of affairs in the euro area?
2.  Financial markets and monetary policy transmission
I shall start with the most general question. To what extent have the recent 
financial market trends changed the way monetary policy affects the economy 
and its price level? This is a crucial issue. Without a fair knowledge of the 
monetary transmission process, its key variables and the lags involved, central 
banks will face a tough job when deciding on official interest rates. For this 
reason, the Eurosystem closely monitors structural developments in financial 
markets. We also try to detect how financial innovations could have modified 
the way changes in short-term interest rates are transmitted to other financial 
variables, output and inflation. 
Without wanting to go into too much detail, it is essential to point out that, 
when it comes to the impact the recent financial trends have on monetary 
policy transmission, several countervailing effects are in play. These 
countervailing effects are best captured when unravelling monetary policy 
transmission into its different channels, that is by considering individually 
the different ways in which a change in central bank interest rates affects 
economic variables – at least in the short term. 
Let me focus on the channels and arguments that are the most prominent in 
the euro area. To begin with, there is the interest rate channel. According to 
the existing literature, the development of deeper, more complete and more 
competitive financial markets seems to have strengthened the pass-through 
from central bank interest rates to market interest rates. This can be put down 
to two factors: Consolidation in the banking system, implying the emergence 
of (fewer and) larger banks and thus improved arbitrage opportunities between 17 Financial markets and monetary policy transmission
different financial markets, and an enhanced availability of alternative capital 
market-based instruments for debt financing.
It is indeed likely that the increased competition between banks, as well 
as between bank loans and different financial market products, has led to 
a closer relationship between market and bank interest rates. Consequently, 
the deepening of financial markets should have amplified and/or speeded-up 
the effects of monetary policy on bank interest rates (and, other things being 
equal, on other financial variables, output and inflation). 
Financial developments over the past decade should also have strengthened 
the balance sheet channel. Basically, the idea is that, in an economy with 
highly developed mortgage markets and a proliferation of mark-to-market 
accounting rules, changes in the value of collateral and wealth have a greater 
impact on the economy. In such an environment, borrowers’ balance sheets 
tend to fluctuate more, which leads to a higher volatility in the amount of funds 
banks are willing to lend to households and firms. Obviously, greater changes 
in the supply of credit will translate into greater changes in consumption and 
investment, thereby strengthening monetary policy transmission. 
At the same time, a third prominent monetary policy transmission channel, the 
bank lending channel, is generally supposed to have become less important. 
Comparable with the balance sheet channel, the bank lending channel 
emphasises that monetary policy can influence aggregate demand not only 
through interest rates, but also through its impact on the supply of bank loans. 
Whereas the balance sheet channel focuses on the availability and value of 
collateral necessary for borrowing operations, the bank lending channel refers 
to changes in the banks’ and borrowers’ funding possibilities. 
Usually, two reasons are put forward why the balance sheet channel has 
weakened of late. Banks have become more flexible because of the growing 
use of securitisation and improvements in risk management. Consequently, 
banks can respond more flexibly to changes in financial market conditions 
and will therefore not pass through each and every change in the central 
bank’s official short-term interest rate. Hence, other things being equal, 
the effect of monetary policy on the overall loan supply has decreased. 
Moreover, financial development has not only broadened banks’ options in 
terms of responding to interest rate changes; it has also broadened borrowers’ 
financing opportunities, reducing their dependency on bank loans. 18 Financial markets and monetary policy transmission
To put all the arguments in a nutshell, monetary policy seems, on balance, 
to have gained influence on financial market prices and the real economy 
in the short run. This is confirmed by the existing theoretical and empirical 
literature, which, by the way, delves much more deeply into the intricacies 
of the various transmission channels than I am able to do today. In any case, 
it should be borne in mind that the evidence is still tentative. As financial 
development is an ongoing phenomenon, it should therefore be considered 
valid only at the current juncture. Nonetheless, the bottom line is that, in 
the face of greater competition among financial intermediaries, financial 
innovation and financial globalisation, monetary policy remains a powerful 
tool for delivering price stability.
In this context, however, it is of the essence that the monetary policy strategy 
utilises a broad-based approach in order to guarantee a robust assessment of 
the developments in the economy and on financial markets.
3. Financial  stability
3.1. Financial stability analysis 
Let me now turn to financial stability. A widely accepted definition of 
financial stability is the ability of the financial system to perform its key 
functions efficiently, namely, the allocation of capital and risks and the 
settlement of payments and securities transactions. These functions must 
be fulfilled smoothly not only in normal times, but also during periods of 
structural adjustment and stress. 
For obvious reasons, supporting financial stability is an important objective 
for central banks – and has always been so. First, as noted above, monetary 
policy is largely transmitted through financial market operations. Hence, the 
effect that monetary policy has on the real economy depends crucially on the 
smooth functioning of financial intermediaries and financial markets. It is at 
this point that financial stability analysis and monetary policy analysis are 
most closely interlinked.19 Financial stability
Second and more generally, major macroeconomic objectives, especially 
price stability and sustainable output growth, are jeopardised if the financial 
system suffers from instability. This is underlined by the generally high 
macroeconomic costs of financial crises. In addition, this aspect has gained 
importance since financial turbulences seem to have become more frequent 
in past decades owing to accelerated growth in financial transactions and the 
greater complexity of new financial instruments. 
Third, financial stability is closely linked to a central bank’s interest in the 
prudent design and management of the payment and settlement systems 
which process its currency. The Eurosystem, for instance, has the statutory 
task of promoting the smooth operation of payment and settlement systems. 
Against this background, referring to financial stability analysis as a new 
trend among central bankers would be something of a misnomer. Indeed, 
financial stability analysis is anything but a passing fashion. It has, in fact, 
been a field of research of its own right since the mid-1990s. This is reflected 
in the wide dissemination of Financial Stability Reports, which are now 
produced in more than 50 countries worldwide. 
Nonetheless, it is fair to say that financial stability analysis is still, to a large 
extent, work in progress. To illustrate my point, let me outline briefly the 
kind of challenges central banks face. To begin with, financial stability is not 
easily measured. This is hardly surprising as, in contrast to monetary policy 
analysis, there is no single indicator (such as inflation) to observe. Similarly, 
initiatives to create some sort of an all-encompassing financial stability index 
have failed to convince so far. Instead, the concept of financial stability 
involves various financial intermediaries, financial market segments and 
infrastructure, for which a whole host of different quantitative and qualitative 
indicators exist. As a consequence, determining the degree of financial 
stability remains a highly complex task. 
At this point, the natural suggestion from an academic outsider would be 
to construct a theoretical model. Such a simplified representation of reality 
would help the academic to single out the most relevant indicators and to 
define the interrelationships between financial market and economic variables. 
However, model-based financial stability analysis is still in its infancy. Three 
issues are particularly striking. 
The feedback effects between financial system behaviour and the real 
economy are difficult to model, especially in episodes of stress. Currently, 20 Financial stability
most macroeconomic models treat key financial system interactions and 
feedback effects only in a rudimentary manner. Therefore, the “true” costs in 
terms of real GDP that are associated with systemic risk in financial markets 
are difficult to determine. This is a significant limitation, given that feedback 
effects play a crucial role in assessing a financial system’s vulnerability to 
contagion and system-wide stress. 
Another principal reason why episodes of stress are difficult to model lies in 
the fact that financial instability is inherently non-linear. As one consequence 
of this non-linearity, risk factors typically are not normally distributed. 
Instead, their distribution is characterised by fat tails, implying that extreme 
values are observed more frequently than what would be predicted under 
the assumption of normality. Modelling non-linearities greatly complicates 
research, but it is indispensable, given the central focus of financial stability 
analysis on default, contagion and spill-over effects.
A further challenge faced by financial stability analysts is a lack of relevant 
data. First of all, historical time series on episodes of stress are rare, luckily. But 
that makes it even more difficult to understand financial markets’ behaviour 
in the fat tail of risk distributions. Moreover, and more generally, some of the 
data needed for financial stability analysis still require development. With 
the exception of market prices and regulatory information, only a limited set 
of data is on hand in a timely, comparable and satisfactory manner. Think, 
for instance, of financial intermediaries’ financial reporting and the little 
information available on credit risk transfer. Therefore, methods have to be 
found for handling the shifting demand for data in an environment in which 
financial markets are constantly undergoing change. 
To sum up, feedback effects, non-linearities and the handling of a limited 
set of data are prime examples of the numerous challenges encountered 
by financial stability analysts in designing financial stability models. As 
a consequence, it comes as no surprise that a standard analytical model of 
financial stability has not yet been developped. At present, modelling is 
often scattered with respect to risk categories, financial market segments and 
structural or regulatory issues. 
Mind you, there is no reason to play down the progress achieved so far, 
on the contrary. Financial stability analysis is becoming more and more 
sophisticated, as is borne witness by the increasing number of related working 
papers and conferences. 21 Financial stability
As for the recent financial market turmoil – the trigger for the recent financial 
market turbulence, the speed at which it spread across global financial 
markets and its persistence were not foreseen, but that does not conflict 
with my statement. Far from it – financial stability analysis does not aim for 
clairvoyance. Instead, it is most likely that financial crises will continue to 
emerge in spite of perceptible progress in financial stability analysis. But the 
crucial point is that their impact can be alleviated by warnings, moral suasion 
and – if necessary – adjustments to the institutional and regulatory framework. 
For this reason, further improvement in the framework for financial stability 
analysis is a very high priority for central banks. 
3.2. Dealing with episodes of financial instability 
There is yet another reason why central banks need to keep well-informed 
on financial market developments. The turmoil that has been affecting global 
financial markets since summer last year has been a further example of 
central banks not only taking a predominantly passive role in analysing and 
commenting on financial stability, but also of playing an active part as well. 
Indeed, the role of central banks in crisis management dates back to the 19th 
century and was reflected in the views of Thornton and Bagehot. Both noted 
that a central bank should – under specific conditions – provide liquidity to 
the banking system as a lender of last resort. 
And that is exactly what happened when the crisis in the US subprime 
market triggered a rapid loss of confidence among financial intermediaries 
on a global scale. As a result of it, uncollateralised interbank lending has 
been muted – the reasons for which are twofold. On the one hand, banks’ 
willingness to lend has fallen sharply due to mounting counterparty risks. On 
the other, the uncertainty banks face with respect to their own longer-term 
liquidity planning has increased considerably. To alleviate ongoing tensions 
in interbank money markets, central banks from all over the world have acted 
as liquidity providers of last resort to the banking system.
As for the Eurosystem, we have so far stood the test in this challenging 
environment. Owing to the broad design of our liquidity operations toolbox, 
the Eurosystem’s operational framework has had to change only slightly 
since the outbreak of the financial market turbulence. What is more, the 
Eurosystem succeeded fairly quickly in reestablishing confidence in the 
functioning of the Euro money market by promptly injecting additional funds 
on a temporary basis. We shall continue to provide liquidity flexibly – which 22 Financial stability
seems warranted given the ongoing tensions in the Euro money market, 
including, and especially, in the longer-term sector.
Although there have recently been some identifiable signs of easing in several 
financial market segments, it is still too early to give the all-clear. Specifically, 
the still elevated level of money market spreads underlines the fact that there 
is no room for complacency. 
In this context, I would like to stress two points. In the Eurosystem, we have 
strictly separated our management of aggregate liquidity conditions from 
the determination of our monetary policy stance. Hence, when deciding on 
interest rates, the primary objective of the Governing Council has been (and 
will continue to be) price stability. Against the background of the continuing 
and persistently strong upside risks to price stability, the Governing Council 
is in a state of heightened alertness and in readiness to act. Moreover, our 
strict separation makes clear that the Eurosystem does not intentionally and 
directly offer some sort of ex post insurance to financial market participants 
who have engaged in excessive risk-taking. This is intended to limit moral 
hazard to a large extent. 
Apart from this, it seems appropriate to point out that, in a free market 
economy, central banks’ liquidity support must always be confined to 
a transitional period. In other words, in the medium run, central bank 
interventions cannot substitute the need for financial intermediaries to regain 
confidence gradually. At the top of the list of requirements, I would like to 
see financial intermediaries trying to enhance their transparency regarding 
credit and market risk exposures and also, if necessary, raising capital 
and adjusting business models. Furthermore, it is essential that financial 
intermediaries convince investors that the financial system as a whole is 
capable of managing risks adequately in a setting of continuously changing 
financial market trends. 
Finally, taking a step back from crisis management, the recent financial market 
turmoil has underscored the need for crisis prevention to be strengthened. 
This is exactly what is taking place at the moment. National, European and 
international forums and organisations are currently putting a lot of effort 
into identifying the lessons to be learned. There are various initiatives under 
way, but it is particularly important that the recommendations made by the 
Financial Stability Forum are implemented rapidly and effectively. The 
implementation of these recommendations, including those on disclosure 23 Financial stability
standards and risk management, will be a major step forward in enhancing the 
resilience of the international financial system. 
4.  Financial integration in the euro area
If I were governor of a central bank whose currency area coincided with the 
boundaries of its financial markets, I could end my speech here with a brief 
summary. However, as governor of a central bank that is an integral part of 
the Eurosystem, there is yet another topic to cover: financial integration. It is 
generally accepted that, in a currency union, well-integrated financial markets 
facilitate the implementation of the single monetary policy. There are three 
aspects worth mentioning. 
First, a currency union should work more smoothly, the more integrated 
the national financial markets are. Indeed, financial integration can help 
individual EMU member states to absorb country-specific shocks more easily. 
The reason for this is that the more diversified the sources of national income 
and the easier it is to borrow abroad, the less consumption and investment 
need to follow fluctuations in national output. Hence, national consumption 
and investment levels can be insulated from domestic macroeconomic shocks 
via cross-border risk sharing. 
Second, financial integration strengthens the stability of the euro area financial 
system – and of the macro economy in general. Basically, in a well-integrated 
financial system, risks tend to be more diversified on a cross-border scale 
which should lead to financial intermediaries, markets and infrastructure 
becoming more resilient to idiosyncratic shocks. Having said that, integrated 
financial markets arguably broaden the scope for spillover effects across 
borders – as manifested by the recent US subprime crisis. 
Third, I have already stated that the Eurosystem’s tasks include the smooth 
operation of payment and settlement systems – which is closely linked to the 
progress of financial integration. There is an abundance of evidence that the 
launch of the euro was a major catalyst for financial integration in the euro 
area. 24 Financial integration in the euro area
In general, financial integration is most advanced in those market segments 
which are the closest to the single monetary policy. This is particularly visible 
in the unsecured money market, which was almost perfectly integrated right 
at the start of EMU, as measured by the low cross-country standard deviation 
of the average overnight lending rates among euro area countries. Moreover, 
the euro has significantly reduced home bias in the euro area bond and 
equity markets, albeit to varying degrees. Principally, financial integration 
has progressed most in government bond markets and is least advanced in 
equity markets. Having said that, the percentage of cross-border holdings 
of bonds and equities in the euro area has grown over the past ten years. In 
addition, bond market yields and share prices are increasingly being driven 
by common euro-area factors, although local factors continue to play a role. 
These developments have been supported by the elimination of currency risk 
within the euro area, the higher demand from a larger pool of investors, and – 
as far as bonds issued by smaller member states and companies are concerned 
– the reduction of liquidity premiums in domestic-currency debt. In essence, 
however, these developments reflect the high degree of substitutability among 
bonds and equities issued by various governments and corporations across the 
euro area. 
Let me also highlight the fact that the recent financial market turbulence 
has not undone the process of financial integration in the euro area. True, 
euro-area sovereign spreads vis-à-vis the German benchmark have increased 
substantially. Moreover, cross-border country and cross-sector dispersions 
in euro area equity returns have risen since the second half of 2007. Both 
examples indicate that national factors in market dynamics and asset pricing 
have regained importance in a time of financial market tensions. But the 
scale on which this has happened is still small in comparison with the major 
developments of the past ten years. 
As already noted, financial integration in the euro area has not proceeded at 
the same pace across all sectors and markets. Integration of the retail banking 
markets, for instance, has remained limited, reflecting the persistence of legal, 
institutional and cultural differences. This shows that financial integration 
in the euro area is dependent not only on how close a market segment is 
to monetary policy, but also on how far the relevant market infrastructures 
have become integrated. A case in point is the high degree of integration of 
the large-value payment systems in the euro area. They have made possible 
the integration of euro area money markets. TARGET2, offered by the 
Eurosystem, is a further step forward in that direction. Other efforts to reduce 
infrastructure barriers are under way. One of the most significant initiatives 25 Financial integration in the euro area
in this regard is the Eurosystem’s TARGET2-Securities project which will 
provide a pan-European securities settlement platform. These innovations 
demonstrate that the Eurosystem attaches great importance to promoting 
financial integration in the euro area.
5. Concluding  remarks
Ladies and gentlemen, this has been a wide-ranging overview of the changing 
relationship between central banks and financial markets. I hope it has 
given you some flavour of the importance that financial stability, financial 
market developments and financial integration have for monetary policy 
implementation. Financial markets have always been a field of vital interest 
to the Eurosystem, but certainly, the recent financial market turmoil has 
been a further spur to our efforts in coping with periods of financial stress, 
conducting financial market research, and supporting the integration of the 
euro-area financial markets. 
First and foremost, however, the Eurosystem contributes to safeguarding 
financial stability by maintaining price stability in the euro area in the 
medium term. 29










1)   The case for “Leaning Against The Wind” :-
(LATW hereafter)
We argue that central banks can improve macroeconomic performance by 
reacting to asset price misalignments over and above their reaction to fixed 
horizon inflation forecasts. This is because such countercyclical monetary 
policy tends to offset the impact on output and inflation of such bubbles. In 
addition, if it were know ex ante that monetary policy would LATW in this 
way, it might reduce the probability of bubbles arising at all.
2) “Practical” objections to LATW:-
Although bubble identification is difficult, there is no significant difference 
between the informational requirements of any form of monetary policy 
rule that requires a reasonably accurate aggregate demand forecast versus 
a LATW rule. Also, central banks are better equipped to LATW because they 
are less subject to short-termist performance pressures. Some argue that one 
would need to create a recession to prick a bubble. However, LATW does 
not imply an attempt to prick bubbles, and is merely an attempt to improve 
overall macroeconomic stability.30 Executive Summary
3)   Are we better off just mopping up after the bubble bursts?
We strongly disagree with relying on “mopping up.” The inherent asymmetry 
is likely to reinforce the procyclicality of the financial system. Further, 
a central bank may find itself unable to mop up after a bubble bursts (e.g. an 
external inflation shock that makes it difficult to cut rates, or a credit crunch 
that impairs the transmission mechanism). This “nightmare scenario” is alas, 
only too real at the moment.
4) Can we just rely on an inﬂ  ation targeting system?
In practice, the answer is probably no, as asset price misalignments often 
cause difficulties at time horizons well beyond the one-three year period that 
are typically considered. Since a LATW is wholly consistent with the remit of 
the MPC in the UK, there may well be a case for the Government encouraging 
the MPC to discharge its remit more effectively in this regard. To those who 
regard LATW as “impractical”, we remind them that the Swedish Riksbank 
has done it in the context of an inflation-targeting regime.
5) Potential changes to the regulatory framework:-
Since using monetary policy to LATW is unlikely to be enough, it is important 
to also examine other regulatory changes that might help (e.g. requiring more 
bank capital in good times, or maximum loan-to-value-ratios). Also, tax 
policy may also be considered.31
1. Introduction
1
It is a great privilege to be here today at the SUERF colloquium. When 
Professor David Llewellyn kindly invited me to speak, it was with some 
trepidation that I suggested that I attempt to revisit the debate on whether 
monetary policy should respond to asset price misalignments. It had become 
a deeply unfashionable subject, and I was also conscious that I had battled the 
central banking consensus on this subject for at least nine years.
2
Indeed, when Stephen Cecchetti, Hans Genberg, John Lipsky and I (CGLW 
hereafter) published a report on “Asset Prices and Central Bank Policy” 
arguing that central banks should “lean against the wind” (LATW hereafter) 
in early 2000, I recall that a major newspaper largely neglected it, which 
was in sharp contrast to, say, The Economist, which made our report the 
foundation for their cover story. When I politely questioned a journalist at 
this newspaper about this anomaly, I was informed that the powers-that-be 
had told all journalists to steer away from “abstract” and “academic” material 
that was not of “practical” interest.
You can therefore imagine my feeling of relief when the organisers told me that 
the other keynote speaker this morning, Professor Axel Weber of the Bundesbank, 
was also going to, among other things, discuss central banks and financial 
markets, and I am greatly looking forward to his remarks this morning.
The recent credit crisis appears to have had a significant impact on the importance 
attached to this debate. For example, the Financial Times informs us:-
“The US Federal Reserve is reconsidering the way it deals with asset 
price bubbles in the wake of the housing and credit bust, in a move 
that could see the central bank using extra regulation – or even interest 
rates to fight unjustified increases.” 
May 14, 2008
1 I am greatly indebted to Stephen Cecchetti and Hans Genberg, with whom I have had the 
privilege of working in this area over the past years. I am also very grateful to Roy Cromb for his 
advice and help on this speech. Of course, I bear responsibility for all errors.
2 See Wadhwani (1999) and CGLW (2000), though, of course, among others, economists 
at the BIS (see, e.g. Borio and Lowe (2002) and White (2006)) have also disagreed with the 
consensus view and made many valuable contributions to the debate.32 Introduction
Moreover the US Treasury has proposed that the Federal Reserve be given 
new powers as a stability regulator in the hope that it would reduce the risk 
of asset bubbles.
I will now begin by restating the case we have previously made for 
central banks to “lean against the wind” in situations involving asset price 
misalignments and then turn to a review of the debate. I shall also consider 
alternative policies designed to make the financial system less cyclical.33
2.  The case for “Leaning against the wind”
In this section I simply restate the arguments presented in CGLW (2000) 
and CGW (2002) for how asset price misalignments should be used to guide 
central bank policy. We were primarily interested in examining whether and 
how asset price misalignments should influence monetary policy once other 
factors, such as the short-term inflation outlook and the output gap, have been 
taken into account. 
One should not neglect the fact that bubbles can be costly. The 2003 IMF 
World Economic Outlook estimates that the average equity price bust lasts 
for 2 ½ years and is associated with a 4 per cent GDP loss. Housing busts 
are around twice as long and are associated with output losses that are about 
twice as large.
To avoid confusion or misunderstanding, I want to emphasize that we are not 
advocating that asset prices should be targets for monetary policy, neither 
in the conventional sense that they belong in the objective function of the 
central bank, nor in the sense that they should be included in the inflation 
measure targeted by the monetary authorities. Instead our principal claim 
was that central banks can improve macroeconomic performance by reacting 
systematically to asset price misalignments, over and above their reaction to 
inflation forecasts and output gaps. It is our view that central banks seeking 
to smooth output and inflation fluctuations can improve these macroeconomic 
outcomes by setting interest rates with an eye toward asset prices in general, 
and misalignments in particular. The main reason for this is that asset price 
bubbles create distortions in investment and consumption, leading to excessive 
increases and then falls in both real output and inflation. Raising interest rates 
modestly as asset prices rise above what are estimated to be warranted levels, 
and lowering interest rates modestly when asset prices fall below warranted 
levels, will tend to offset the impact on output and inflation of these bubbles, 
thereby enhancing overall macroeconomic stability. In addition, if it were 
known ex ante that monetary policy would act to “lean against the wind” in 
this way, it might reduce the probability of bubbles arising at all, which would 
also be a contribution to greater macroeconomic stability.
The rationale for our conclusions comes both from the intuition gained from 
simple theoretical models and from quantitative simulation results. 34 The case for “Leaning against the wind”
As I said back in 2002 (see CGW (2002)), the first illustration of the potential 
usefulness of reacting to asset prices is an application of the basic insight of 
Poole (1970), that leaning against the wind of interest rate changes is useful 
when disturbances originate in the money market. In CGLW we generalized 
this argument slightly to allow for movements in equity (or real estate) prices 
in an economy where the stock market (or the housing sector) is particularly 
important and to allow for changes in the exchange rate in an economy where 
the external sector is crucial.
A straightforward application of Poole’s analysis shows that moderating 
changes in asset prices diminishes fluctuations in economic activity so 
long as the underlying reason for the asset price movement can be traced to 
a disturbance in the demand and/or the supply of the asset in question. To 
be sure, the same logic implies that when asset prices change as a result of 
disturbances in other markets, for example if equity prices increase because 
of favourable productivity shocks, then the case for leaning against the wind 
of the asset price change disappears. It is important not to react automatically 
to any and all changes in asset prices, but to evaluate each situation separately 
and act accordingly.
The second illustration given in CGLW is based on a model due to Kent and 
Lowe (1997). Their model is dynamic and explicitly incorporates the notion 
of asset price misalignments. In their setup, when a bubble develops in equity 
markets, standard wealth effects drive current inflation up. Importantly, 
though, expected inflation may not change since there is a probability that 
the bubble will disappear by itself, reducing future inflationary pressures. 
A forward-looking central bank that sets the current interest rate in response 
to expected inflation (and does not take the equity price bubble into account) 
would not tighten monetary policy under such circumstances. As a result 
the bubble in the equity market will bring about even higher inflation in the 
future if it continues and an even stronger economic slow-down if it collapses 
from an even higher level. Although expected inflation (i.e. the probability 
weighted average of these two future scenarios) may be on target, the country 
will suffer from highly variable economic activity as a result of the stance of 
monetary policy. By contrast, a policy of pre-emptively tightening in response 
to the emerging equity price bubble reduces this variability.
Similar mechanisms play a pivotal role in models in which monetary policy 
is transmitted via credit channels, and where the financial accelerator plays 
a significant role. In these cases, an emerging financial market bubble leads 
to higher investment as, given the higher value of their collateral, firms find 35 The case for “Leaning against the wind”
it easier to borrow. More investment does stimulate aggregate demand and 
output in the short run, but in the end creates overcapacity and results in 
a sharp downturn. Even if average inflation is not affected significantly, the 
asset market bubble leads to higher output volatility. A central bank that reacts 
to the root cause of the instability - the asset price misalignment - will reduce 
the overall volatility in economic activity.
At an intuitive level, these arguments establish a prima facie case for taking 
asset price misalignments into account in the normal course of determining 
monetary policy, not only because they have an impact on expected inflation, 
but also because misalignments lead to unnecessarily large business cycle 
fluctuations. These conclusions were confirmed by the simulation results 
which we presented in CGLW (2000).
Of course, there are some alternative simulation results (e.g. Bernanke and 
Gertler (1991, 2001)) which have yielded different results. However, as we 
discuss in some detail in CGW (2002), as long as the central bank can and 
does distinguish between moves in asset prices that originate in that market 
versus other markets (e.g. productivity shocks), then we would stand by our 
original simulation results. Since, in any case, we do not believe that the 
central bank should lean against the wind if asset prices rise because of sound 
fundamental reasons, that is as it should be. 
It is also worth emphasising that, in any case, these simulation exercises 
probably underestimate the gains from LATW. First, these models do not allow 
for the possibility that if it were known ex ante that the central bank would 
take this into account, then this would likely reduce both the probability and 
the eventual size of any bubble. Indeed, arguably this may be an even more 
important effect of LATW than is incorporated in these simulation exercises, 
(see also Allen and Gale (2000) for a theoretical model which incorporates 
such an effect).
Second, asset price bubbles tend to produce distortions (e.g. overinvestment 
in the internet sector in 1999–2000, and in construction during the recent US 
house price bubble). These distortions may be costly over and above their 
effect on output and inflation volatility. Once again, the simulation exercises 
tend to ignore these additional social costs imposed by these distortions.
Notwithstanding the above arguments, LATW is opposed by many thoughtful 
and highly respected central bankers. In some cases they are willing to accept 
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grounds. Hence, for example, Bernanke (2002), who dubs a LATW policy 
as “bubble insurance”, argues that “…it is rarely the case in economics that 
the optimal amount of insurance in any situation is zero. On that principle, 
proponents of leaning against the bubble have argued that completely 
ignoring incipient potential bubbles, if in fact they can be identified, can’t 
possibly be the best policy…. I believe that, nevertheless, “leaning against 
the bubble” is unlikely to be productive in practice.” 
Therefore, it is to some of the “practical” objections to LATW that I turn to 
next.37
3.  Commonly advanced objections to LATW
3.1. Problems vis-à-vis Identifying a Bubble
Many central bankers and academics have argued that the difficulties associated 
with identifying a bubble makes LATW impractical
3. Typically, the argument 
is that central bankers have neither more information nor greater expertise in 
valuing a particular asset than private market participants. Moreover, there 
are concerns that if central bank judgements replace those of the market in 
valuing assets, financial market efficiency may be compromised.
I would not want to quarrel with the notion that it is difficult to identify 
bubbles. However, I do not believe that bubble identification is a problem that 
is unique to a LATW policy. It is also a problem for inflation forecast-targeting 
policy, and/or monetary policy that uses an interest rate reaction function that 
uses the output gap as an input. The absence/presence of a bubble can have 
a large effect on one’s inflation forecast, as I recall from my own experience of 
attempting to set monetary policy in 2000–2001 within the inflation targeting 
regime in the UK (as the equity price “bubble” was bursting). Specifically, 
it is very difficult to accurately forecast aggregate demand (e.g. because of 
wealth effects on consumption and overinvestment by the corporate sector 
because of bubbles in the equity or housing markets) without forming a view 
on whether there is a bubble, and one’s judgement on its likely persistence. 
Hence,  I do not see any significant difference between the informational 
requirements of any form of monetary policy rule that requires a reasonably 
accurate aggregate demand forecast, versus a LATW rule. The problems 
associated with bubble identification makes the setting of monetary policy 
difficult irrespective of whether or not one has a LATW bias.
Moreover, it is not immediately obvious to me that it is any easier to estimate 
the output gap than to identify bubbles. Indeed, any credible estimate of the 
prospective output gap depends, in any case, on bubble identification. Not 
only is the absence/presence of a bubble relevant to an aggregate demand 
forecast, but it also affects estimates of aggregate supply (as a bubble can 
affect corporate investment and observed productivity growth). In practice, 
Orphanides (1998) shows that over the period 1980–1992, the real time 
estimate of the output gap averaged –3.99%, while, by 1994, the revised 
3  Bernanke (2002), Gertler (1998) and Issing (1978)38 Commonly advanced objections to LATW
figures suggested an average output gap estimate of –1.64%. If one had 
inserted these output gap estimates mechanically into a Taylor rule, the 
implied difference in interest rates would have been over 100bp!
I wonder whether some of those who object to a LATW-tilt in monetary 
policy on the grounds that bubble identification is too difficult are really 
saying that they would rather carry out inflation forecast-targeting policy on 
the assumption that financial markets are efficient and there are no bubbles. 
Indeed, this predisposition to believe that financial markets are efficient 
on the part of some members was a frequent source of disagreement when 
I was a member of the MPC at the Bank of England. For example, when 
I joined the committee, it was conventional to project the exchange rate 
assuming uncovered interest parity, even though there was a large body of 
research documenting that this was likely to be a biased predictor (see e.g. 
Wadhwani (1999)). Similarly, in early 2000, at what proved to be the peak of 
the NASDAQ market, there was considerable resistance on the part of some 
colleagues to allow for the likelihood that corporate investment would be 
weak after the bubble burst.
It is also important to emphasise that, often, recognising a bubble does not 
necessarily require central bankers to have more information or any greater 
insight than some private sector financial market participants. During bubbles, 
it is not unusual for at least some private sector participants to be aware that 
the market is “overvalued”, but yet, to be unwilling or unable to bet against it. 
This relates to Keynes’ dictum that markets can remain irrational longer than 
an individual investor may remain solvent.
4 Of course, the central bank has 
significant institutional advantages over its private sector counterparts. The 
central bank is much less subject to short-termist performance pressures
However, in a stimulating and important paper, Gruen, Plumb and Stone 
(2005, GPS hereafter) come up with a sophisticated example of a situation 
where not knowing enough about the stochastic properties of a bubble can 
lead to a LATW tilt being sub-optimal relative to doing nothing. Essentially, 
the LATW policy-maker needs to worry about the countervailing influences. 
On the one hand, policy needs to be tighter than a fixed horizon inflation-
targeting benchmark to counter the expansionary effects of future expected 
growth in the bubble and to increase the probability that the bubble will burst. 
On the other hand, policy needs to be looser to prepare the economy for the 
possibility that the bubble may have burst by the time policy is having its 
4  See, e.g. Stein (2004) for a model where a bubble can persist even though everyone knows 
the bubble is there.39 Commonly advanced objections to LATW
impact on the economy. It is this latter effect that complicates the task of the 
policy maker who is attempting to use a LATW tilt. 
GPS contend that because the information requirements of following a policy 
with a LATW tilt may be so great (to make sure that one does not tighten 
policy when it might be the optimal policy to ease) that it might, indeed, be 
optimal under certain circumstances to be a policy “sceptic” and completely 
ignore the future possible path for the asset price bubble in setting policy). 
While GPS make an important and interesting point, we should note that, even 
within their own model, LATW is optimal in all scenarios if one, plausibly, 
believes that the distortions induced by a bubble imposes efficiency losses on 
the economy. Moreover, Haugh (2008) shows that the GPS result is special. If, 
instead one modifies their model a little in a more realistic direction (whereby 
the output gap depends on the size of the asset price bubble in addition to its 
growth rate), then, in general for asset prices changes that are sufficiently 
large, it is optimal to LATW. 
In general, I would not wish to imply that a LATW policy will not occasionally 
lead to the central bank tightening when it should have eased. However, 
such errors are inevitable in any process of setting policy under uncertainty. 
My own, strong presumption, based on my reading of the literature, is that 
a LATW policy will, on average, improve social welfare.
Given the frequency with which bubbles have occurred historically, it does 
seem unwise to ignore bubbles when setting monetary policy. Substituting 
monetary policy with a LATW tilt by going for inflation forecast-targeting 
assuming financial market efficiency is likely to lead to poor monetary 
policy.
3.2. The Difficulty of “Safe Popping”
Bernanke (2002) argues that “…my suspicion is that bubbles can normally be 
arrested only by an increase in interest rates sharp enough to materially slow 
the whole economy. In short, we cannot produce “safe popping”, at least not 
with the blunt tool of monetary policy.”
Greenspan (2007) has made a similar argument. However, I believe that 
this argument only applies to those that are actually using monetary policy 
to actively prick bubbles. As already discussed, this is not what a LATW-
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macroeconomic stability, not to pricking bubbles per se. Note that the 
degree of the “tilt” imparted to monetary policy is designed to optimise 
macroeconomic stability, and is most unlikely to involve creating a recession 
to prick a bubble. Recall that the simulation results in CGLW (2000) suggested 
that the LATW-tilt helped stabilise output and inflation relative to the no-tilt 
scenario even when monetary policy does not directly affect the bubble.
3.3. The Federal Reserve in the 1920s
Bernanke (2002), in discussing the 1920’s, argues “…that monetary policy 
tried over zealously to stop the rise in stock prices. But the main effect of the 
tight monetary policy….was to slow the economy……The slowing economy, 
together with rising interest rates, was in turn a major factor in precipitating 
the US stock market crash.” He, and others, have argued that this illustrates 
the dangers of bubble popping by a central bank.
However, Bernanke (2002) himself says that in early 1928, the “…Fed passed 
into the control of a coterie of aggressive bubble-poppers.” It is my belief 
that we would all agree that a LATW-tilt to monetary policy in an attempt to 
enhance macroeconomic stability is wholly different from aggressive bubble-
popping, and, therefore, the experience of the 1920’s in the US sheds little 
light on the optimality of a LATW-tilt.
3.4. Can one use a LATW tilt in a small, open economy?
An objection to a LATW tilt policy is that if an equity price misalignment is 
caused mainly by developments in financial markets elsewhere, then changes 
in monetary policy in a small, open economy will not be able to affect the 
level of equity prices significantly. However, this does not invalidate the 
use of a LATW tilt. Remember that one is not trying to target a particular 
level of share prices, but react to them. One can respond to the potentially 
destabilising effects of these equity price changes in the interests of improving 
macroeconomic stability regardless of what causes these misalignments.41
4.  Are we better off just mopping up after the bubble 
bursts?
Greenspan (1999) formally argued that is was important to focus on policies 
“to mitigate the fallout when it occurs and, hopefully, ease the transition to the 
next expansion.” Not only has the Federal Reserve explicitly followed such 
a policy, but many other central bankers (as, for example represented by Bean 
(2003) of the Bank of England) also appear to be sympathetic to this notion. 
However, relying purely on mopping up after the event is dangerous for 
a variety of reasons.
First, the inherent asymmetry of this policy seems to make it a rather 
dangerous strategy to pursue. If the Greenspan “risk management” approach 
implies doing nothing when asset prices rise alongside rapid credit expansion, 
but then reacting aggressively by cutting interest rates when asset prices fall, 
then some argue that this could contribute to moral hazard, excessive risk-
taking and possible damage to the credibility of the central bank (see, e.g. 
White (2006)). Kohn (2006) counters that the Federal Reserve has not been 
asymmetric, but that the shocks have been asymmetric. Of course, in these 
matters, perceptions trump reality. I would venture that the vast majority of 
financial market participants perceive the Fed to have been asymmetric and 
one imagines that this has affected their behaviour, and, thereby, reinforced 
the pro-cyclicality of the financial system.
It is perhaps no coincidence that some critics regard the Federal Reserve as 
having become a “serial bubble blower”.
A second difficulty with the Greenspan doctrine of mopping up after the 
event is that, thereby, the central bank misses the opportunity afforded by 
a LATW-tilt to monetary policy to reduce the size of the bubble by affecting 
expectations.
Third, and perhaps most importantly, the central bank may find itself unable 
to mop up and, hence, a deep and prolonged recession might occur after 
a bubble bursts. For example in Wadhwani (2007), I argued that it was not 
difficult to envisage circumstances where an external inflation shock might 
lead the MPC of the Bank of England to raise interest rates even as the house 42 Are we better off just mopping up after the bubble bursts?
price “bubble” unwound. This “nightmare scenario” is, alas, only too real at 
the moment. If we do now get a recession in the UK, a part of the blame for 
this must lie with the Bank of England for not being more willing to have 
a LATW-tilt while house prices were rising.
Another possible scenario that should worry those who rely on mopping up is 
the possibility that monetary policy becomes less effective once bank balance 
sheets are hurt. This appears to have played some role in the explaining the 
“lost decade” in Japan. Again, alas it is a feature of the current conjuncture, 
and were significant further shocks to hit bank balance sheets, we might yet 
find that central banks find it difficult to stimulate economies through interest 
rate cuts.
Hence, to summarise, I do not believe that the “conventional” wisdom of 
doing nothing as asset prices rise, but relying on “mopping up” after the 
bubble bursts is either a desirable or a reliable way of running monetary 
policy. If we are to reduce the likelihood of deep and prolonged recessions, 
we need to find a better way.43
5.  Can we just rely on an inflation targeting system?
Some authors (e.g. Bean (2003)) have argued that, in a flexible inflation 
targeting framework, if you look at the entire future path of expected inflation 
and growth, there is no independent role for asset prices.
Of course, as a purely theoretical proposition, we agree, and CGLW (2000) 
explicitly asserted this. Indeed CGW (2002) say “this paper is not about what 
the central bank objective should be. Instead, we concurred with how an 
inflation-targeting central bank can most efficiently fulfil its objectives.”
5.1. So what then is the controversy about?
The key issue in the debate, in my opinion, is that in practice much of interest 
rate setting is not driven by looking at inflation and growth forecasts at all 
horizons, but is based on rules of thumb. In particular, inflation targeting is 
usually based on inflation forecasts one to three years out, often with a focus 
on a fixed horizon such as two years. This can have the effect that asset price 
misalignments get an insufficient weight in policymaking. 
At the Geneva conference when we first presented our work in 2000, Ueda-
san argued that a Japanese central banker who was looking 10 years out 
would have been raising rates in 1987-88. But, given that the central bank was 
focused on inflation only one or two years out, it was more difficult to justify 
raising rates (see CGLW (2000), pp 111–12). 
This is why just lengthening the inflation forecast horizon from, say, 2 years 
to 3 years (as supposedly happened in the UK) is unlikely to be enough
5. 
We are simply proposing that, where the reaction function includes fixed-horizon 
inflation forecasts, it should also incorporate asset price misalignments. 
As we said in 2000:
5 I say “supposedly”, as in its May 2008 Inflation Report, the Bank of England published 
a 3-year-ahead inflation forecast which is below target, but did not explain why it had not led 
them to cut rates.44 Can we just rely on an inflation targeting system?
“A purist might argue that the central bank should really look at inflation 
forecasts at several (all) future time periods … such a policy might not be easy 
to implement … The proposal for incorporating asset price misalignments can 
be interpreted as an alternative way of allowing for considerations relating to 
longer time-horizons” (CGLW (2000) p 51). 
Hence, our view was simply that including asset price misalignments would 
help us to do better than existing rules of thumb. 
5.2. But why focus on Rules of Thumb?
There are those, like Bean (2003), who argue that improving on existing 
rules of thumb is not interesting or relevant. Instead, one should just use the 
theoretically “optimal” policy rule. Recall that, in this case, that might involve 
reacting to a 10-year-ahead inflation profile. My heart sinks at the thought of 
having to attempt to implement such a rule.
(1) Practical considerations. It is very time-consuming to agree on a two-
year profile for inflation, let alone going out many years into the future. 
Also many of the econometric models that underlie such forecasts perform 
particularly badly at longer horizons.
(2) It is what most central banks do in practice. Therefore, unsurprisingly, 
for most of the period I was on the Bank of England Monetary Policy 
Committee (MPC), the emphasis was on the two-year ahead horizon. This 
was reflected in the substantial time spent on deciding whether the inflation 
forecast was 2.4, 2.5 or 2.6% at the two-year-ahead horizon. Of course, 
towards the end of my term on the MPC, the relationship may have become 
a little less tight. But, even then, for the majority of members of the committee, 
the two-year-ahead point forecasts remained central.
(3) Ease of communication. Both internally and in terms of how policy 
is communicated to the public, simple rules are much easier to work with. 
In particular, if the inflation target is more easily understood, inflation 
expectations will be better anchored, providing crucial support to the success 
of monetary policy.
(4) Accountability. If the framework is vague, it is difficult to make the 
central bank accountable.45 Can we just rely on an inflation targeting system?
5.3. Avoiding Bubbles
Bean (2003) asserts that:
“… the design of monetary policy does not require a change in the formal 
structure of inflation targets” (p 18).
I wonder. 
A clear and explicitly enunciated role for asset prices in the inflation targeting 
framework has the advantage that bubbles will be discouraged. Having 
a transparent reaction function consisting of the two-year-ahead inflation 
forecast plus an asset price misalignment adjustment could potentially make 
bubbles less likely to occur.
As already discussed above, one key point is that the simulation work in 
the literature significantly understates the benefits of including asset price 
misalignments in the reaction function. It doesn’t allow for the Kent-Lowe 
(1997)/Allen-Gale (2000) effect – i.e. the impact that the central bank can have 
on the probability of the bubble growing, by signalling that it will respond.
Over the years, several current and former members of the MPC at the Bank 
of England have expressed scepticism about a LATW tilt to monetary policy. 
In the absence of the MPC unanimously agreeing to a LATW tilt, and it being 
clearly understood by the wider public that policy would react to a growing 
bubble, one is unlikely to see the benefits of such a policy. Note that the remit 
already requires that the MPC look at potential inflation deviations from target 
“at all times”, but the committee has chosen to interpret this, as something 
closer to fixed horizon inflation-targeting. This is a pity. If we are to make 
our financial framework less- procyclical, it is important that the MPC, at 
a minimum, explicitly say that they will look at asset price misalignments in 
addition to a fixed horizon inflation target. The Government must ensure that 
the MPC do so, because this clarification of the remit would make what the 
MPC actually does closer to what the remit already says it should do. It would 
be easy to do so through, say, a letter from the Chancellor to the MPC.
Of course, as a political matter, having a consumer price index measure in 
which the prices of houses played an important role would have gone some 
way towards imparting a LATW tilt to monetary policy.46 Can we just rely on an inflation targeting system?
While I believe that the measure of inflation chosen to target should ultimately 
be the measure that is conceptually most appropriate, this may have been 
a pragmatic way of, at least, getting the MPC to focus a bit more on a proxy for 
asset price misalignments. In that regard, it is a pity that the UK switched from 
the RPI-X measure to the current HICP measure, that excludes housing costs.
5.4. Lack of Clarity of the current UK Framework
While the current UK framework has many advantages, there is a lack of 
clarity on asset prices and imbalances. The “flexibility” of the framework in 
this area has meant that MPC members have, in the last two to three years, 
had a whole host of views on how they should react to the imbalances. This 
has therefore been confusing to the public.
In particular, some members have reacted differently to the exchange rate 
“misalignment” and the house price/consumption “misalignment”. According 
to our suggested rule of thumb:
(1)   Since unsustainable house price growth could lead to a crash and very 
low inflation three to four years out, interest rates should initially have 
been higher than warranted by the two-year-ahead forecast to prevent 
a build-up of debt and house prices.
(2)    But, acting in the opposite direction, since the exchange rate was higher 
than warranted, interest rates should have initially been set lower than 
otherwise. This would have helped keep the exchange rate lower, thereby 
reducing the size of its eventual crash.
However, some members did not apply this same logic to both misalignments. 
The same members argued for higher interest rates because of the housing 
market, in line with our proposed rule of thumb. But, at the same time, these 
members argued that the strength of sterling also argued for higher interest 
rates. The reasoning was that this meant there was a risk of future exchange 
rate falls, stimulating inflation at some uncertain point.
Therefore, so-called flexible inflation targeting allows people to be inconsistent 
in their treatment of misalignments in different asset markets. It would be 
much better to have a transparent and consistent rule of thumb in that case.47
6.  Can LATW work in Practice? The Swedish Case
There are those who argue that a LATW-style monetary policy is not feasible
6 
Yet, it would appear that Sweden does offer us a modern-day example of 
where policy with a LATW tilt has been used.
Lars Heikensten, the former governor of the Riksbank recently wrote: “With 
house prices increasing drastically…On a few occasions in 2004–05 the 
Riksbank did for that reason not follow a strict inflation-targeting rule. We 
“leaned against the wind”, in the sense that we did not take rates down as 
quickly as we could have done considering the outlook for inflation alone….
We explicitly referred to asset prices in our published minutes, press releases 
and speeches…” (Heikensten (2008))
Of course, Heikensten openly acknowledges that LATW is not enough, and 
that, perhaps, more should have also been done with respect to better and more 
effective regulation or fiscal policy. It is also my belief that LATW monetary 
policy should be a part of a broader counter-cyclical financial framework. 
One does not want to overburden monetary policy and regulatory policy also 
needs to play a role. It is to this that we turn out attention next.
6 Greenspan is quoted in the Financial Times, May 27, 2008 as saying that he would be 
“fully supportive” of “leaning against the wind” with interest rates when asset prices are rising if 
someone could provide a credible framework for doing so. He is quoted as saying “I have just not 
seen any evidence that it is feasible”.48
7.  Potential Changes to the Regulatory Framework
As discussed above, monetary policy has been perceived as asymmetric. 
White (2006) reminds us that the same has been true of our regulatory 
framework. A safety net is provided by features such as deposit insurance, 
a Lender of Last Resort function and the “too big to fail” doctrine. However, 
heretofore, the regulatory framework does not require that more capital 
is built up in good times. Specifically, Goodhart and Persaud (2008) have 
suggested that Basel II capital adequacy requirements be modified by a ratio 
linked to the “excessive” growth of the value of bank assets. This proposal 
seems to deserve further study.
There are also other sensible things that need to be investigated. In a UK context, 
one did not have to have a Ph.D in Economics to realise that a loan-to-value ratio 
of 125% might lead to difficulties, but our regulatory framework did nothing 
about it. Cecchetti (2006) argued that maximum loan-to-value ratios might have 
been considered, and also raises the possibility of using the tax system.
Having said that, in the current political atmosphere, it would not be difficult 
to see the “wrong” type of regulatory charges being implemented. Specifically, 
one might either see either harmful or ineffectual changes being proposed. 
The Assistant Secretary for Financial Institutions, David Nason, is quoted in the 
Financial Times (April 30, 2008) as saying that the US central bank should use 
its proposed new powers as a stability regulator to force institutions to change 
their investment strategy if it is judged they threatened the wider economy. 
Even assuming that this was feasible, it is far from obvious that it would be 
socially desirable. It is also obviously important that we contemplate regulatory 
reforms that will make a difference. There might be a lot that is inappropriate 
about the compensation packages of the financial sector, but it is not obvious 
that changes in their remuneration structure would have made a significant 
difference e.g. whatever went wrong at Bear Stearns was not because the 
employees and shareholders did not know that they had plenty to lose. 
In any case, these changes in the regulatory framework are to prevent a future 
build up of imbalances and the next crisis. In the here and now, we need to 
ensure that appropriate monetary, liquidity and regulatory policies are put 
in place in an attempt to protect the real economy from the downside risks 
associated with the current credit crisis.49
8.  Appropriate Policy after a Bubble bursts
We discussed in section IV above that aggressive interest rate cuts after 
a bubble bursts may create an unfortunate asymmetry (if one does not LATW 
when asset prices rise), and this may sow the seeds of the next crisis.
However, irrespective of whether one did LATW on the upside, once a bubble 
bursts, the lessons of history (e.g. see the discussion of monetary policy in the 
US after the 1929 crash, and in Japan after their 1989–90 fall in share prices 
in CGLW (2002)) are that aggressive interest rate cuts are desirable in order 
to reduce the probability of a long-lived recession.
As already noted, it is an unfortunate feature of the current conjuncture that 
the simultaneous rise in oil and food prices has made several central banks 
less willing to reduce interest rates.
In CGW (2000), after having analysed previous historical experiences, we 
concluded that
“….at very high frequencies, liquidity needs to be provided to ensure orderly 
markets….. it is very important to ensure that, when it (bubble) bursts, the 
damage does not wipe out the financial intermediation system.”
These lessons seem to have been well absorbed by authorities in the US and 
Europe.
Unfortunately for a while last year, it was not immediately obvious that these 
lessons had been taken on board by the UK authorities. For example, after the 
August 9, 2007 shock, the Bank of England allowed the overnight rate to stay 
well above the interest rate set by the MPC for a significant time period. This 
can be dangerous, and it may well have contributed to the well-publicised 
difficulties of the time. Once a bubble bursts it is imperative that one does 
not spend all one’s time worrying about “moral hazard” – it is much more 
important to deal with the crisis at hand, and turn one’s attention to improving 
institutional design at a later stage. Of course, inappropriate liquidity and 
LOLR policies in a crisis can carry significant downside risks for the economy 
and can then place an inappropriate burden on monetary policy. Fortunately, 
subsequent events might suggest that better sense has now prevailed, and we 
sincerely hope that this remains true as this crisis unfolds.50
9. Conclusions
I hope that I have persuaded you today of the theoretical and empirical case 
for considering a LATW tilt to the way we run monetary policy. I expect this 
to enhance macroeconomic stability and reduce microeconomic distortions. 
Carrying out such a policy is entirely feasible. Of course, it would be highly 
desirable if such improvements in monetary policy-making were also 
accompanied by other changes in the regulatory framework that made our 
financial system less pro-cyclical.51
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In order to protect investors of collective investment schemes the regulation 
in force at European and national level provides for asset allocation risk-
spreading rules. In case of harmonised fund, the European directive 85/611
2, 
as amended by directive EU/108/2001, set prudential rules in order to limit 
risk exposure. Moreover, fund management companies investing in financial 
derivatives, are required to employ a risk-management process which enables 
it to monitor and measure at any time the risk of the positions and their 
contribution to the overall risk profile of the portfolio.
Starting from the empirical evidence of the Italian market, this paper aims at 
addressing three main issues: 
1 This paper was written when the author worked at the Banca d'Italia in the Supervision 
Department on Financial Intermediaries. The author thanks Luca Zucchelli, Michele Carofiglio, 
Aldo Stanziale and Pasquale La Ganga for helpful comments, but retains full responsibility 
for all errors. The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not involve the 
responsibility of Banca d’Italia.
2 The 1985 UCITS Directive (85/611/EEC) introduced a passport for the investment funds 
harmonised by the Directive. The passport is based on mutual recognition. It allows the units of 
a UCITS authorised in its home Member State to be marketed in other Member States without 
seeking authorisation in those host States, provided that the notification requirements are 
fulfilled.56 Introduction
1.    Do regulatory investment and borrowing restrictions capture the portfolio 
overall risk profile?
2.    Is the regulation in force really effective in protecting retail investors? 
3.    Which alternative approach could be adopted? 
Data analysis carried out in the paper prove that funds, subject to the same 
risk spreading rules, having similar investment policies can differ significantly 
in terms of risk. To this end, a cluster analysis of Italian mutual funds is 
conducted in order to aggregate funds according to their risk profile. 
The findings tend to confirm that “long only” harmonised mutual funds have 
– on average – a greater exposure to risks than alternative investments (such 
as hedge funds) subject to less regulatory burdens.
The market evidence suggests that associating the fund’s risk profile to 
portfolio composition can be misleading: on one hand, the volatility of the 
same asset class is not constant but changes over time; on the other, portfolio 
exposure to the same risk factors can be modified by means of investment 
decisions.
A retail investor could prefer to have a well defined risk exposure with 
a flexible asset allocation instead of a rigid asset allocation with a changing 
risk profile. The analysis intends to verify if it could be more convenient to set 
regulatory limits in terms of risk budgeting rather than in terms of portfolio 
constraints. If this is the case, we could consider a complementary approach 
to regulation, moving from an asset allocation perspective to a risk budgeting 
one, focused mainly on the risk-return profile of managed products.
The paper intends to provide a general framework starting from which further 
discussions about a risk-based approach to regulation of collective investment 
schemes may be developed. 
This paper has three substantive sections: section 1 describes how European 
regulation addresses risk of collective investment schemes; Section 2 
illustrates the main findings of the cluster analysis along with the outcomes 
of a comparative examination of Italian mutual funds’ returns with respect 
to financial markets and hedge funds indices; Section 3 explores the risk 
budgeting approach, considering its pros and cons.57
2.  European regulatory approach on matter of risk
2.1. Investors' risk perception
In recent years, risk perception by investors has greatly increased due to 
financial scandals and market turbulences.
The understanding of the risk-return profile of financial products is crucial 
for all sectors of financial intermediation. According to theory, informed 
investors can make better financial decisions and thus be able to attain a better 
risk-return combination and higher than average final wealth. But acquiring 
financial information is costly, either because it may entail monetary costs or 
because it is time intensive.
Since their creation, mutual funds
3 have been a popular investment vehicle 
for investors. Their simplicity along with other attributes provides great 
benefit to investors with limited knowledge, time, or money. For retail 
investors
4 mutual funds offer significant advantages. Instead of picking 
stocks or bonds one at a time, they can invest in a collection of them designed 
to match investment goals. Asset managers pool investors’ money and 
assemble portfolios designed to achieve specific investment objectives, which 
are spelled out in the fund’s prospectus. 
3  Mutual funds are investment vehicles, created with the sole purpose of gathering resources 
from investors to be invested in a diversified pool of assets. Investors buy securities issued by the 
fund against the underlying assets, and the value of those securities fluctuates with the value of the 
underlying assets. In this way, small investors can buy exposure to a professionally managed and 
diversified basket of financial assets. Overheads are spread over the pool of investors, reducing 
average cost for the investor. By law, a fund must buy back its shares when investor wants to sell 
them. The price at which fund shares are bought and sold is based on the fund’s net asset value, 
or NAV, which is the market value of the fund’s holdings, minus management expenses and taxes, 
divided by the number of fund shares outstanding.
4 The term “retail investor” is referred to an individual who buys and sells securities for 
his personal account, and not for a company or an organization. Similar terms are “individual 
investor” or “small investor”.58 European regulatory approach on matter of risk
Unfortunately, all funds carry some level of risk
5. Investors may lose some or 
all of the money invested because the securities decrease in value. Dividend 
or interest payments may also fluctuate as market conditions change. 
European regulation of collective investment schemes is intentionally 
designed to protect retail investors. In the long walk to achieve this goal, 
there has been a relevant progress in the refinement of rules in order to make 
them more sensitive to risk factors. To this end, three key elements have been 
taken into account by European regulators: 1) the risk limitation rules that 
all harmonised funds have to comply with in order to ensure liquidity and 
risk diversification; 2) the list of assets which are eligible for investment; 3) 
information about risk to be given to investors. Hereinafter the main steps of 
this process are summarised. 
2.2. Risk limitation rules
In order to protect investors of collective investment schemes the regulation 
in force at European and national level provides for asset allocation risk-
spreading rules. In the case of harmonised funds, the Council Directive 
85/611/EEC of 20 December 1985 on the coordination of laws, regulations and 
administrative provisions relating to undertakings for collective investment in 
transferable securities (UCITS), as amended by Directive 2001/108/EC, set 
prudential rules in order to limit:
•   concentration by UCITS in investments which expose them to counterparty 
risk to the same entity or to entities belonging to the same group;
•   the investments in non-listed securities;
•   the recourse to leverage;
•   the maximum potential exposure relating to derivative instruments so that 
it does not exceed the total net value of the UCITS’s portfolio;
•   the risk exposure to a counterparty of the UCITS in an OTC derivative 
transaction.
As underlined by the European  Commission Recommendation of 
27 April 2004 on the use of financial derivative instruments for UCITS, one 
5  In this paper we refer primarily to market risk as key risk category for investors. In case of 
mutual funds other risks (such as operational risk) need to be considered in order to assess their 
overall risk profile; on this matter specific considerations are developed in Section IV.59 European regulatory approach on matter of risk
of the aims of the amendments introduced by Directive 2001/108/EC
6, was 
to ensure investor protection. Directive 85/611/EEC, as amended, therefore 
establishes an extensive system of risk-limitation. In order to ensure that 
the risks related to the new classes of financial instruments, in particular 
regarding derivatives, are duly and accurately monitored, measured and 
managed, management companies or investment companies are required 
to apply sound risk measurement processes under the supervision of the 
competent authorities. 
The Recommendation is intended as a first step towards a uniform 
understanding of risk measurement methodologies in the UCITS area to 
ensure an equivalent and effective protection of investors throughout the 
Community and level the playing field for UCITS operators and products 
regulated under different jurisdictions.
According to the European Commission, the total exposure of a UCITS needs 
to be assessed on the basis of both default risk of the UCITS and leverage 
produced by the use of financial derivative instruments. It should therefore be 
ensured that the market risk of a UCITS is adequately measured, and possible 
approaches of market risk measurement are being investigated, by clarifying 
the conditions for the use of two different methodologies: the commitment 
approach; the Value-at-risk approach (VAR approach) and stress tests in case 
of sophisticated UCITS.
Member States are recommended to ensure that management or investment 
companies employ risk measurement systems which are adapted to the 
relevant risk-profile of a UCITS in order to make sure that they accurately 
measure all material risks related to the UCITS under the supervision of the 
competent authorities
7.
6 Directive 2001/108/EC, “the product directive” (along with Directive 2001/107/EC, “the 
profession directive”) is commonly referred to as “UCITS III Directive”.
7 The Recommendation proposes some harmonised interpretation of limitations to the 
UCITS’ risk- exposure to derivatives, as follows:
•  limitation to a UCITS’ global exposure on derivatives and overall risk exposure. Member 
States are recommended to ensure that the global exposure relating to financial derivative 
instruments may not exceed 100 % of the UCITS’ net asset value (NAV), and hence that the 
UCITS’ overall risk exposure may not exceed 200 % of the NAV on a permanent basis.
•  Limitation to possible temporary borrowing. Member States are recommended to ensure 
that the UCITS’ overall risk exposure may not be increased by more than 10 % by means of 
temporary borrowing, so that the UCITS’ overall risk exposure may not exceed 210 % of the NAV 
under any circumstances.60 European regulatory approach on matter of risk
To this end, the Recommendation distinguishes between “non-sophisticated 
UCITS”, which have overall less and simpler derivative positions by 
using e.g. a few plain vanilla options, and “sophisticated UCITS”; for this 
two categories of funds the methodological approach in measuring risk is 
differentiated
8.
To date, only Luxembourg, France, Germany and Ireland have defined the 
concept of sophisticated versus non-sophisticated UCITS
9.
Considering that these risk-measurement methodologies need further 
refinement, the European Commission encourages Member States and 
National Authorities to undertake further work with a view to elaborating 
more advanced methods of risk-measurement and thus develop a convergent 
Community-wide approach. This concerns in particular:
•   the criteria to identify sophisticated and non-sophisticated UCITS;
•   the conversion of financial derivative instruments into equivalent underlying 
assets and the netting of positions underlying the financial derivative 
instruments in case of the application of the commitment approach;
•   best practices in the area of VAR and stress tests;
•   the standards which internal models must meet in order to be used by 
UCITS.
2.3. Definition of eligible assets
Tightly connected to the definition of investment limits is the definition of the 
eligible assets in which a harmonised fund can invest. Financial innovation 
makes much more difficult for regulators to trace the perimeter of the universe 
of assets in which harmonised funds can invest; the variety of financial 
instruments traded on financial markets has increased considerably, leading 
8 In the case of “sophisticated UCITS”, Member States are recommended to require 
management or investment companies to apply regularly VAR approaches. In the VAR 
approaches, the maximum potential loss that a UCITS portfolio could suffer within a certain time 
horizon and a certain degree of confidence is estimated. Member States are recommended to 
require management or investment companies also to apply stress tests in order to help manage → 
risks related to possible abnormal market movements. Stress tests measure how extreme financial 
or economic events affect the value of the portfolio at a specific point of time. The Commission 
invites Member States to consider, as a possible reference the following parameters: a 99 % 
confidence interval, a holding period of one month and ‘recent’ volatilities, i.e. no more than one 
year from the calculation date without prejudice to further testing by the competent authorities.
9  European Commission – DG Internal Market - PricewaterhouseCoopers (2008).61 European regulatory approach on matter of risk
to uncertainty in determining whether certain categories of instruments are 
encompassed by Directive 85/611/EEC. 
New investable asset can influence significantly the funds overall risk 
profile: therefore it is crucial to determine if the asset is coherent with the 
fund’s investment strategy and fund rules. 
Uncertainty in applying the definitions gives rise to divergent interpretations 
of the Directive. In order to ensure a uniform application, the European 
Commission issued Directive 2007/16/EC of 19 March 2007 to develop 
a common understanding as to whether a given asset category is eligible for 
a UCITS. 
This Directive, along with CESR’s
10 guidelines (Ref. CESR/07-044), to be 
brought into effect by Members States by March 2008, clarifies which assets 
are eligible, comprising credit derivatives, closed end funds, financial indices 
– included hedge funds indices
11 – and which conditions have to be fulfilled.
2.4. Disclosure obligations on risk profile
From investors’ point of view, it is essential to receive adequate information 
on the basic characteristics of financial products and the risks and costs 
associated with investing in such products so that they can decide what best 
suit their needs. Adequate disclosure enables investors to take an investment 
decision on a properly informed basis and to compare among products. 
The UCITS Directive (Section VI) tried to achieve this goal through the 
introduction of the simplified prospectus (SP). The SP contains, in summary 
form, key information about the UCITS. It must be offered to investors free 
of charge before the conclusion of the contract. 
However, the SP, as currently implemented, has proven not to be a useful 
tool to guide investors’ investment decisions. In most cases, the document 
is too long and not understood by its intended readers. Member States 
have implemented the SP in different ways and some established additional 
10 CESR is an independent Committee of European Securities Regulators established under 
the terms of the European Commission’s Decision of 6 June 2001. In summary, the role of CESR 
is to improve co-ordination among securities regulators; act as an advisory group to assist the 
EU Commission and work to ensure more consistent and timely day-to-day implementation of 
community legislation in the Member States.
11 For further details see CESR’s guidelines concerning eligible assets for investment by 
UCITS. The classification of hedge fund indices as financial indices. July 2007; ref: CESR/07-43462 European regulatory approach on matter of risk
stringent national requirements. The outcome is a document of limited value 
to the investors and a considerable overhead for the fund industry.
In matter of risk, the simplified prospectus tends to be useless attended that 
it adopts standardised risk descriptions which do not really discriminate 
funds having the same eligible assets. And even in case of funds having 
different investment strategies, the ambiguity is not overcome because of the 
overlapping among risk categories and the absence of any indication of which 
risks are more relevant for each fund. In Table 1 the risk description of three 
harmonised open-ended funds managed by one of the major European asset 
management company is reported (extract from the Simplified Prospectus).63 European regulatory approach on matter of risk
Table 1 – Example of risk description
Type of fund Fixed Income Balanced Equity
Investment
Strategy
The Fund will invest 
primarily in fixed 
income debt securities 
of U.S. or non-U.S. 
issuers that, in the 
judgement of the 
Investment Manager, 
offer the highest yield 
available without 
excessive risk at the 
time of the purchase.
The Fund normally 
will be invested 
in fixed income 
debt securities with 
investment grade or 
lower grade ratings, if 
issued by U.S. issuers, 
or, if issued by non-
U.S. issuers or unrated, 
their equivalent.
The Fund may also, 
temporarily and/
or on an ancillary 
basis, seek investment 
opportunities in 
any other types of 
securities. The Fund 
may invest up to 10% 
of its assets in credit-
linked securities. The 
Fund may also invest 
up to 10% of its total 
assets in securities in 
default.
The Fund will invest 
in a diversified 
portfolio of debt 
and equity securities 
worldwide. The Fund 
seeks income by 
investing in a portfolio 
of fixed and floating 
rate debt securities 
and debt obligations 
of governments, 
government-related 
or corporate issuers 
worldwide including 
emerging markets, 




yields. In particular, 
the Fund may purchase 
debt obligations 
issued by governments 
and supranational 
entities organized and 
supported by several 
national governments. 
The Fund may invest 
in investment grade 
and non-investment 
grade debt securities 
issued by U.S. and 
non-U.S. issuers 
including securities in 
default.
The Fund will invest 
primarily in U.S. 
equity securities, 
including common and 
preferred stocks, or 
securities
convertible into 
common stocks, as 
well as American 
Depository Receipts 
and American 
Depository Shares that 
are listed on the major 
U.S. stock exchanges.
On an ancillary basis, 
the Fund may employ 
hedging techniques 
and hold cash reserves 
from time to time.64 European regulatory approach on matter of risk
Type of fund Fixed Income Balanced Equity
Risk
description
•      Credit  risk
•    Credit-Linked 
Securities risk
•   Defaulted  Debt 
Securities risk
•   Derivative 
instruments risk
•   Foreign  Currency 
risk
•   Interest  Rate 
Securities risk
•    Low-Rated or Non-
Investment Grade 
Securities risk
•   Credit  Risk
•   Defaulted  Debt 
Securities risk
•   Emerging  Market 
Risk
•   Equity  risk
•   Foreign  Currency 
risk
•   Interest  Rate 
Securities risk
•    Low-Rated or Non-
Investment Grade 
Securities risk
•   Credit  risk
•   Derivative  risk
•   Equity  risk
•   Interest  Rate 
Securities risk
•    Low-Rated and Non-
Investment Grade 
Securities risk
European regulators are aware that the concept of “simplified prospectus” 
should be replaced by a new concept of “key investor information” to be 
drawn up by the investment company, or in case of unit trust or common 
funds, the management company and to be provided to investors (either 
directly by the fund manager or through the relevant intermediaries) prior to 
the subscription of units in a UCITS by investors.
CESR published in February 2008 its advice to the European Commission on 
‘the content and form of Key Information Document disclosures for UCITS’ 
(Ref. CESR/08-087), known as the KID, which should contain only the 
essential elements for making and carrying out investment decisions, which 
excludes information serving only legal or regulatory requirements.
The description of risk factors and presentation of the relationship between 
risk and reward is a particularly difficult issue. CESR recommends testing 
two high-level approaches – one which is based on a purely narrative 
description of risks (a qualitative assessment), and one which uses a synthetic 
indicator to evaluate the level of risk that investment in the fund would 
represent (a quantitative assessment). There has been support from consumer 
representatives for the use of a synthetic indicator
12.
12 According to CESR the use of synthetic risk indicators has already been endorsed by 
the regulators of some European countries, or adopted by individual firms, using a variety of 
methodologies and presentational formats. There are a number of complex issues that would 
have to be resolved in relation to developing a methodology and presenting the results, including 
whether it could capture all relevant risks and whether it may be unsuitable for certain types 
of fund. CESR does not propose to recommend a particular methodology at this stage, but has 
included a set of possible criteria for the assessment of methodologies. These might then be used 65 European regulatory approach on matter of risk
CESR considers that even though no preferred methodology has yet been 
identified, it is still possible, and indeed necessary, to test whether a synthetic 
indicator, despite its possible limitations, is likely to improve investors’ 
perception of risk and reward. Further work on methodological issues and 
the use of structured fund scenarios, involving industry practitioners and 
other stakeholders, can proceed in parallel with the first phase of consumer 
testing.
2.5. Conclusion
European Directives address risk by means of investment and borrowing 
restrictions in order to ensure a minimum level of diversification of 
fund’s holdings, a maximum level of leverage and a maximum exposure to 
financial derivatives. To some extent, regulation tends to mitigate specific 
risk
13 by means of issuers diversification.
As a matter of fact, UCITS regulation provides for an extensive grid of 
investment limits and an exhaustive list of eligible assets: in this paper we 
define this approach to regulation, based on portfolio constraints, as “asset 
allocation approach”.
Despite its level of detail, UCITS III has not prevented from differences in the 
legal framework governing funds across European Member States. The main 
divergences are observed with reference to the use of derivatives, the eligible 
to identify or develop a common methodology at European level, to be built either by regulators 
or by industry participants.→
Any synthetic indicator would require appropriate explanatory text, addressing such points 
as what the indicator means, why the fund has been classified in that category, and what its 
limitations are (e.g. not a guarantee, may not hold true in adverse market conditions). Such text 
could also indicate in broad terms the connection between risk and reward. For the purpose of 
consumer testing, CESR suggests using generic wording that refers to the typical features and 
limitations of a volatility-based measure. CESR suggests that a presentation based on a numeric 
scale (e.g. from 1 to 5) should be tested against other possibilities (words such as “high risk” or 
“low risk”, or graphics / icons). Alternatively, if the indicator cannot be adapted to a particular 
fund the KID should explain this. Special considerations might apply to structured funds, where 
the use of prospective scenarios or tables might help investors to understand potential outcomes. 
CESR suggests testing an example scenario or table with consumers, although further work is 
needed to refine the proposal.
13 For both equity and debt securities, risk can be ideally divided into two components: 
specific risk and generic (or systematic) risk. Specific risk depends on the characteristics of the 
issuer and can be substantially reduced by investors spreading their investments over securities 
issued by different issuers (portfolio diversification), whereas systematic risk represents the 
portion of the variability in the price of a security that depends on the fluctuations of the market 
and cannot be eliminated through diversification. 66 European regulatory approach on matter of risk
counterparties and the valuation rules for OTC derivatives. Those differences 
are significant enough to demonstrate that the harmonization of supervision 
for UCITS is not yet complete
14.
Concerning UCITS disclosure, European regulators are aware of its importance 
for retail investors provided that only information on risk-return profile 
can help them make informed judgements on risk and compare products 
effectively. 
Nevertheless, the simplified prospectus has proven its inefficiency in ensuring 
a proper risk perception by investors. Moreover, no agreement has been yet 
reached about the synthetic risk indicator to be used in the KID nor, in case 
of quantitative measure, which is the best one.
* * *
In order to verify if an “asset allocation approach” induces an effective 
discrimination of funds’ risk profile, we assume that open-ended funds subject 
to the same risk spreading rules and characterised by the same investment 
policy should have the same, or at least, similar, risk profile.
In the following section this assumption is tested through a cluster analysis 
carried out on a sample of Italian harmonised funds.
14  European Commission – DG Internal Market - PriceWaterhouseCopeers (2008)67
3. Cluster  analysis
In order to assess if an asset allocation approach allows an effective 
discrimination of mutual funds’ risk profile we carried out a cluster analysis
15 
using time series of past daily returns
16 of 368 Italian open-ended mutual 
funds operative between December 1997 and December 2007 (i.e. 2,601 
observations for each fund).
Our aim is to verify if a classification of funds based on portfolio holdings 
is consistent with a classification based on risk
17. As a matter of fact, if the 
clusters obtained with the first method matches with the second, all relevant 
information about risk are reflected by asset allocation of each fund. As 
a consequence, investors could assume well informed investment decisions 
based on offering documents where information about asset allocation and 
regulatory investment and borrowing restrictions are spelled out.
If this is not the case, further considerations should be made about the 
regulation approach of collective investment schemes.
3.1. First step: portfolio composition classification
In Italy, as well as in other European countries, the national association of mutual 
funds managers (Assogestioni) keeps and publishes its own classification, 
which is based on the periodical screening of funds portfolio holdings.
15 Cluster analysis, also called “segmentation analysis” or “taxonomy analysis”, creates 
groups, or clusters, of data. Clusters are formed in such a way that objects in the same cluster are 
very similar and objects in different clusters are very distinct.
16 For each open-ended Italian mutual fund Banca d’Italia calculates – on a daily basis – an 
index whose value reflects the unit price (equal to the net asset value divided by the number of 
issued units) and the dividends paid to the units holders (if any). More formally, let I be the index 
referred to fund “i” at day “t” with unit price equal to Quote, paying dividends “Div”, then:
Index (fi,t)=[(Quote (fi,t)+Div (fi,t))/Quote (fi, t–1)]*Index (fi,t–1)
For new funds the first value of the index is set equal to 100. 
The daily total return has been calculated as a log return Î ln[Index(fi,t)/ Index (fi,t–1)]
17  A cluster analysis of Italian open-ended funds has been conducted also by Pattarin, Paterlini 
and Minerva (2004) who propose a classification algorithm for mutual funds style analysis, based 
on the time series of past returns to identify clusters of funds characterized by the same style. 
The classification procedure is applied to a data set of 186 equity funds that were present in the 
Italian market between 1996 and 2000, for which the end of period classification by investment 
objectives is known. The clustering method proposed may be used as a low-cost tool to monitor 
managers’ investment behaviour.68 Cluster analysis
Assogestioni’s ranking model
18 is conceived as an orientation tool for retail 
investor within the variegated offer of management products and services. 
The declared principal objective of this raking model is to allow the saver 
to identify in immediate and effective way the most important risk factors 
that characterize the investment policies of mutual funds. According to 
Assogestioni, the link of the classification proposed with well known risk 
indicators represents for the saver an incentive to take into account the 
binomial risk-return and a clear invitation to deepen the knowledge of the 
product through the careful reading of the offering documentation (prospectus 
and fund rules).
A third characteristic that defines Assogestioni’s ranking model is represented 
by a rigorous set of rules according to which Italian funds are classified in 
different classes. Each of Assogestioni’s classes is defined by specific asset 
allocation limits that must be satisfied by any fund belonging to it. In order 
to prevent opportunistic behaviours, asset managers declare the class they 
want their fund to be attributed to, thus committing themselves not to violate 
the stated asset allocation limits; Assogestioni periodically checks if these 
are met by querying managers about their portfolio holdings. In the case of 
this being violated, the manager is compelled to rebalance his portfolio or 
to choose a different class for the fund; if the manager defaults, mandatory 
reclassification is undertaken by Assogestioni itself. In our sample, we have 
368 funds belonging to 29 classes by investment allocation (Table 2)
18 For a complete description of Assogestioni ranking model see “Classification Guide” 
available on www.assogestioni.it. 69 Cluster analysis
Table 2 – Number of funds for each of Assogestioni’s class




BALANCED EQUITY  4
BOND FUNDS – DOLLAR GOVERNMENT MEDIUM/LONG TERM 9
BOND FUNDS – DOLLAR GOVERNMENT SHORT TERM  1
BOND FUNDS – EMERGING MARKETS  6
BOND FUNDS – EURO CORPORATE INVESTMENT GRADE 2
BOND FUNDS – EURO GOVERNMENT MEDIUM/LONG TERM  31
BOND FUNDS – EURO GOVERNMENT SHORT TERM 33
BOND FUNDS – FLEXIBLE 4
BOND FUNDS – INTERNATIONAL GOVERNMENT  26
BOND FUNDS – MIXED 18
BOND FUNDS – OTHER SPECIALIZATIONS 12
EQUITY FUNDS – AMERICA 23
EQUITY FUNDS – COMSUMER GOODS 1
EQUITY FUNDS – EMERGING MARKETS 8
EQUITY FUNDS – EURO AREA 6
EQUITY FUNDS – EUROPE 25
EQUITY FUNDS – FINANCE 2
EQUITY FUNDS – HEALTH 4
EQUITY FUNDS – INTERNATIONAL 24
EQUITY FUNDS – ITALY  32
EQUITY FUNDS – MEDIA  2
EQUITY FUNDS – OTHER SECTORS 2
EQUITY FUNDS – OTHER SPECIALIZATIONS 1
EQUITY FUNDS – PACIFIC  24
EQUITY FUNDS – TECHNOLOGY  2
FLEXIBLE 12
MONEY MARKET FUNDS – EURO AREA  19
TOTAL 36870 Cluster analysis
3.2. Second step: risk profile classification
Risk analysis is carried out assuming a retrospective viewpoint. As an 
investor, we are interested in how different has been funds’ risk profile 
looking backwards at past returns. Our view is therefore completely different 
from an active asset manager
19 who needs to define a risk policy for each 
managed portfolio. The differences are summarised in Table 3.
Table 3 – Investor vs. Asset Manager approach to investing
Subject Investor Asset Manager (Active)
Objectives
•    Evaluate fund’s risk profile
•   Compare  investment 
alternatives
•    Define a risk policy
•   Assume investment decisions
Documentation
•   Prospectus
•   Periodic  audited/unaudited 
reports
Detailed information about any 
single portfolio holding provided 
by stock exchange management 
companies, info providers (such 
as Reuters, Bloomberg, Telekurs, 
etc.), issuers, brokers, financial 
analysts. 
Data set Mutual fund’s past returns
•   Assets’ returns, volatilities and 
correlations
•    Financial market trends
Instruments Simple Complex
Methodology
Self assessment or investment 
proposal by financial (or 
banking) salesmen
In house (or advisors’) 
methodology to define asset 
allocation, stock picking and 
market timing.
19 In an active investment strategy, the fund managers attempt to beat market return by 
selecting securities that they believe will outperform the market. A passive investment strategy 
(also referred to as an index strategy) seeks to match the return of a market, rather than beat it, 
by investing in a basket of securities that replicate the performance of an index. Fees for actively 
managed strategies are generally higher than index strategies and reduce net investment returns. 
Advocates of index strategies believe that markets are generally efficient and it is difficult to 
consistently outperform the benchmark after transaction costs and advisory fees. Additionally, 
turnover is lower with passive investing because managers only buy and sell securities to reflect 
changes in the underlying index. This results in lower transaction costs. Index funds generally 
provide investors with a low-cost, effective method of gaining diversified market exposure and 
realizing competitive long-term returns. Low fees are a primary advantage of an index strategy. 
In addition to index and active investment strategies, there are enhanced index strategies seeking 
to slightly outperform a specific index while maintaining an overall risk profile comparable to the 
index. Enhanced index strategies are typically implemented through risk-controlled security or 
sector-selection strategies that exploit small inefficiencies occurring within capital markets. 71 Cluster analysis
Before carrying out the clustering, tests have been conducted to determine 
whether our daily returns are normally distributed or not. We used the Jarque-
Bera test, a two-sided goodness-of-fit test suitable when a fully-specified null 
distribution is unknown and its parameters must be estimated
20.
The test statistic is
where n is the sample size, s is the sample Skewness, and k is the sample 
kurtosis 
21. 
For all funds belonging to our sample, the hypothesis of normality has 
been rejected. That’s why we refer to the actual values of risk measures 
without recurring to statistical hypothesis about the characteristics of the 
distribution.
Risk encompasses many different concepts and, consequently, it makes difficult 
any reduction to a single quantitative measure. In this paper 6 different risk 
measures have been calculated for each fund (standard deviation, downside 
risk, Historical Value at risk at 99% confidence level, Historical Expected 
Shortfall at 99% confidence level, Sortino Ratio and Sharpe ratio), along with 
the sample mean of past returns. 
Starting from daily returns, risk measures have been calculated as illustrated 
in Annex A.
20 Judge et al. (1988) and Gujarati (2003) recommend the Jarque-Bera test. Büning and 
Thadewald (2007) demonstrate that different tests could be used, depending on the shape of the 
empirical distribution. The Jarque Bera is superior to its competitors for symmetric distributions 
with medium up to long tails and for slightly skewed distributions with long tails. The power of the 
Jarque-Bera test is poor for distributions with short tails, especially if the shape is bimodal. In this 
case a modification of the Cramér-von Mises test or the Shapiro-Wilk test may be recommended. 
In this paper we use the “Jarque-Bera” in consideration of its general acceptance as a standard 
test. 
21 The statistic JB has an asymptotic chi-square distribution with two degrees of freedom 
and can be used to test the null hypothesis that the data are from a normal distribution. The null 
hypothesis is a joint hypothesis of the skewness being zero and the excess kurtosis being 3, since 
samples from a normal distribution have an expected skewness of 0 and an expected excess 
kurtosis of 3. As the definition of JB shows, any deviation from this increases the JB statistic. 72 Cluster analysis
In the field of fund management, most analysis consider other risk indicators 
such as the Tracking Error Volatility
22 or Relative-VAR
23 over a given 
benchmark, in order to verify how well fund managers are able to track the 
returns on some index related to the fund’s announced purpose (stated in the 
prospectus).
Also in the investment management industry, it is common practice to control 
the risk of active managers by imposing a constraint on tracking error. 
According to Jorion (2003) this setup, however, can be seriously inefficient. 
When myopically focusing on excess returns, the active manager ignores 
the total risk of the portfolio. As a result, optimization of excess returns will 
always increase total portfolio risk relative to the benchmark.
In this paper, are taken into account only risk measures related to mutual 
funds’ absolute risk; this option is assumed as closer to retail investors’ 
perspective. 
In order to make this point clearer consider Figure 1 where are plotted two 
funds (Y and X) with respect to a benchmark and the evolution of their net 
asset values over 1 year. 
22  Tracking error is the difference between a portfolio’s return and the benchmark or index it 
was meant to mimic or beat. Tracking error is sometimes called active risk. There are two ways to 
measure tracking error. The first is to simply subtract the benchmark’s cumulative returns from the 
portfolio’s returns. However, the more common way is to calculate the standard deviation of the 
difference in the portfolio and benchmark returns over time. The formula is as follows:
Where:
  TE = Tracking Error
  RP = Return of Manager or Fund
  RB = Return of Benchmark
  N  = Number of Return Periods
23  Relative VaR” (RVaR) is defined as the level of tracking error that will not be exceeded over 
the chosen time horizon with an assigned confidence level (Maspero and Saita, 2002).73 Cluster analysis
Figure 1 – Absolute risk vs. Relative risk
In relative terms, considering their tracking error volatility, Fund Y is riskier 
than Fund X; but if we consider the standard deviation of absolute returns, 
the conclusion is reversed.
3.3. Cluster Analysis 
The methodology used for the cluster analysis is the K-Means clustering 
which partitions data into k mutually exclusive clusters, and returns the index 
of the cluster to which it has assigned each observation
24. Unlike hierarchical 
clustering, K-means clustering operates on actual observations (rather than 
the larger set of dissimilarity measures), and creates a single level of clusters. 
K-means clustering is more suitable than hierarchical clustering for large 
amounts of data, as in our case.
We got a multivariate dataset (368-by-7 matrix) to be clustered in 29 groups. 
One of the key issues in K-means clustering is to determine ex ante the 
24  K-means treats each observation as an object having a location in space. It finds a partition 
in which objects within each cluster are as close to each other as possible, and as far from objects 
in other clusters as possible. There are different distance measures (such as squared Euclidean 
distance) that can be used, depending on the kind of data to cluster. Each cluster in the partition 
is defined by its member objects and by its centroid, or center. The centroid for each cluster is 
the point to which the sum of distances from all objects in that cluster is minimized. K-means 
computes cluster centroids differently for each distance measure, to minimize the sum with respect 
to the specified measure. K-means uses an iterative algorithm that minimizes the sum of distances 
from each object to its cluster centroid, over all clusters. This algorithm moves objects between 
clusters until the sum cannot be decreased further. The result is a set of clusters that are as compact 
and well-separated as possible. 74 Cluster analysis
number of clusters. In our case, the choice was straightforward: we set this 
number equal to the Assogestioni’s classes of our sample of mutual funds. 
The choice is consistent with the goal to test if the taxonomy based on asset 
allocation matches (or not) with the classification based on risk measures. In 
Table 4 are summarized the findings. 
For further details about the cluster analysis, see Annex B.
Table 4 – Assogestioni’s classes vs. Risk-based clusters
Table 4shows that there is no perfect matching between asset allocation 
classes and risk-based clusters. For example, in the first risk-based cluster 
(i.e. first column in the table) we found 37 funds belonging to 6 different 
Assogestioni’s classes (5 bond funds category and 1 flexible). On the other 
hand, observing the first Assogestioni’s class (i.e. the first row in the table), 
we found that the 26 balanced funds were split among 7 risk-based clusters.
It can be argued that a correspondence between the two classifications is still 
valid considering macro-categories of funds (all equity funds, all bond funds) 
but this is not what an investor would have expected: an equity fund specialised 
in Far East companies should have a different risk profile with respect to a fund 
investing in European or American companies (see cluster n. 6).75 Cluster analysis
In order to verify if it is appropriate to consider all these risk measures instead 
of choosing a single one, we run the cluster analysis considering each risk 
indicator separately. Only in case of VAR, the results are similar; the choice 
of different risk indicator leads to a suboptimal clustering, assuming as 
optimization criteria the discrimination between bond (and monetary) funds 
and equity funds (i.e. no bond or monetary fund should be included in the 
same cluster with an equity fund). For further details see Annex C.
However, some limitations of this analysis should be taken into account. 
The conclusions are influenced by the time at which the risk evaluation 
is performed. Assogestioni’s classification takes into account only end of 
period funds’ asset allocation: it means that during the period under review 
(10 years) some funds have changed class and maybe their classification 
changed as a consequence of the introduction of new classes fitting better 
their investment policy. Moreover, funds mergers may determine volatility 
breaks during the funds life.
Secondly, different investors may have quite different and legitimate 
perceptions and concerns about risk, depending on, among other things, their 
time horizons, goals, financial situations, other investments in their portfolios, 
and basic attitudes. As a consequence, different risk measures could have 
been used.
Even in presence of such limitations, it can be claimed that mutual funds 
risk profile cannot be adequately captured considering only investment and 
borrowing power restrictions laid down in the regulation.
The risk spreading rules tackle only partially risk profile: investment limits 
set in the European regulation are too broad, applying to all categories of 
harmonised funds regardless different fund’s investment strategies.
The cluster analysis signals that a classification based on asset allocation tend 
to be misleading for investors: investment decisions based on investment 
strategies, as declared in the prospectus, and on institutional classification, 
may be distorted when considering risk, because they do not embrace the 
overall funds’ risk profile.
Besides possible distortions in risk discovery process, we have to consider 
how effective are the rules in place in protecting retail investors. It is 
important to note that – for long only funds – diversification and leverage 
restrictions do not ensure capital protection in a declining market.76 Cluster analysis
As a matter of fact, investment limits have not prevented retail investors 
from bearing – especially in case of equity, balanced and flexible funds – 
huge losses. In the next paragraph is provided an evidence of how Italian 
harmonised mutual funds performed in recent years with respect to financial 
markets and hedge funds indices. 
3.4. Italian Funds Indices vs. Financial Markets Indices
In order to evaluate Italian funds behaviour we consider a person investing 
100 Euro equivalent amount of money at the end of 1998 in 3 different funds 
(liquidity, bond and equity) whose monthly performance are equal to the 
weighted average monthly performance of all funds belonging to the same 
category; to this end, we use Fideuram mutual fund indices
25. The comparison 
is made taking into account the Italian market; equity and bond indices have 
been rebased to 31/12/1998. Indices expressed in US Dollars have been 
converted into Euro. 
Figure 2 – Italian liquidity funds vs. Italian short term government bond
25 Fideuram indices are published by Banca Fideuram. For further details about calculation 
methodology see https://sito.bancafideuram.it/fideuram/news_e_mercati/indici2/come_sono_
costruiti.html. 77 Cluster analysis
Figure 3 –   Italian Bond Fund Index vs. JPM Global Bond Index (All Maturities) and 
Euro MTS Index
Figure 4 – Italian Equity Funds Index vs. Stock Indices78 Cluster analysis
The charts show as mutual funds have registered a lower final wealth with 
respect to market indices. A substantial part of the underperformance is due to 
fees and taxes, that Italian mutual funds calculates on a daily basis applying 
a 12.5 per cent levy on capital appreciation and income, although actual 
payment is made once a year
26; as a consequence, fund shares are quoted 
net of fees and taxation, making difficult a direct comparison with market 
performances.
3.5. Italian Funds Indices vs. Hedge funds Indices
In order to evaluate the effectiveness of risk limitation rules ensured by 
UCITS in protecting retail investors, it has been considered the universe of 
Italian UCITS (Fideuram Indices) w.r.t. a sample of Hedge funds Indices 
(HFR indices
27). In Table 5 are summarised the average monthly returns
28 
from January 1999 to December 2007. The summary statistics include mean, 
standard deviation (SD), Skewness
29 and Kurtosis
30. Moreover, we calculated 
the Historical VAR (at 95% and 99% confidence level), Historical Expected 
Shortfall (ES 99%) and a scale independent risk-adjusted measure (Mean/
SD), expressing the return generated by the funds’ indices per unit of risk. 
26 Computationally, the levy is applied to the difference between the NAV at time t and the 
NAV at time t − 1. If this difference is negative, taxation is also negative, that is, a tax credit 
results. This induces a difference between Italian and Foreign mutual funds as the latter are taxed 
when capital gains are collected, affecting net performances. See, Savona (2006).
27 Hedge Fund Research, Inc. (HFR) is a research firm specializing in the aggregation, 
dissemination and analysis of alternative investment information. The HFRI Monthly Indices 
(“HFRI”) are a series of benchmarks designed to reflect hedge fund industry performance by 
constructing equally weighted composites of constituent funds, as reported by the hedge fund 
managers listed within HFR Database. The HFRI range in breadth from the industry-level view 
of the HFRI Fund Weighted Composite Index, which encompasses over 2000 funds, to the 
increasingly specific-level of the sub-strategy classifications.
28 We consider monthly returns provided that daily or weekly returns of hedge funds tend to 
manifest a high autocorrelation as a consequences of the lack of significant intra-month net asset 
values changes.
29  Skewness (Skew in the table) measures the “tailing” properties of a distribution (the third 
moment of the distribution). A negative value means that the distribution is skewed to the left; 
while a positive value means the distribution is skewed to the right. In a normal distribution, 
perfectly symmetric, the Skewness is 0.
30 Kurtosis measures the “elevation” properties of a distribution (the fourth moment of 
the distribution). The Kurtosis value for a normal distribution is three. The larger the value 
(positive) the more “peaked” is the distribution. The smaller the value (negative) the flatter is 
the distribution. In Table 5 is reported the “excess” Kurtosis value (coefficient of Kurtosis minus 
three), so if Kurtosis value is positive, then the distribution tends towards being more peaked than 
a normal distribution; while if Kurtosis value is negative, then the distribution tends towards being 
flatter than a normal distribution.79 Cluster analysis
Details about calculation methodologies of VAR and ES are provided in 
Annex A.
Table 5 –   UCITS vs. Hedge Funds (Source for monthly returns: Thomson Financial 
Datastream)
In case of HFR Indices we considered both Euro and US Dollar (original) 
values; in the first case, we assumed the perspective of a European 
investor willing to compare the performance of UCITS and Hedge Funds 
on a currency unbiased basis. In the second one, risk measures have been 
computed analysing the indices on a stand alone basis in order to appreciate 
their intrinsic risk.
On average, Italian UCITS show a negative Skewness, with the exception of 
Liquidity funds, with a left tail of the distribution of monthly returns more 
pronounced than the right one (i.e. losses are more likely to be extreme 
even though they occur less frequently) whilst in case of hedge funds the 
situation is reversed
31.
31 When comparing Hedge funds Indices and Mutual funds Indices, it should be considered 
the “survivorship bias” that can affect mostly the Hedge Funds Indices provided that funds are 
included in the database on a voluntary basis, and in case of poor performance the asset manager 
can stop sending reports; consequently, the risks associated may be underestimated. In case of 
HFR Indices a fund is removed when: 
•  it liquidates, or 
•  the fund manager requests removal from the database, or 
•  it fails to satisfy the requirements for constituency (e.g. the amount of assets falls below the 
minimum asset threshold, equal to 50 million dollars).→80 Cluster analysis
Over the period under review, Hedge Funds Indices present significant fat 
tails, but their returns per unit of risk are – on average – better than UCITS 
(except for Liquidity Funds).
It is worth noting that the downside risk, captured in Table 5 by Historical 
VAR, is greater for some categories of UCITS than for Hedge Funds: Equity, 
Balanced and Flexible UCITS present the worst values in terms of VAR at 
95% confidence level. Surprisingly, the VAR at 99% confidence level and the 
average of losses beyond VAR (ES 99%) has been significantly higher for 
Equity and Flexible UCITS than for all categories of Hedge Funds.
The findings tend to confirm that “long only” harmonised mutual funds have 
– on average – a greater exposure to risks than alternative investments (such 
as hedge funds) subject to less regulatory burdens.
*
* *
In 2005 the European Fund and Asset Management Association (EFAMA) 
agreed with the European Commission that the heavy reliance of the UCITS 
Directive on detailed investment limits and risk-spreading rules is no longer the 
right approach to protect investors. It recognised that other approaches should 
have been discussed (e.g. a risk-based approach) with both Commission and 
CESR, but it would need a complete redrafting of the UCITS Directive
32.
In the following section, a possible risk-based approach is depicted.
However, a fund’s past performance will always remain in its respective index up until 
the point of liquidation or manager-requested removal from HFR database. In order to limit 
survivorship bias, HFR declare to “exhaust all efforts to receive a fund’s performance until the 
point of final liquidation. This convention provides the most robust characterization of results 
possible”. Likewise, when a new fund is added to the Index, the historical performance of the new 
constituent fund will not affect the finalized historical performance of the index.
32 EFAMA comments on the EU Commission Green Paper on the enhancement of the EU 
framework for investment funds (sec(2005) 947) - 15 November 2005.81
4.  An alternative approach: risk budgeting
4.1. A new approach for UCITS. 
Financial innovation and the growing demand for more sophisticated products 
able to protect the nominal capital invested, have contributed to the build of 
investment products more and more complex.
It is quite difficult for retail investors to assume informed investment 
decisions, assessing ex ante the risk of mutual funds: as a matter of fact, 
the prospectus does not appear completely effective attended that it adopts 
standardised risk descriptions which do not really discriminate funds having 
the same eligible assets.
The market evidence signals that associating the fund risk profile to portfolio 
composition could be misleading: on one hand, the volatility of the same asset 
class is not constant but changes over time; on the other, portfolio exposure 
to the same risk factors can be modified by asset managers by means of 
investment decisions.
A retail investor could prefer to have a well defined risk exposure with 
a flexible asset allocation instead of a rigid asset allocation with a changing 
risk profile. As a matter of fact, the asset allocation tells us less about funds’ 
overall risk profile than expected: it may be better to first identify a risk 
comfort level and then derive an asset allocation consistent with that risk 
level
33.
Therefore it could be more convenient to set limits in terms of risk budgeting 
instead of portfolio constraints. If this is the case, we could consider 
a complementary approach to regulation in the asset management sector, 
moving from an asset allocation perspective to a risk budgeting one, focused 
mainly on the risk-return profile of managed products.
As a first step, the paper considers the possible benefits associated with the 
introduction a of new category of harmonised mutual funds (i.e. “risk budget 
funds”) with a predefined level of financial risk – set in the fund rules – that 
allows asset managers to change portfolio allocation more freely in order 
33  Stubbs and Gulpa (1998).82 An alternative approach: risk budgeting
to respect the risk budget
34 taking into account all relevant risks (liquidity, 
market, credit and counterparty risk). 
In the following paragraphs are examined the characteristics of the new 
approach, its pros and cons and the possible impact on supervisory activity.
4.2. Risk budget funds vs. harmonised funds
In the mutual funds universe are already offered to investors harmonised 
products that assume – as investment objective – the maintenance of a given 
risk profile (for example, Value at risk) or have a flexible investment policy 
which allow asset managers to vary fund asset allocation according financial 
market conditions or propose a capital protected investment strategy. 
Sometimes, these three elements can be combined in the same investment 
vehicle. 
Why risk budget funds should be different?
All harmonised funds have to comply with the risk limitation rules set in 
the European Directives. In case of risk budget funds the aforementioned 
these rules would not be applied. Asset managers should be free to adjust 
fund’s asset allocation and leverage provided that their goal is to keep risk 
profile in line with a fixed risk target. The basic idea behind this approach can 
be caught by the following graph.
34 In financial literature the term “risk budgeting” has different denotations related to 
specific risk optimization techniques: Jorion (2003) defines it as the conversion of optimal 
mean–variance allocations to Value at Risk assignments for active managers while in Gilkeson 
and Milcheson (2004) risk budgeting is a process that seeks to maximize expected alpha subject 
to a total tracking error constraint for the portfolio (the assumption underlying the process is that 
selected managers will produce additional alpha as they are allotted addition tracking error from 
the total portfolio constraint). Before them various aspects of risk budgeting have been explored 
by Chow and Kritzman (2001), who provide an overview of the process, by Rawls and Izakson 
(2000) who differentiate between traditional mean-variance optimization and the risk budgeting 
framework. Lee and Lam (2001) discuss the risks that must be estimated when constructing a risk 
budget, arguing that information risks (the accuracy of a specialist’s estimates) are as important 
as statistical risks. 83 An alternative approach: risk budgeting
Figure 5 – Traditional Funds vs. Risk Budget Funds
Let’s consider more closely a risk budget fund and its characteristics.
4.3. Technical characteristics of risk budget funds
Regulation of risk budget funds should deal with, at least, the following main 
issues:
1.  liquidity of fund’s shares;
2. portfolio  diversification;
3.  leverage and short selling;
4. eligible  assets;
5.  risk indicators to be used;
6.  asset management company’s organisational requirements.
4.3.1 Liquidity of fund’s shares. 
The new category of funds should be included in the list of open-ended 
harmonised funds offered to retail investors all over the European Community; 
to this end, the collective investment schemes must preserve the ability to 
redeem its units at the request of the unit-holders and to calculate its net asset 
value whenever units are issued or redeemed.
It is therefore essential to consider the main requirements the assets held in the 
portfolio should comply with. We believe that some key elements concerning 
liquidity settled in the Council Directive 85/611/EEC of 20 December 1985 84 An alternative approach: risk budgeting
and in the Commission Directive 2007/16/EC of 19 March 2007 should be 
maintained. 
The liquidity risk is a factor that the asset management company must 
consider when investing in any financial instrument in order to be compliant 
with the portfolio liquidity requirement. 
A financial instruments is liquid when can be sold at limited cost in an 
adequately short time frame, taking into account the obligation of the fund to 
repurchase or redeem its units at the request of any unit holder. This quality 
can be presumed when the financial instrument:
–  is freely transferable;
–  is admitted to, or dealt in on, a regulated market (unless there is information 
available to the UCITS that would lead to a different determination);
In any case, its liquidity must be verified taking into account all information 
available
35.
Whenever securities are not admitted to trading on a regulated market, 
liquidity cannot automatically be presumed. The UCITS will therefore need 
to assess the liquidity of such securities where this is necessary to meet 
foreseeable redemption requests. With reference to non listed securities, they 
can be bought or held only if there are sufficiently liquid securities in the 
portfolio so as to be able to meet liquidity requirement.
4.3.2 Portfolio diversification.
Diversification is one of the milestone of asset management sector regulation. 
All risk spreading rules aim at mitigating risk via reducing the impact of any 
one investment held in fund portfolio. 
35 According to CESR, examples of the matters a fund manager may need to consider in 
assessing the liquidity of the financial instrument are: the volume and turnover in the transferable 
security; if price is determined by supply and demand in the market, the issue size, and the portion 
of the issue that the asset manager plans to buy; also evaluation of the opportunity and timeframe to 
buy or sell; where necessary, an independent analysis of bid and offer prices over a period of time 
may indicate the relative liquidity and marketability of the instrument, as may the comparability 
of available prices; in assessing the quality of secondary market activity in a transferable security, 
analysis of the quality and number of intermediaries and market makers dealing in the transferable 
security concerned should be considered. CESR’s guidelines concerning eligible assets for 
investment by UCITS. March 2007; ref: CESR/07-4485 An alternative approach: risk budgeting
A wide literature has approached the diversification problem starting from 
the seminal works of Markowitz (1952, 1959) that identified the risk-
reduction benefits associated with holding a diversified portfolio of assets. 
Subsequently a number of authors have attempted to measure the rate at 
which risk-reduction benefits are realised as the number of securities in 
a portfolio is expanded. Evans and Archer (1968) modelled risk in terms of 
a portfolio’s standard deviation and concluded that for a randomly selected 
and equally weighted portfolio (i.e. naïve diversification) there is very little 
risk-reduction to be obtained from expanding a portfolio beyond eight to ten 
securities. Subsequent studies have used similar techniques to confirm the 
risk-reduction advantages of diversification.
Statman (1987) contradicted this conclusion, showing how a well diversified 
stock portfolio must include, at the very least, 30 stocks for a borrowing 
investor, and 40 stocks for a lending investor. Many other studies analysed the 
same problem in case of hedge funds.
From the regulatory side, the UCITS Directive requires a minimum portfolio 
diversification of the fund; for example, in case of stocks, mutual funds must 
invest at least in 16 different issuers
36.
In this paper, no minimum diversification criteria are proposed. We regard as 
arbitrary setting a minimum threshold; in case of risk budget funds the key 
point should be the contribution to the overall risk profile of each asset held 
in portfolio. The number and the type of assets depend on how they concur to 
the achievement of the target risk level.
As a matter of fact, no asset manager could offer a fund which is actually 
invested in only one single stock or bond!! We think that the minimum level 
of diversification should be autonomously set by the asset management 
company and declared in the contract/prospectus.
36 According to article 22 of UCITS Directive, a fund may invest no more than 5 % of its 
assets in transferable securities issued by the same body. Member States may raise the 5 % limit to 
a maximum of 10 %. However, the total value of the transferable securities and the money market 
instruments held by the UCITS in the issuing bodies in each of which it invests more than 5 % 
of its assets must not then exceed 40 % of the value of its assets. Consequently, an equity fund 
could invest 40% of its portfolio in 4 issuers and the residual 60% in 12 issuers, for a total of 16.86 An alternative approach: risk budgeting
4.3.3 Leverage and short selling.
Risk budget funds innovations do not affect portfolio diversification only. 
Regarding liabilities, UCITS regulation – as already noted – aims at reducing 
risk profile setting limitations to short selling
37, borrowing and total exposure 
to derivatives.
Recent developments in the UCITS marketplace has seen an increase in new 
trading strategies particularly with the introduction of long/short trading 
strategies, commonly referred to as 130/30 funds. These funds use investment 
strategies which maintain 100% net long exposure by a combination of 130% 
long and 30% short. They allocate 100% of NAV to long positions and then 
short sell securities to the value of 30% of NAV. The proceeds from the short 
sale are then used to acquire additional long positions, thereby bringing the 
total exposure to 130% long and 30% short. 
In any case, no physical “covered” short sales should be allowed
38. The 
European Commission has recently confirmed this negative position (in 
a letter addressed to the CESR), considering this technique as inconsistent 
with important provisions of the UCITS Directive such as those regarding the 
prohibition on borrowing set in Article 36 which is not confined to borrowing 
money but also extends to securities. Other concerns are related to the absence 
of explicit provisions governing exposures through physical short selling or 
the organisational and technical requirements for managing the related risks 
(i.e. market, operational and counterparty risks).
As a matter of fact, this position is totally comprehensible within the 
boundaries of UCITS regulation.
37 Short selling is the practice whereby an investor seeks to act on the belief that a particular 
security is likely to fall in value. There are a number of techniques for short selling. These broadly 
fall into two categories, “physical” short-selling or “synthetic” short selling. Physical short selling 
involves the actual sale of the security and may be covered or uncovered. An uncovered short sale 
is where the investor has no right to the security at the time of agreeing to the sale. The investor 
will then seek to purchase the security before delivery is required. In contrast, in a covered sale, 
typically the security is borrowed from another party. The security is then sold on in the belief 
that when the time comes to return it, it will be possible to purchase it more cheaply. The profit is 
the difference in the sale and purchase prices, less the cost of borrowing and any transaction costs 
incurred. Synthetic short selling involves the use of financial derivative instruments to create an 
exposure to the price of the security, rather than the actual sale of the security.
38  The conditional is motivated by the fact that Irish Financial Services Regulatory Authority 
(IFSRA), under certain conditions, recently gave regulated investment funds the green light 
to perform direct physical short sales of assets, removing one of the few remaining absolute 
restrictions within the UCITS framework. Other countries are likely to follow; see also D. Prime 
(2008). Moreover, in France short sales of transferable securities are allowed up to 10% of the 
assets covered by repos.87 An alternative approach: risk budgeting
The adoption of a risk-based approach to supervision of collective investment 
schemes (as suggested in this paper) could foster the use of such techniques. 
A relaxation of investment limits (including leverage, exposure to derivatives 
and short selling) could be possible only if asset managers demonstrate their 
capacity to identify, measure, monitor and control all relevant risks associated 
to portfolio management techniques they intend to use. 
This reflects a more general recognition by financial supervisors worldwide 
that it is no longer feasible to monitor all of the operations of financial 
institutions, and that a more effective approach entails ensuring that these 
institutions have sound risk management practices and internal controls.
A key issue to be addressed refers to the degree of freedom allowed to risk 
budget funds: if short selling is no more limited for UCITS which would be 
the difference with respect to hedge funds? 
Before answering to the question, it should be considered that a convergence 
is visible between alternative investments and sophisticated UCITS funds. 
UCITS III allows the structuring of funds replicating several alternative 
investment strategies with absolute returns. It has also observed the interest 
of Prime Broker, a service provider essential to Hedge Funds managers, for 
sophisticated UCITS
39. 
Anyway, some structural differences should be maintained. 
Firstly, liquidity requirements set by UCITS regulation should be preserved 
in order to mitigate the risk of investing in illiquid assets which are, on the 
contrary, “eligible” for hedge funds.
Secondly, it should be set a global limit to the leverage of risk budget funds 
which takes into account debt, borrowed securities (in case of physical short 
selling) and financial derivatives leverage. This restriction on leverage tend 
to limit not only fund’s market risk exposure but also the risk for the stability 
of banking and financial systems, preventing UCITS from becoming high 
leveraged institutions.
A possible measure could be the following ratio:
39  European Commission – DG Internal Market - PriceWaterhouseCopeers (2008).88 An alternative approach: risk budgeting
The maximum leverage ratio is set equal to 80% of total assets in order to 
preserve a buffer for unexpected events that could cause a strong increase 
in fund’s liabilities (e.g. redemptions of units, depreciation of total assets, 
margin calls on listed financial derivatives).
We tend to exclude listed financial derivatives from the numerator for three 
reasons: 1) these contracts can be sold, liquidated or closed at any time; 2) 
the effective fund’s commitment is limited to the margin (included among 
the total assets) and 3) provided that most listed financial derivatives are 
futures on market indices, whose commitments are calculated multiplying the 
reference capital by the value of the index, we consider as too stringent their 
inclusion into the global leverage ratio.
As a matter of fact, the notional value is not an indicator of the risk exposure 
associated with financial derivatives. The effective risk exposure is only 
a small fraction of the notional value and depends on the features of the 
contracts (underlying asset, indexation mechanism and duration) and the 
characteristics of the market in which the transactions are handled (the 
expected volatility of the value of the underlying asset, the market liquidity 
and the credit rating of the counterparty).
Pertaining OTC derivatives commitments, their calculation should be made 
using market standard methodologies, as taken in national regulations
40. 
It is to discuss if the requirements set in the UCITS Directive should be 
maintained, provided that the counterparty risk should be included in the 
40  First of all it should be allowed the netting of positions. According to the Italian regulation:
1.    the transactions must have the same underlying and maturity. Maturity mismatching shall 
be permitted only if the maturities differ:
•    by not more than seven days, where the transactions to be netted have a residual maturity 
of between one month and one year;
•    by not more than thirty days, where the transactions to be netted have a residual maturity 
of more than one year:
2.   the risk exposure created by one transaction must be of opposite sign to that created by 
the other.
Where netting concerns transactions of opposite sign that give rise to commitments of different 
value, the difference must be included among the fund’s commitments.
Secondly, the calculation of fund’s total commitments should include:
a)   in the case of options, the current value of the underlying assets multiplied by the option’s delta. 
Management companies that manage funds with substantial positions in options must adopt 
organizational measures to keep risk factors other than delta under control;
b)   in the case of forward sales contracts, the value of the contract (e.g. the reference capital 
multiplied by the contract settlement price);
c)   in the case of derivative financial instruments whose execution involves the payment 
of cash differentials, other than those referred to in a) and b), the commitment shall 
correspond to the contract’s reference capital.89 An alternative approach: risk budgeting
risk measures adopted by the fund managers in order to control the overall 
fund’s risk profile.
Furthermore, UCITS should declare in the offering documentation the 
maximum threshold levels for leverage and short positions.
Another substantial difference between hedge funds and risk budget funds is 
that the latter should be subject to the supervisory review process aiming at 
verifying the adequacy of asset managers’ organisation. A strong incentive 
mechanism should be put in place in order to commensurate the operational 
possibilities (in terms of leverage, short selling and use of derivatives) to the 
soundness of risk management systems, the adequacy of investment decision 
process, the reliability of IT systems. 
Proportionality should therefore be ensured among the depth of supervisory 
controls, the sophistication of risk models adopted by fund managers and 
the widening of investment and borrowing powers; to this end, a formal 
recognition by the Supervisor of internal risk models could be deemed as 
necessary. 
4.3.4 Eligible assets.
The definition of eligible assets is one of the most challenging task for 
UCITS regulators provided that financial innovation – as an ongoing process 
– generates a multitude of new products, including many new forms of 
derivatives and alternative risk transfer products, more and more complex to 
evaluate. 
Rather than establishing exhaustive lists of financial instruments and 
transactions, it should be preferable to set the general criteria to be respected 
in order to assess if an asset is eligible or not. To this end, it must be preserved 
fund’s liquidity (see § 4.3.1), the accuracy of net asset evaluation, and the 
proper management of assets (e.g. avoiding derivatives contracts that could 
entail the physical delivery of commodities).
Pertaining portfolio evaluation, any financial instruments should have a value 
which can be accurately determined at any time, based primarily on available 
market data; to this end, evaluation criteria set in the European Directive 
85/611 could be applied to risk budget funds’ assets as well. 90 An alternative approach: risk budgeting
4.3.5 Risk indicators to be used.
The key element in risk budget funds is the choice of the risk indicator which 
should drive asset managers’ investment decisions. We recognise that in 
this field “one-size-fits-all” principle could generate severe inefficiencies; 
therefore it is not possible for regulators to impose one single risk measure 
to be used without distorting the investment process or competition among 
asset managers. 
It’s up to the asset management company to decide which kind of risk policy 
to adopt, as described in the funds rules and in the prospectus, subject to 
supervisory review. As Brandolini, Pallotta and Zenti (2003), we define a risk 
policy as a “reaction function” by which an asset manager reacts to different 
level of portfolio risks, changing assets’ weights. 
A risk-based investment process should therefore involve:
•   the choice of a set of relevant risk indicators;
•   the definition of an investment holding period;
•   the choice of a target risk threshold;
•   the ex ante estimation of possible values for the chosen risk indicator;
•   a systematic comparison between ex ante estimation and the target, 
changing assets’ weights in order to align portfolio risk profile to the target 
level of risk.
More formally, assuming that the portfolio rebalance is conducted with 
a frequency equal to h (i.e. the holding period of any asset is equal to h, for 
example 1 week), we denote with wt the vector of weights of assets held in 
the portfolio at time t and with wt+h the vector of weights determined at time 
t that remain unchanged till time t+h. Consequently, wt is determined at time 
t–h as a result of the risk policy and of the evolution of assets’ returns in the 
period between t–h and t. 
Assuming Risk* as the target value for the generic risk indicator stated in the 
fund rules and setting Riskt as the ex ante estimation at time t of the same 
indicator, the risk policy can be represented as a function RP according to 
which:
wt+h = RP (Riskt – Risk*, wt), wt+h ∈ W91 An alternative approach: risk budgeting
where W is the set of possible values of weights, satisfying the limitations 
imposed by the regulation or autonomously set by the board of director of the 
asset management company. 
In our general equation, the input for function RP is the actual level of 
risk (Riskt) and the difference from the target level (Risk*). The portfolio 
rebalancing could be a two step process:
first, the asset manager determine the unconstrained weights, according his 
views on the markets ;
•   secondly, the weights are rescaled (up or down) in order to attain the target 
level Risk*.
Considering the technical difficulty to maintain constantly the actual level of 
Risk equal to Risk*, deviations from this target should be allowed in the very 
short term (i.e. 1 week) ensuring that on a monthly basis the average is in line 
with the expected value
41.
Pertaining the characteristics that the risk indicator should comply with, it 
could be suggested that a “coherent measure” à la Artzner (1999) should be 
chosen but this option would exclude a number of risk measures commonly 
used by asset managers, such as Value at Risk
42; in this paper, we consider as 
preferable not to restrict the set of possible risk measures.
It is worth stressing the substantial difference existing between the risk-reward 
measure suggested by CESR
43 for the Key Information Document and the 
risk indicator used within a risk budget fund. In the first case, the measure 
has only informative purpose; in the second one, it is a tool used by asset 
managers in order to orientate investment decisions. In the latter case, risk 
indicator is really implemented within the organisation and does not need to 
be “translated” in the “key indicator”.
Reminding that the main objective of regulation in the asset management 
sector should be the protection of retail investor, we assume that only 
41  It could be allowed a deviation from Risk* of no more than 5% (up or down). 
42 According to Artzner et al. (1999), a coherent risk measure is a risk measure that satisfies 
properties of monotonicity, sub-additivity, positive homogeneity, and translational invariance. 
Value at Risk is not, in general, a coherent risk measure as it does not respect the sub-additivity 
property; as a consequence Value at Risk might discourage diversification. Value at risk is, 
however, coherent, under the assumption of normally distributed losses.
43  See paragraph 2.4.92 An alternative approach: risk budgeting
measures addressing funds’ total risk should be taken into account: it means 
that indicators capturing “relative risks” (w.r.t. a benchmark), such as 
Tracking Error Volatility and Relative-VAR are not considered as relevant for 
risk budget funds.
4.3.6 Organisational requirements.
With reference to organisational requirements, the management of a risk 
budget fund implies – among others – that:
the asset management company has defined a risk measure (or more than one 
risk measure) on the basis of which the fund managers assume investment 
decisions;
the board of director has approved the risk management system and the 
investment process, being aware of the main technical aspects concerning the 
aforementioned risk measures;
the company has in place risk management systems able to capture the 
funds’ overall risk profile. This entails that fund managers should identify 
and understand the sources of risks inherent in their investment processes 
and, above all, should estimate the impact of an event on the portfolio’s risk 
(and the probability of this event occurring). The sophistication of the risk 
management system is consistent with the nature of the risk indicators 
adopted by the asset management company;
the risk management function is involved in the strategy decision making 
process;
an independent and periodic review is carried out by the Internal Audit 
function testing model control practices and model validation procedures to 
ensure compliance with established policies and procedures;
the information system is able to track and report funds’ risk exposure in 
a timely manner to all relevant parties involved in the risk taking and risk 
controlling processes;
the investment decision making process, the risk control activities and the 
structures involved should be set forth in bylaws, board resolutions, or written 
management plans adopted by the board or its designated committee.93 An alternative approach: risk budgeting
4.4. Advantages of risk budget funds
This new category of funds may provide relevant advantages for investors, 
distributors, asset managers, and regulators.
From the investors’ perspective, it seems more respondent to the demand 
for investment products with a well pre-defined risk profile enhancing the 
discovery process of funds that really match investors’ risk appetite. 
A risk budget fund is required to set in the contract the engagement to preserve 
a given exposure to risk during its life: supervisory experience suggests how 
many investors’ complaints are referred to unexpected losses suffered during 
the permanence in the fund. In many cases, at the moment of the subscription 
of units the risk was perceived or represented as low.
Risk perception is influenced by information gathered at the moment of 
subscription of the funds’ units. To this end, a risk budget fund can facilitate 
– w.r.t. standardised risk descriptions stated in the prospectus – the awareness 
about risk; this is crucial when the purchase of fund‘s shares is made in 
“execution only”, with no assistance by brokers in deciding which fund fit 
the best investor’s investment objectives and risk tolerance
44; in this case 
the financial intermediaries do not offer any advice, but simply act on the 
client’s instructions. 
In addition, a clear description of risk target stated in the prospectus 
contributes to mitigate the problem of asymmetric information experienced 
by investors. 
For European distributors of financial products, MiFID Directive – entered 
into force on 1 November 2007 – is reshaping distribution business models 
with the aim to ensure a higher level of protection of investors when making 
investment decisions. 
44 According to the MiFID Directive (Directive 2004/39/EC, replacing the Investment 
Services Directive adopted in 1993) if an investor buys or sells non-complex products, such 
as harmonised investment funds, at his initiative (for example, via Internet) the principle of 
‘execution only’ will apply. It means that the intermediary has no obligation to check investors’ 
knowledge and experience. 94 An alternative approach: risk budgeting
To this end customers are split into three categories: 1) non-professional (retail) 
customers; 2) professional customers; 3) eligible counterparts. The protection 
is the maximum for retail customers and the least for counterparts. 
For a retail investor, the purchase of funds’ shares may be made not only at his 
initiative, but in most cases, in consequence of services carried out by a bank, 
an investment firm or an asset management company; in such circumstances, 
financial intermediaries are required to assess if the mutual fund is appropriate 
or suitable for the investor
45. 
The quest for marketing instruments able to discriminate funds’ risk profile is 
a challenge faced by all distributors in the UCITS III world. The emergence 
of alternative strategies in sophisticated UCITS and their public placement 
requires reasonable market segmentation in order to limit reputation and 
regulatory risks.
Risk-budget funds could facilitate asset managers and distributors in 
complying with MiFID directive requirements, because investment funds 
could be classified according to their risk profile. As a consequence, 
distributors would also be supported in assessing the risk of different products 
and their appropriateness or suitability to the clients’ financial situation, 
investment objectives and risk appetite. 
45 When the subscription is made as a result of a placement activity, the firm providing such 
service has to require to the investor information about his knowledge and experience in the 
investment field relevant to the specific type of product or service offered or demanded so as to 
enable the firm to assess whether the product or service envisaged is appropriate for the client 
(in the sense that the client has the necessary experience and knowledge in order to understand 
the risks involved in relation to the product or service). Where the appropriateness test applies, 
firms must either offer to a client or transact for him only those products that are appropriate or, 
if the client demands a product that is assessed as inappropriate for him, give the client a warning 
(which can be in standard form if the firm wishes) that the product is inappropriate to the 
client’s circumstances in terms of the test. If a client is provided with a warning but still wishes to 
proceed, the firm should consider whether to do so having regard to the circumstances. If the client 
does not, or cannot provide sufficient information to allow the firm to judge appropriateness but 
the client still wishes to do business with the firm, the firm must warn the client that it is unable 
to judge appropriateness before considering whether to proceed. 
When the purchase of fund’s share is made in consequence of investment advisory service, the 
firm has to perform a suitability test. In order to make an assessment of suitability, the firm needs 
to obtain the necessary information in relation to the client to assess: (i) his investment objectives; 
(ii) his financial situation; and (iii) his knowledge and experience. Knowledge and experience can 
be assumed for products, services or transactions in respect of which a client has been classified 
as professional; it cannot be assumed for retail clients. If a firm does not obtain the necessary 
information to assess suitability, it cannot make a personal recommendation to the client or take 
a decision to trade for him.95 An alternative approach: risk budgeting
For regulators, the solution proposed could represent a possible way out in the 
debate on eligible assets: financial innovation makes much more difficult for 
regulators to define the list of assets in which harmonised funds can invest. 
In case of risk budget approach the problem could be mitigated because the 
focus is on the asset’s contribution to risk and not on the nature of the each 
eligible asset, considered on a stand alone basis (see also § 4.3.4).
Considering the possible applications of this new approach, we should take 
into account which kind of supervision should be carried out on entities 
managing risk budget funds. 
The European supervision model in place attributes a high relevance to the 
respect of investment limits; a significant portion of supervisory activity is 
still dedicated to licensing of new products and administrative controls of 
asset managers’ compliance with regulatory restrictions. The new approach 
involve a significant shift in supervision mentality evolving from the 
emphasis on ensuring compliance with rules to a much more comprehensive 
approach designed to ensure proper management of all risks associated with 
fund management. 
As a consequence, Supervisors should not authorise any single fund 
established by the company but should assess asset managers’ capacity to 
manage the funds they intend to promote.
To this end, it could be thought of a sort of program of funds to be launched 
within a given period of time (“set up program”) where are specified the 
characteristics of each category of funds in term of investment objectives, 
risk policy and fees structure. Once the Authority has reviewed the risk 
management systems, and has verified that the organisation is coherent with 
the investment process adopted by the asset management company, funds can 
be offered to investors without further prior intervention by the Authority.
The supervisory framework should enable to tailor examination activities to 
the level of risk of each category of funds.
From the regulatory perspective, a risk based approach in the asset 
management sector:
•   could entail a reduction of the regulatory burden for supervised entities in 
exchange for demonstrated risk management capacity;
•   encourages greater risk awareness in entities and supervisors;96 An alternative approach: risk budgeting
•   requires an evaluation of risks through scoring systems that combine 
quantitative and qualitative standards; 
•   enables better allocation of supervisory resources, more focused on technical 
and organisational analysis supporting selective interventions based on 
evaluation of the quality of the management of funds and changes;
•   is coherent with the Basle II approach to banking supervision.
The supervisory review process should evaluate the main elements of the 
risk model adopted by fund managers, among which key elements are: 
the underlying assumptions, the model’s capacity to include all relevant 
risk factors, the reliability of data sources, the robustness of calculation 
methodologies, the completeness of back-testing activities, and the consistency 
of stress tests.
Along with financial risk, supervisors have to consider operational risks as 
well, which are attached to the different features and quality of the trading, 
settlement and accounting procedures operated by the collective investment 
schemes, as their high level of complexity, or their poor quality, may increase 
the chances of losses due to human or technical errors. 
This process requires high level financial and technical expertise within 
supervisory authority and effective deployment of this across different units 
involved. 
The adoption of such approach may call for internal organization changes of 
the Authority requiring the presence of specialist risk units or risk experts, 
the issue of regulatory standards and guidelines; the definition of robust risk 
scoring models.
4.5. Possible drawbacks
Although the new approach paves the way for reducing compliance burdens 
and improving fund asset management sector efficiency, so far there is no 
agreement to what extent this trade-off can be widened. How much regulatory 
requirements should be relaxed in order to get an increase in the investment 
process efficiency without reducing investors’ protection?
The choice of the risk indicator is crucial: ideally, the risk measure should be 
sensitive to all relevant risk factors affecting the net asset value of funds. To 
this end, Value at Risk models seem the more appropriate to capture overall 97 An alternative approach: risk budgeting
risk profile; specific requirements should ensure the control of liquidity risk 
(if not captured by other risk measures) and operational risk. 
As far as, the domestic regulation of four European countries (Luxembourg, 
France, Germany and Ireland) provides a VAR approach for UCITS (including 
non-sophisticated collective investment schemes), even if there is no 
convergence on VAR models to be used and on parameters to be satisfied
46. 
Another possible drawback of risk budget funds is the definition of time 
horizon: setting a very short term for portfolio rebalancing, so as to maintain 
the risk profile in line with the target level of risk, could entail high transaction 
costs or preclude time diversification gains. In this section, we referred to 
a time frame of 1 week in order to adjust the vector of weights of the assets 
held in portfolio; it could be preferable to allow multiple time horizons – 
coherent with the nature and the complexity of investment strategies of each 
fund – over which the fund managers assume the obligation to align funds’ 
overall risk profile to the target.
Moreover, the management of risk budget funds could be potentially pro-
cyclical producing market distortions: when markets become more volatile, 
the goal of maintaining the fund’s risk profile as close as possible to the target 
may induce to sell risky assets thereby accentuating market volatility.
Last but not least, what happens if the risk target levels are not met? At 
this regard, possible enforcement measures should be provided for, such 
as the prohibition to launch new funds or the imposition of specific capital 
requirements in consequence of proven inability of asset managers to control 
fund’s risk profile. 
46  European Commission – DG Internal Market - PriceWaterhouseCopeers (2008).98
5. Conclusion
The fund business is undergoing profound structural changes which will have 
lasting consequences such as continuous innovation in investment strategies 
and products, new forms of business model, emergence of specialised service 
providers, more discerning investors. 
Regulatory challenge is to ensure that the supervision framework is capable 
of representing a viable basis for the successful development of the fund 
industry over the longer-term while assuring a high level of investor protection. 
According to the European Commission the UCITS Directive establishes 
several lines of defence to protect investors; however, new risks are emerging 
and market expectations are changing. There may be need to consider reflections 
on a more comprehensive risk-based approach to investor protection.
In this paper, we have underlined the weaknesses of UCITS regulation based 
on an extensive grid of investment and borrowing restrictions and on an 
exhaustive list of eligible assets: despite its level of detail, the regulation does 
not seem capable to capture fund’s risk profile.
To this end, a cluster analysis has been carried out on a sample of Italian 
UCITS in order to group funds having similar risk profiles; the outcomes 
demonstrate that funds, subject to the same risk spreading rules, having 
analogue investment strategies, can differ significantly in terms of risk.
In addition, stringent investment and borrowing power restrictions on “long 
only” harmonised mutual funds do not seem to have been really effective in 
protecting individual investors. As a matter of fact, on average, Italian UCITS 
present a downside risk greater than alternative investments (such as hedge 
funds), subject to less regulatory burdens.
In this context, we have proposed a new category of harmonised funds 
(risk budget funds) intended as a first step to a new approach to regulation 
of collective investment schemes that, instead of focusing on investment 
limits, provides for minimum criteria to be met by asset managers related to 
the following items: liquidity, leverage and short selling, eligible assets and 
organizational requirements. The proposal aims at increasing the protection 
of investors, stimulating the offer of funds with a pre-defined risk level which 
should be maintained by means of investment decisions. 99 Conclusion
The adoption of a risk-based approach to supervision of collective investment 
schemes (as suggested in this paper) could foster a redrafting of UCITS 
Directive. The main driver would be a relaxation of investment limits 
(including leverage, exposure to derivatives and short selling) in presence 
of a recognised capacity of asset managers to identify, measure, monitor and 
control all relevant risks associated to portfolio management techniques they 
intend to use. A stringent supervisory process should ensure proportionality 
among the depth of supervisory controls, the sophistication of risk models 
adopted by fund managers and the widening of investment and borrowing 
powers.
This approach – coherent with international regulatory trends induced by 
Basel II and MiFID Directive – could provide significant advantages to all 
parties involved in the fund management industry entailing, for Supervisors, 
a movement away from rule based compliance enforcement to the development 
of a more flexible and comprehensive risk-based supervisory framework. 100
Annex A Risk indicators used in the cluster analysis
Standard deviation is a measure of the dispersion of a set of data from its mean. 
The more spread apart the data, the higher the deviation. The dispersion is defined 
as the variability around the central tendency (i.e. the mean of the distribution). 
In finance and investment theory, the central tendency is the measure of the 
reward and the dispersion is a measure of risk. The statistical measurements are 
the variance σi
2 and its square root, the standard deviation σi.
The standard deviation is estimated by examining a random sample taken 
from the population. The most common measure used is the sample standard 
deviation, which is defined by
where (x1,x2,…,xn) is the sample and x-bar is the sample mean. The 
denominator N − 1 is the number of degrees of freedom in the vector.
Following the modern portfolio theory developed by Markowitz, the overall 
concept of risk is that as it increases, the expected return on the asset will 
increase as a result of the risk premium earned – in other words, investors 
should expect a higher return on an investment when it carries a higher level 
of risk. 
The sample dataset used in this paper show as the volatility of funds’ returns 
changes over time as a consequence of volatility changes of any of the assets 
held by the fund or as a consequence of an active investment strategy. 
This matter has been analysed – among others – by Beltratti and Miraglia 
(2000) aiming at associating Italian open-ended mutual funds to a category 
of risk, so that to allow the potential investor to appraise the risk profile of 
each fund. The authors based their analysis on the standard deviation of past 
returns, a risk indicator easy to understand for retail investors. The results 
confirm how difficult is to find stable volatility clusters to which mutual funds 
can be associated: their paper suggests to limit the number of cluster to 5 in 
order to avoid frequent migrations of a fund from one category to another
47.
47 In case of 6 volatility classes the authors found frequent migrations, independently from 
the frequency of data used for the calculation of standard deviation. In order to get a reasonable 
stability they suggested rankings based on 5 classes. Such rankings are stable if the episodes 
of migration are considered asymmetrically (index of permanence modified), from a lower to 
a higher volatility rank. The authors proposed 5 volatility clusters: from 0% to 5%, from 5% 
to 10%, from 10% to 15%, from 15% to 20% and more than 20%. For example, if a fund XY 101 Annex A Risk indicators used in the cluster analysis
Downside risk and Sortino ratio
Standard deviation isn’t a good measure for every situation. First of all, it 
doesn’t help to evaluate whether a fund has the ability to limit downside risk 
(not falling as far as the market in a down period). For example, a fund losing 
constantly 0.1% per day will have a standard deviation equal to 0, but it does 
not mean that the fund is a risk free asset!! Moreover, the statistic doesn’t 
distinguish between upward and downward fluctuations.
Downside Risk (DD) can provide additional insights to standard deviation, 
capturing the risk of not achieving the minimum acceptable return (MAR) 
necessary to accomplish some goal (whilst standard deviation captures 
the risk of not achieving the mean). Semi-standard deviation can help in 
analysing the fund profile especially when the distribution of returns is not 
symmetrical. 
As many surveys confirm, for a retail investor “risk aversion” tend to be 
equivalent to “loss aversion”, i.e. the risk that portfolio value will decline in 
the future
48. In this paper we assume MAR equal to the target annual inflation 
ratio set by the European Central Bank (i.e. 2% per annum); in other words, 
the goal is to protect at least the real value of the capital invested.
According to Sortino
49, the most frequently used and least reliable procedure 
for calculating downside risk considers only those historical returns that fall 
below some minimal acceptable return. Errors should be reduced by using 
simulation procedures to generate a discrete distribution of annual returns 
from monthly data. Simulation results could be further improved by fitting 
a curve to the data that allows the distribution to be skewed. 
Nonetheless, looking backwards to past returns in order to evaluate what has 
been realised (and not what could happen in the near future) allow us to limit 
the calculation to the basic formula.
initially attributed to the interval 10%–15%, in the following period is associated to a lower rank 
(volatility less than 10%) the episode is not considered as example of migration since the investor 
doesn’t hold a riskier investment product. If, instead, in the following period, the fund XY presents 
a volatility greater than 15% this episode is considered a case of migration by the moment that the 
underwriter originally holds a riskier investment with respect to the one he first selected.
48  See, among others, Duxbury and Summers (2004) whose paper, starting from the antinomy 
between finance theory (which tends to see risk as related to variance in expected returns) 
and psychology literature (which tends to link risk to probability or size of potential losses), 
investigates whether individuals’ perceptions of risk are linked to variance aversion or loss 
aversion, and finds that a link to loss aversion is supported.
49  Sortino and Forsey (1996).102 Annex A Risk indicators used in the cluster analysis
Once calculated the DD, we obtain the Sortino ratio as:
where the numerator is the average of historic daily differential of fund’s returns 
(Ri) and MAR (equal to 0.005% on a daily basis) and the denominator is the 
daily semi-standard deviation (DD).
Sharpe ratio. It is a risk adjusted indicator of the excess return (or risk 
premium) per unit of risk in an investment asset or a trading strategy. It is 
built on Markowitz’ mean-variance paradigm, which assumes that the mean 
and standard deviation of the distribution of one-period return are sufficient 
statistics for evaluating the prospects of an investment portfolio. According to 
Sharpe (1994) comparisons based on the first two moments of a distribution 
do not take into account possible differences among portfolios in other 
moments or in distributions of outcomes across states of nature that may be 
associated with different levels of investor utility. 
The original author defined both ex ante and ex post versions of the Sharpe 
Ratio. We focus on ex post ratio
50, assuming the excess return w.r.t. a risk free 
asset (three month Italian Government Bond), using the formula:
The ratio indicates the historic average differential daily return per unit of 
historic daily variability of the differential return.
50  Sharpe (1994) defined a generalised version of the ex post ratio as follows. Let RFt be the 
return on the fund in period t, RBt the return on the benchmark (or a risk free asset) in period t, and 
Dt the differential return in period t: 
Let D-bar be the average value of Dt over the historic period from t=1 through T: 
and sigmaD be the standard deviation over the period: 
→
The ex post, or historic Sharpe Ratio (Sh) is: 103 Annex A Risk indicators used in the cluster analysis
When excess returns are negative, problems arise for the standard Sharpe 
Ratio interpretation. As a matter of fact, if two funds have the same negative 
excess returns, the preferable fund (in term of higher Sharpe ratio) is the 
one with the higher standard deviation (i.e. the riskier one). Apart possible 
interpretations that justify this outcome
51, such situation – that affects 125 
funds in our sample – does not concern the findings of the cluster analysis 
as we are interested in grouping funds with a similar risk profile instead of 
ranking them on the basis of the Sharpe ratio.
Historical VAR and Historical Expected Shortfall. Value at Risk, or VAR, 
is a commonly used statistic for measuring potential risk of economic losses 
in financial markets. 
It can be defined as the worst expected loss over a given time interval under 
normal market conditions at a given confidence level
52. With VAR, financial 
institutions can have a sense on the minimum amount that is expected to lose 
with a small probability (1 or 5%) over a given time horizon k (e.g., 1-day or 
10 days); different methodologies are available in order to calculate VAR
53.
We compute VAR through the model-free (or unconditional mean/variance) 
method (i.e. historical simulation). The simplest way to estimate VAR is to use 
the sample quantile estimate based on historical return data. The method is an 
unconditional model approach that has no assumptions about the distribution 
and is referred to as Historical VAR. Since Historical VAR is based on the 
unconditional distribution of losses, it allows departures from normality to be 
captured to some extent.
In order to examine the actual losses suffered by investors of each fund, 
we consider the 99
th percentile of the distribution of equally weighted past 
daily returns to determine which is the Historical VAR of each fund in order 
to cluster them. Consequently, the Historical Expected Shortfall
54 has been 
calculated as the average of losses beyond Historical VAR.
51  McLeod and Van Vuuren (2004). 
52 More formally, value at risk (VAR) can be interpreted as the cutoff point such that a loss 
will not happen with probability greater than p (e.g. 95% percent). If f(u) is the distribution of 
profit and losses on the portfolio, VAR is defined from:
where p is the right-tail probability, and c the usual left-tail probability. VAR can then be 
defined as the deviation between the expected value and the quantile, VAR(c) = E(X) – Q(X,c).
53 Jorion  (2006).
54  Expected Shortfall (or Conditional VAR) is the expected value of the loss when it exceeds 104
Annex B  Cluster methodology
We carried out an iterative partitioning (number of iterations=1000) with 
the aim to minimize the infraclass variance; after standardization of each 
variable, we obtain a 29*29 matrix (see Table 4 in the document). 
The K-means algorithm consists in iteratively improving an initial partition 
by minimizing within-group variance. At each iteration, the algorithm 
calculates the centroids of the clusters in the current partition, then assigns 
each observation to the nearest centroid in order to form a new partition 
whose within-group variance is lower than the previous one. The variation 
used ensures that all clusters contain at least one observation.
In order to improve the convergence to the optimal solution the K-means 
algorithm is based on 1000 random initial partitions, selecting the best final 
partition from those that are created, i.e. the stable groups (the observation 
groups that have always been classified together). The stable groups are the 
intersection of all the partitions considered. Observations that are not part 
of any stable group are assigned to one cluster or another depending on 
the initial partition used. These observations are generally in intermediate 
regions located between stable groups. To identify stable groups, has been 
considered at most the 10 best partitions obtained via multiple executions of 
the algorithm. In the following table are illustrated the final barycentres of 
each cluster.
VAR. This measures the average of the loss conditional on the fact that it is greater than VAR. 
Define the VAR number as q. Formally, the Conditional VAR is given by:105 Annex B  Cluster methodology
Table 6 – Clusters’ barycentres
The drop in intra-class variance in consequence of iteration process is 
depicted in the following figure.
Figure 6 – Intra-class variance106
Annex C Alternative Clustering Results
In the following tables are illustrated the clustering results obtained using, 
along with the average of daily returns, different risk indicators. Only in case 
of Value at Risk at 99% confidence level we obtained an outcome similar to 
Table 4 with only one bond fund, belonging to the “Emerging Markets” class, 
included in the same risk-based cluster with 3 equity funds (2 equity funds in 
the general case, where all risk measures have been applied). 
The optimization criterion is that neither bond nor monetary funds should be 
included in the same cluster where equity funds are present. Implicitly, we 
assume that in case of flexible and balanced funds, overlapping are possible.107 Annex C Alternative Clustering Results
Table 7 – Clusters based on standard deviation of daily returns
In case of cluster n. 23 we found three bond funds (1 Euro Gov. Medium/
Long Term, 1 Euro Gov. Short Term and 1 Mixed) together with 4 equity 108 Annex C Alternative Clustering Results
funds (1 America, 2 Europe and 1 Technology). Moreover, one monetary fund 
is included in cluster n. 2 with 23 equity funds.
Table 8 – Clusters base on Historical VAR at 99% confidence level109 Annex C Alternative Clustering Results
Here the outcome is similar to the general case.
Table 9 – Clusters based on Historical Expected Shortfall at 99% confidence level110 Annex C Alternative Clustering Results
Also Historical ES discriminates quite well between bond and equity funds, 
even if the number of funds falling in the same clusters (i.e. n. 5 and n. 19) 
is bigger w.r.t. VAR.
Table 10 – Clusters based on ex post Sharpe ratio111 Annex C Alternative Clustering Results
Table 11 – Clusters based on Sortino ratio112 Annex C Alternative Clustering Results
Table 12 – Clusters based on downside risk113 Annex C Alternative Clustering Results
The use of Sharpe and Sortino ratios tends to be inefficient in discriminating 
equity and bond funds, mixing in the same clusters funds of both categories. 
The use of ex post Sharpe ratio provides the worst results, putting together 
monetary and equity funds in three cases (see clusters n. 6, 10 and 21); the use 
of Sortino ratio gives a similar result in only one case (see cluster n. 9).
The findings are better than those illustrated in Table 7, provided that no 
monetary fund falls in clusters where equity funds are present.114
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Summary
The increasing role of hedge funds has been a key structural trend in 
the international financial markets in recent years. The development has 
spurred international discussions on both the need for and the feasibility of 
regulating hedge funds. Traditionally, regulation of financial institutions has 
been governed by two primary considerations, i.e. consumer protection and 
limiting systemic risks.
The main challenge for regulation of hedge funds is to address the potential 
risks to financial stability, while maintaining a legal framework in which hedge 
funds can continue to contribute positively to the development and the stability 
of the international financial system. On the one hand hedge funds contribute 
to strengthening financial stability by, among other factors, improving price 
formation and supporting the development of new securities markets. On 
the other hand, the growing importance of hedge funds is associated with 
potential risks of systemic crises, in part because it can be difficult for both 
market participants and authorities to obtain detailed information relating to 
1  Conclusions and opinions expressed in this paper are the authors’ and cannot necessarily be 
attributed to Danmarks Nationalbank.120 Summary
the strategies and portfolios of the hedge funds. Probably the largest risks 
associated with hedge funds are the risks of crowded trades. However, these 
risks are not restricted to involve hedge funds. Thus, risks of crowded trades 
should be dealt with in a much broader context including other institutions 
such as banks and - not the least - sovereign wealth funds.
As regards regulation of hedge funds, an overall distinction can be made 
between direct, indirect and market-based regulation. The best protection 
against financial instability caused by hedge funds is competent risk 
management in the financial enterprises that are hedge-fund counterparties, 
and which are already under financial supervision and regulation. Regulation 
should continue to focus on the stability of these institutions, i.e. it is the 
indirect and market based approaches to regulation of hedge funds that could 
be developed further. It is essential that the financial institutions that are, in 
one way or another, counterparties of hedge funds have the necessary risk 
management tools and information at their disposal to be able to manage 
portfolios that include hedge funds.
As the products offered by hedge funds have become more easily accessible 
to retail investors, for instance via funds-of-funds, there has been a growing 
political pressure to take consumer protection issues into account. It would 
not be advisable to let these concerns set the agenda for regulation of hedge 
funds. In particular, it would most likely be counterproductive to try to apply 
a direct approach to regulation of hedge funds.
The financial market turmoil which started in the summer of 2007 cannot be 
attributed to hedge-fund activities, and throughout the turmoil so far yields 
generated by hedge funds seem to have shown less volatility than yields on 
shares. But some of the initiatives generated by the turmoil, for instance on 
improving accounting standards and valuation of complex financial products, 
are likely to strengthen the feasibility of indirect and market based approaches 
to regulating hedge funds.121
1.  Background: Tendencies in the development
of hedge funds
1.1. Increased activity by hedge funds
The increasing role of hedge funds has been a key structural trend in the 
international financial markets in recent years. The current number of hedge 
funds is estimated to be around 10,000 globally, with AUM (assets under 
management) totalling 1,500–2,000 billion dollars. The uncertain estimate 
can be attributed to incomplete statistical coverage of hedge funds and their 
activities in national and international financial markets. This is partly due 
to the absence of a clear and generally accepted definition of a hedge fund, 
partly to the fact that a considerable number of hedge funds do not report data 
systematically to authorities or international databases.
The hedge funds’ AUM has been on the increase since 1990, and the 
development has accelerated especially in the last five years, as illustrated in 
Chart 1.122 Background: Tendencies in the development of hedge funds
The growth in hedge funds has taken place even though yields reported since 
2003 have not been systematically higher than those on e.g. shares-only 
portfolios, cf. Table 1
2. The relatively more modest yields can be viewed as 
a result of the maturing and broadening of the hedge fund sector.
Table 1: Annual percentage yield in hedge funds compared with shares and bonds
  2000 2001 2002 2003  2004 2005 2006  2007
Hedge funds ........8.4  6.3  0.1  18.6  7.7  8.6  12.1  11.1
Shares ................–9.1  –11.9  –22.1  28.7  10.9  4.9  15.8  5.5
Bonds  ................11.6 8.4  10.3 4.1  4.3 2.4 4.3  7.0
Note: The yield is stated as the yield calculated on the basis of S&P 500 (for shares), Lehman 
Brothers Aggregate Bond Index (for bonds) and Greenwich Global Hedge Fund Index (for 
hedge funds). The latter index is constructed on the basis of information on approximately 
7,000 hedge funds in and outside the USA. Fund of funds are not included in the index. Yield 
in hedge funds is excluding manager fees.
Source: Greenwich Alternative Investments. 
In addition to actual hedge-fund activities, similar investment strategies
3 are being 
pursued from managed accounts with considerable funds at their disposal, i.e. 
portfolios managed by hedge-fund managers on behalf of private or institutional 
investors. For managed accounts, the investors typically have direct ownership 
of the managed assets, which ensures the investors almost full transparency as 
to the composition of the portfolio and the trading activity. Furthermore, the 
investors can realise their portfolios at very short notice. The extent of managed 
accounts is difficult to estimate. However, it is estimated that around one quarter 
of the existing hedge funds operate managed accounts, and that private managed 
accounts alone amounted to more than 300 billion dollars at the end of June 2005
4. 
Furthermore, strategies similar to those pursued by hedge funds are increasingly 
2 Direct application of traditional risk measures to investment in hedge funds often entails 
problems. As a result, comparisons with traditional investments in e.g. shares and bonds are 
difficult to interpret. One reason is that the yield profiles of hedge funds may be characterised by 
other distributions than those traditionally used for calculations of risk-adjusted yields. Another 
problem is the potential bias in the available data on hedge-fund yields. Funds with particularly 
high yields may have an incentive to keep a low profile if the investors call for discretion. Funds 
with particularly low yields may have an incentive to refrain from reporting, considering new 
potential investors. In addition, data from the hedge funds that have closed down because of 
unsuccessful investments are not included. Finally, some hedge funds differ from more traditional 
investments in that the hedge-fund manager can choose not to manage the capital in periods when 
attractive placement opportunities are found to be insufficient within the hedge fund’s chosen 
strategy. In that case, the deposits are simply returned to the investors until the manager can see 
investment opportunities again.
3 The hedge funds’ most frequently applied investment strategies are outlined in Thuesen 
(2005).
4  Source: ECB (2007:2).123 Background: Tendencies in the development of hedge funds
being applied by the proprietary trading desks of major international banks
5. In 
addition, strategies that might be applied by hedge funds have been indirectly 
applied by some banks through the establishment of conduits and SIVs.
1.2. Developments in the geographical spread of the activity
Until 10 years ago, hedge funds were primarily a US phenomenon. The USA still 
accounts for the largest share by far of hedge-fund activity, but hedge funds have now 
also rapidly gained ground elsewhere, especially in the UK. Chart 2 illustrates the 
geographical spread measured in terms of AUM and the number of hedge funds.
Chart 2: Geographical Spread of Hedge-Fund Activities
Note: Data is based on questionnaires from the OECD and IOSCO, mainly calculated as of mid-2006.
Source: OECD (2007:2) and OECD (2007:3).
5  Source: ECB (2007:2).124 Background: Tendencies in the development of hedge funds
1.3.   A key role in trading and price formation in securities markets
Despite the growth in recent years the portfolios managed by the hedge funds 
are still modest compared to the estimated amount of approximately 18,000 
billion dollars managed globally by conventional investment funds. In most 
countries, AUM for hedge funds account for less than 10 per cent of AUM 
for investment funds
6. Many hedge funds tend to trade their portfolios more 
often than other portfolio managers. Consequently, hedge funds now account 
for a considerable share of total turnover in many major securities markets. 
This is illustrated by US data in Table 2. Hedge funds therefore play a key role 
in liquidity and price formation in the international securities markets.
Table 2: Hedge Funds’ Share of Trading in Selected Securities in the USA, 2006
Security Percentage of trading
Shares 30
Credit derivatives (plain vanilla) 60
Credit derivatives (structured) 33
Emerging market bonds 45
Distressed debt 47
Leveraged loan trading 33
High yield bond trading 25
Source: OECD (2007:2), Greenwich Associates, Financial Times.
1.4. A Wider spread on more hedge-fund strategies
Hedge funds often try to identify and exploit market imperfections. As the 
number of hedge funds increases, and in step with the growing complexity 
of the financial markets, hedge funds are increasingly specialising, and the 
pattern of investment strategies shows greater dispersion. This means that the 
traditional long/short strategies
7 are less dominant than previously, although 
they are still estimated to make up almost one third in terms of AUM.
6  In Sweden, Austria and the USA, the figure is approximately 10 per cent, while Switzerland 
and the UK are notable exceptions with approximately 20 per cent and almost 60 per cent, 
respectively. Source: OECD (2007:3).
7 A long/short strategy enables the hedge fund to utilise any assumed imbalances in relative 
prices within the same class of assets. For instance, a hedge fund might buy a corporate bond that 
it believes to be priced too low and short-sell a corporate bond that it believes to be priced too 
high. The overall position may be neutral in relation to the market, so that the yield does not →125 Background: Tendencies in the development of hedge funds
1.5. Less clearcut interfaces to other investment types and financial 
players
In step with the increasing prevalence of hedge funds, the traditional distinction 
between hedge funds and other investment types and financial players has in 
some cases become blurred. A case in point is the distinction between hedge 
funds and private equity funds. The latter are characterised by investing in 
individual business enterprises in order to obtain a controlling influence 
on the enterprises’ strategies and operations, i.e. “governance activism”. 
In contrast, conventional hedge funds operate with portfolio investments 
only, among other characteristics. However, recent years have seen several 
examples of large hedge funds playing an active role in e.g. negotiations on 
consolidation of banks or operators of securities markets.
1.6. Changed composition of investors
Traditional investors in hedge funds are private individuals with very 
substantial wealth. Part of the growth in hedge funds can be attributed to the 
higher number of such people globally. In recent years, institutional investors, 
including a number of pension companies, have placed an increasing share 
of their assets in hedge funds. Furthermore, there has been a tendency for 
increased investment in hedge funds by private individuals who do not fall 
into the category of very affluent. These investments are primarily indirect 
investments via FoHF
8. The structural shift in the investor base, especially 
the tendency towards more retail investors, has given rise to an international 
debate concerning whether the authorities should introduce consumer 
protection rules in relation to hedge funds similar to the rules applying to 
traditional investment products offered to retail investors.
depend on changes in the level of interest rates, but only on changes in the relative prices of the 
two bonds selected. The classic hedge fund is an equity long/short fund, with short and long 
positions in shares within the same category, e.g. the same industry. Such hedge funds are not 
always market neutral, and some may rapidly shift from being net long to being net short in the 
market.
8  Cf. e.g. Crockett (2007).126
2.  Implications for financial stability
2.1. How hedge funds can affect financial stability
Many analyses indicate that hedge funds have so far generally had a positive 
impact on financial stability e.g. by contributing to better price formation and 
spreading of risk in the global financial markets
9. This can be attributed to 
the following direct and indirect factors, among others:
Hedge funds’ strategies and methods of analysis are often based on identifying 
and exploiting even very small market imperfections, thereby contributing to 
more efficient price formation. 
Through considerable trading activity and position-taking, hedge funds 
contribute liquidity to the financial markets 
Hedge funds often possess financial expertise and risk appetite that can 
benefit the development of new markets. An example is the development of 
the credit derivatives markets in recent years. 
Hedge funds may contribute to limiting market volatility. Since they often 
aim at absolute yields, they might be less inclined to buy in a rising market 
and sell in a falling market
10.
Hedge-fund investors cannot usually withdraw their deposits at short notice. 
This contributes to dampening the hedge funds’ need for rapid realisation 
of assets, which could result in an unintentional negative impact on already 
falling markets. In this respect, hedge funds are different from e.g. conduits 
and SIVs, whose financing structure has contributed strongly to the recent 
turmoil in the financial markets. 
9  For example, the ECB finds as follows in ECB (2007:2): “So far, experience with the active 
participation of hedge funds in financial markets over the past decade has, on balance, been very 
positive …”.
10 An example of a stabilising effect: When an index rises, investors that benchmark 
themselves against the index are increasingly exposed in the index, particularly in the securities 
that rise the most. Hedge funds aiming at absolute yields (not relative yields) will leave the index 
as it rises (basically, they do not want to change their exposure in the index). The opposite applies 
when the index falls127 Implications for financial stability
Yields on investments in hedge funds have proved to be significantly less 
correlated with yields in the share and bond markets than e.g. yields in the 
share and bond markets with each other. Inclusion of hedge funds in portfolios 
therefore increases investors’ possibilities of diversifying their portfolios.
However, the increasing importance of hedge funds is also associated with 
a number of potential risks. The risks that are most often pointed out are as 
follows:
Probably the most important risks associated with hedge funds are crowded 
trades, i.e. a situation with most of the hedge funds trading in the same 
direction in a falling market, thereby reinforcing downturns in the international 
securities markets. This can be amplified by the fact that the proprietary 
trading desks of large investment banks may pursue trading strategies similar 
to those of hedge funds.
A related risk to crowded trades is the potential for vicious circles of price 
declines in asset markets. If losses by hedge funds would lead to margin calls 
by prime brokers and/or redemption calls by hedge fund investors, this could 
lead hedge funds into forced sales which could lead to price declines in asset 
markets, which could lead to further losses for hedge funds etc. Since hedge 
funds account for a large share of trading in many securities markets, they 
play a key role in price formation, as mentioned above. Thus, this vicious 
circle could be further enforced as markets become less liquid, because hedge 
funds are being restricted in their role as significant liquidity providers.
Due to the increasing hedge-fund activity, prime brokerage has become 
a substantial business area for some of the large international investment banks. 
For these banks, there are risks associated with the further development of the 
hedge-fund sector and potential shifts in the terms of competition between the 
existing and any new providers of prime brokerage.
•   Losses on hedge funds had no significant implications for financial stability 
as long as the investors were mainly very affluent individuals. As more and 
more banks and institutional investors have increased their direct or indirect 
positions in hedge funds, the potential risks associated with hedge funds 
have risen. It is essential that the financial institutions that are, in one way or 
another, counterparties of hedge funds have the necessary risk management 
tools and information at their disposal to be able to manage portfolios that 
include hedge funds.128 Implications for financial stability
These potential risks, among other factors, have given rise to the debate on 
hedge funds in recent years. A central policy issue in the debate has been 
whether it is expedient – and possible – to launch international initiatives to 
strengthen the regulation of hedge funds.
2.2. Ten years of “pre-market turmoil” history of major hedge-fund 
crises
In connection with the most well-known collapse of a hedge fund, Long-Term 
Capital Management, LTCM, in the autumn of 1998, the Federal Reserve 
actively encouraged a solution in view of the potential negative impact on the 
financial markets of compulsory liquidation. LTCM was thus subsequently 
acquired by other private financial enterprises
11. However, experience from 
the years after LTCM shows that problems and losses for even large hedge 
funds did not give rise to systemic crises in the international financial 
markets. Table 3 provides an overview of the largest hedge-fund crises from 
the LTCM-crisis to the beginning of the recent market turmoil.
Table 3: Selected Crises in Hedge Funds 1998–2006





Tiger Management 2,600 2000






Manhattan Investment Fund 400 1999
MotherRock 230 2006
Source: Ferguson et al. (2007).
11  In connection with the LTCM crisis in the autumn of 1998, 17 LTCM counterparties stood 
to lose 3-5 billion dollars in total.129 Implications for financial stability
It is estimated that well in excess of 2,000 hedge funds closed down in the 
period 1999 – 2005
12. None of these events gave rise to systemic crises in the 
financial markets.
Liquidations can be voluntary, i.e. initiated by the hedge-fund manager, or 
involuntary if it is no longer possible to obtain sufficient AUM volume. Many 
liquidations are attributable to the latter reason either because the hedge funds are 
unable to attract a sufficient number of new investors, or because the investors 
execute their right to withdraw their investments from the hedge funds.
2.3. Hedge funds and the recent turmoil in the international financial 
markets beginning in the summer of 2007
During the second half of 2007 hedge funds generally generated reasonable yields 
despite the financial market turmoil, although some hedge funds experienced 
losses particularly in August and November 2007. The relatively robust 
performance came as a surprise to some market observers. Others interpreted the 
development as a consequence of the more specialized and focused investment 
strategies often followed by hedge funds, and many hedge funds’ focus on 
absolute returns. A part of the explanation is probably the heterogeneous nature 
of the hedge fund sector in terms of strategies and risk levels. Consequently, 
hedge funds are affected in different ways by sudden shifts in market conditions, 
and they also have different response patterns. During the first months of the 
turmoil, it seemed that although a few hedge funds had to close down, there 
were only few examples of hedge funds being forced to sell their assets or 
having to refuse investors who wanted to withdraw their investments, in order 
to avoid forced sale of the their assets. In other cases, hedge funds apparently 
contributed to stability by buying assets in falling markets
13. Another likely 
explanation could be, that hedge funds as a group was initially less exposed to 
the US subprime market than some observers had believed.
In the first months of 2008 hedge funds experienced considerable losses – as 
did a number of other financial institutions. The losses seem to have been 
reported mainly for January and March, while reports for February, April 
and May seem to be on the positive side. In total, yields reported for hedge 
12 Cole et al. (2007). The assessment is based on the inflow and outflow of reporting hedge 
funds to the LipperTASS Database. It is not possible to state the precise number of closed-down 
hedge funds since there might be other reasons why a hedge fund chooses no longer to report to 
the database. According to an estimate for 2006, more than 700 hedge funds closed down, while 
just under 1,000 new funds were established.
13 According to analyses from - among others - Bank of England and ECB.130 Implications for financial stability
funds for the first six months of 2008 seem to be close to zero. At the same 
time, there have been considerable losses on shares, and yields on shares have 
shown much higher volatility, cf. chart 3.
Chart 3: Hedge Funds’ Relative Performance during the Turmoil
Note: The yield is stated as the yield calculated on the basis of S&P 500 (for shares), Lehman 
Brothers Aggregate Bond Index (for bonds) and Greenwich Global Hedge Fund Index (for 
hedge funds). The latter index is constructed on the basis of information on approximately 
7,000 hedge funds in and outside the USA. Fund of funds are not included in the index. Yield 
in hedge funds is excluding manager fees. Preliminary data for June 2008.
Source: Greenwich Alternative Investments
However, the probably most remarkable phenomenon in relation to hedge funds 
was that they became restricted in their role as significant liquidity providers in 
important markets, because prime brokers were forced to or inclined to restrict their 
businesses with hedge funds as a consequence of the turmoil. According to some 
analyses there are tentative signs that the relatively poorer hedge fund performance 
in the beginning of 2008 could have had the effect that more hedge fund investors 
are looking to redeem funds towards the end of the year
14. This would add to the 
difficulties for the hedge fund sector to restore its liquidity providing capabilities.
Throughout the financial market turmoil so far, yields generated by hedge funds 
– seen as a group - seem to have shown less volatility than yields on shares, cf. 
Chart 3
15.
14  Bank of England (2008).
15 There are considerable differences in yield performance between different categories of 
hedge funds. 131
3.  Regulating hedge funds and supporting financial 
stability
The increasing role of hedge funds has spurred international discussions on 
both the need for and the feasibility of regulating hedge funds.
3.1. Approaches to regulation of hedge funds
As regards regulation of hedge funds, an overall distinction can be made 
between direct, indirect and market-based regulation
16. 
3.1.1. Direct  regulation
Direct regulation of hedge funds can be associated with a number of 
problems.
For instance, it would be difficult to regulate hedge funds on the basis of risk-
based requirements for capital adequacy and risk management systems, along 
the lines of the regulatory framework applying to other financial institutions. 
One reason is that the rapid restructuring of the hedge funds’ often very 
complex portfolios would require frequent and resource-intensive inspections 
by the supervisory authorities. On the liabilities side it may be somewhat 
easier for the authorities to limit investor access, in practice blocking retail 
investors’ access to invest in hedge funds, which would minimise consumer 
protection concerns. However, this raises the fundamental issue of whether 
only already very affluent individuals should have access, as private investors, 
to the potentially higher yields that can be achieved by including hedge funds 
in portfolios
17.
In addition, there is the perhaps most important and practical problem in 
relation to direct regulation, i.e. that many hedge funds are registered in 
16  This distinction is often applied in the literature, cf. e.g. Crockett (2007).
17  The Danish Act on Hedge Associations, which entered into force on 1 July 2005, provides 
a solution that does not limit the associations’ investment strategies, while accommodating 
consumer information needs by imposing information requirements on the hedge associations as 
regards investment strategies and risk profiles.132 Regulating hedge funds and supporting financial stability
offshore financial centres
18, or can easily move to offshore financial centres 
if new regulatory requirements are imposed.
3.1.2. Indirect  regulation
Indirect regulation of hedge funds may take prime brokers as the starting 
point. Prime brokers are typically already regulated and subject to financial 
supervision. By imposing the right requirements on prime brokers, the 
authorities can contribute to curbing the risk that problems in the hedge-fund 
sector spread to the core of the financial system. Such requirements could 
encompass the size and quality of collateral for loans and securities lending, 
the size of margins on derivatives contracts, capital requirements for exposure 
to hedge funds and the quality of risk management systems.
In principle, the objective of, and approach to, indirect regulation of hedge 
funds is no different from the regulation applying to prime brokers and 
other traditional financial enterprises to ensure appropriate risk management 
and capital adequacy in these enterprises. However, having hedge funds 
with complex investment strategies as counterparties may present special 
challenges. An important advantage of indirect regulation is that it is feasible 
in practice, which makes it the most frequently recommended approach to 
hedge funds in recent years’ international reports
19.
It should be noted that indirect regulation does not necessarily prevent 
problems in one or more hedge funds from causing problems in the financial 
markets as a result of crowded trades and sudden liquidity shortages, as 
described above.
3.1.3.  Market based regulation
Proposals for market-based regulation of hedge funds are based on the 
assumption that if all market participants are sufficiently well informed, they 
can take the relevant risks into account
20. In principle, this also applies to the 
18  The Cayman Islands, the British Virgin Islands, Bermuda and the Bahamas are examples of 
offshore financial centres with a large number of registered hedge funds.
19 Examples are Financial Stability Forum (2007) and Alternative Investment Expert Group 
(2006).
20 Another prerequisite for well-functioning market-based regulation is that the market 
participants can use the available information for risk assessment purposes.133 Regulating hedge funds and supporting financial stability
risks associated with e.g. crowded trades. A considerable degree of market 
transparency is therefore a precondition for well-functioning market-based 
regulation.
Prime brokers and financial investors in hedge funds are qualified counterparties 
that should only do business on an informed basis. The hedge funds are 
therefore effectively under substantial pressure to provide information to the 
counterparties, although not necessarily to the general public. Nevertheless, 
there may still be a need to increase the transparency of hedge funds with 
a view to monitoring by both market participants and authorities of the 
potential risks that hedge funds may represent to the financial system overall. 
For example, how will the compulsory liquidation of a large hedge fund affect 
the financial system, and what are the potential risks associated with crowded 
trades? However, even if a documented need for increased transparency 
exists, it is not always clear how the right information can be provided in 
practice. For example, in many cases the balance sheet of a hedge fund 
does not provide a very good and easily accessible view of its risk profile 
since exposure management is also conducted on an off-balance-sheet basis, 
including widespread use of a range of derivatives.
3.2. The financial stability approach to regulating hedge funds
Traditionally, special regulation of financial institutions has been governed by 
two primary considerations, i.e. consumer protection and limiting systemic 
risks.
3.2.1.  Focus on financial stability issues
The main challenge for regulation of hedge funds is to address, where 
possible, the potential risks to financial stability, while maintaining a legal 
framework in which hedge funds can continue to contribute positively to the 
development and the stability of the international financial system. It should 
be recalled, that one of the reasons why hedge funds have in many cases been 
able to contribute positively to the functioning and development of markets 
is that they have been able to implement investment strategies that could 
not have been implemented under the regulatory framework for traditional 
financial institutions such as banks and investment associations. Any need to 
regulate hedge funds’ portfolio management should therefore be considered 
in relation to the potential drawbacks of regulation.134 Regulating hedge funds and supporting financial stability
A default of a hedge fund - or its investors for that matter – is not as such 
a financial stability issue as long as it does not have severe consequences for 
the core of the financial system. As illustrated above, there have in recent 
years been many defaults in hedge funds, even large hedge funds, without 
severe financial stability consequences.
The best protection against financial instability caused by hedge funds, 
therefore, seems to be competent risk management in the financial enterprises 
that are hedge-fund counterparties, and which are already under financial 
supervision and regulation. Regulation should continue to focus on the needs 
of these institutions, i.e. it is the indirect and market based approaches to 
regulation of hedge funds that could be developed further. This is in line with 
recent recommendations from Financial Stability Forum
21 and the approach 
taken so far in the EU
22. It is essential that the financial institutions that are, 
in one way or another, counterparties of hedge funds have the necessary risk 
management tools and information at their disposal to be able to manage 
portfolios that include hedge funds.
The financial market turmoil which started in the summer of 2007 cannot be 
attributed to hedge-fund activities. However, hedge funds play an important 
role in markets for securitization and trading of credit, i.e. for those financial 
structures and markets that have been put into focus in the ongoing work to 
deal with the turmoil and support future financial stability. And some of the 
initiatives generated by the turmoil are likely to strengthen the feasibility of 
indirect and market based approaches to regulating hedge funds. One example 
of this is the accelerated work on transparency in securitisation processes and 
markets. Another example is the work on principles for the valuation of illiquid 
or complex financial products. Besides the fact, that the financial turmoil has 
highlighted the general need for ways of valuing illiquid assets and complex 
portfolios, a special characteristic of hedge fund industry is that the hedge-
fund managers’ remuneration is often directly linked to the calculation of the 
hedge funds’ yields and, hence, to the valuation principles. A third example is 
21  Financial Stability Forum (2007).
22 In the EU, hedge funds were discussed at the informal Ecofin meeting in April 2007, 
and in May the Ecofin Council adopted Council conclusions on hedge funds. The conclusions 
acknowledge that the existing approach with indirect regulation/supervision has so far strengthened 
the resilience to systemic risks, and the Council encourages market participants and authorities to 
remain alert as to potential risks. How  ever, at the same time the Council points out the need for 
better understanding of the significance of hedge funds to financial stability. Finally, the Council 
conclusions refer to the concerns expressed by some member states regarding retail investors’ 
investments in hedge funds. The European Commission has been asked to investigate the need for 
EU regulation of the investment funds that are currently subject to national legislation and are on 
offer to the general public. These might include some funds of hedge funds.135 Regulating hedge funds and supporting financial stability
the accelerated work on accounting and disclosure standards for off-balance 
sheet entities.
The strong political focus has put pressure on the hedge-fund sector to be 
more willing than previously to engage in a dialogue with the authorities on 
the potential risks associated with hedge funds. One result has been that in 
the summer of 2007 a working group of 14 of the largest European hedge 
funds invited other European hedge funds to cooperate on formulating 
a code of conduct for hedge funds. Their resulting report came in January 
2008
23. Another result has been that in the US two committees of the 
President’s Working Group on Financial Markets released their respective 
best practices recommendations for hedge fund managers and investors in 
April 2008
24. 
Special attention needs to be devoted to the potential systemic problems 
caused by crowded trades and/or shifts in very large portfolios which are de 
facto controlled by a small number of market participants. Since hedge funds 
play a crucial role for liquidity and price formation in many markets (at least 
they did so until recently and they are expected to regain this role), solutions 
need to include ways to approach hedge funds in these matters. This is not 
an easy task at all, and so far there does not seem to be obvious solutions. 
For instance, it would be very complicated even for supervisors with powers 
to collect institution-specific data to gain an overview of all major market 
players, their portfolios, and the potential for crowding trades implied by their 
trading strategies. And even if a point-in-time overview could be obtained, 
this could change very quickly.
In order to address these challenges one must be aware that the potential 
systemic problems related to crowded trades are not restricted to involve 
hedge funds. Also the proprietary trading desks of large financial institutions 
have the potential to end up in systematic crowded trading behaviour. And 
probably even more importantly, the fast growing influence of sovereign 
wealth funds on markets should be involved in considerations on how to 
avoid crowded trades and how to secure well functioning capital markets in 
the future.
23  Hedge Fund Working Group (2008).
24 Asset Managers’ Committee to the Presidents’s Working Group on Financial Markets 
(2008)and Investors’ Committee to the Presidents’s Working Group on Financial Markets (2008)136 Regulating hedge funds and supporting financial stability
3.2.2.   Less focus should be on consumer protection issues when dealing 
with hedge funds
The consumer protection issue has until recently not been relevant to hedge 
funds, as the funds’ investors have traditionally been high net worth individuals 
and subsequently also institutional investors and other professional investors. 
However, as the products offered by hedge fund have become more easily 
accessible to retail investors, for instance via funds-of-funds, there has been 
a growing political pressure to take consumer protection issues into account. 
This could raise a number of problems.
One issue is that regulatory actions motivated by consumer protection issues 
often tend to take the form of direct regulation. As explained above, there are 
a number of problems connected to direct regulation of hedge funds.
Another issue is whether there is at all a traditional case for consumer 
protection when it comes to hedge funds. For financial institutions such as 
banks, pension funds, investments funds etc. main reasons for regulation on 
consumer protection are a) to compensate for the asymmetries in information 
and skill between the demand side and the supply side of the market and 
b) support demand side confidence. This is in the interest of all market 
participants, since financial businesses are basically trust businesses, and if 
one financial institution were to exploit its customers and act unethically, 
there is a risk that this behaviour would harm also the future business of all 
other suppliers of financial services. In the interest of the whole economy, 
retail investors should have access to - and confidence in - banking services, 
pension schemes, basic savings products, insurance etc. However, there is 
not necessarily a public interest in securing retail investors’ general access to 
investments in hedge funds as an asset class. In other words, if some retail 
investors should decide to invest in hedge funds – and if they should default 
on these investments – it is not at all clear why this in itself provides at case 
for regulating hedge funds. (Assumed, of course, that hedge funds are not 
allowed to market themselves to the general public, and that these investments 
are not sold via for instance banks, in which case the investments should be 
covered by the consumer protection rules concerning banks).
A third fundamental issue is, whether hedge funds could be considered an 
asset class, and whether this asset class is at all suitable for retail investors. 
The large differences between hedge funds in terms of strategies, risk profiles 
and the instruments they use, means that the concept “hedge fund” is rather 
a business model or a legal structure that an asset class in the traditional sense. 137 Regulating hedge funds and supporting financial stability
This makes it difficult to apply a “one-size-fits-all” consumer protection 
legislation in a meaningful way. Furthermore, the sometimes complex 
financial structures used by hedge funds as a natural part of their business 
model implies, that retail investors – considered as general group - could 
probably never be expected to understand the actual risk profiles of advanced 
hedge fund portfolios. If lack of financial literacy is of concern in relation 
to retail customers’ buying standardized financial services – and everything 
indicates that it is – this problem would be expanded dramatically with an 
ambition of making investments in hedge funds generally available to retail 
investors within the same framework as more traditional financial services.
In other words, it would not be advisable to let consumer protection issues set 
the agenda for regulation of hedge funds. These concerns ought to be scaled 
down in the political discussions on the rationale for regulating hedge funds. 
In particular, it would most likely be counterproductive to try to apply a direct 
approach to regulation of hedge funds.
First and foremost, consumer protection concerns should not stand in the way 
for a strong focus on financial stability issues when it comes to designing the 
right regulatory approach to regulating hedge funds.138
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Abstract
The recent market turmoil following the crisis of sub-prime mortgages in 
the US has provided rich evidence of some serious deficiencies in the world 
financial system. This paper provides some elements for reflection on how 
to address them. The issues analysed in the paper are classified around four 
key words: transparency, credit rating agencies, liquidity and supervisory 
arrangements.
As the market turmoil is mainly driven by a confidence crisis among market 
participants, improving transparency is a necessary condition to avoid similar 
episodes in the future. This entails improving disclosure of risk exposures 
by financial institutions. In particular, more complete public information on 
implicit exposures to off-balance sheet vehicles is warranted. In addition, 
investors and issuers would benefit from some additional guidance by 
accounting standard setters on appropriate valuation techniques for illiquid 
instruments. At the same time any revision on the scope of application of 
1 This paper was prepared for the 28th SUERF Colloquium on "New Trends in Asset 
Management: Examining the Implications" held in Munch on 12 – 14 June 2008, and has not been 
revised to take into account developments since unfolding thereafter.144 Abstract
the fair value principle should be consistent with the primary objective of 
accounting principles; namely, to reflect properly the economic reality of the 
reporting companies.
Transparency regarding financial institutions should be complemented with 
more enhanced monitoring of the process of financial innovation. This would 
include eliminating spurious forces (such as regulatory arbitrage or lax credit 
assessment practices) that currently invite the issuance of highly complex 
structured products. In addition, information flows between originators, 
vehicles and investors should be improved and more standardisation of 
instruments should be promoted. Moreover, transparency requirements 
should be tightened up for non-equity markets – those most affected by the 
turmoil. 
Credit rating agencies have done a poor job of assessing different types of 
structured products. Recent proposals by the FSF and IOSCO to improve 
the current Code of Conduct are welcome, in order to promote the use of 
robust methodologies, prevent conflicts of interest and increase transparency, 
comparability and competition. At the same time, the extent of the problems 
identified should convince public officials to find effective ways to monitor 
these agencies beyond the self-regulation schemes now in place in most 
jurisdictions. The possibility of establishing, at a global level, an independent 
body to issue and monitor compliance with more specific rules than 
those contained in the current code of conduct deserves to be seriously 
considered.
The lack of liquidity in a number of wholesale markets urges measures to 
increase activity in non-equity markets through product standardisation and 
the consolidation of trading platforms for non-equity instruments in the 
eurozone. Problems of liquidity in interbank markets have been effectively 
mitigated by central bank actions. Those, such as the Eurosystem, with more 
flexible collateral and counterparty eligibility criteria have been the best 
positioned to provide the required liquidity to those institutions adversely 
affected by abnormal market conditions. There is scope however to increase 
the transparency of the Eurosystem’s collateral policy, particularly in relation 
to the valuation methods which it currently applies to eligible illiquid 
instruments. In the regulatory sphere, there is a need to enhance supervisory 
control of the liquidity risk of credit institutions, at least through Pillar 2 of 
Basel II. Moreover, accounting standard setters should reflect on the benefit 
of requiring disclosures on variables – such as maturity mismatches – that 
would help investors to assess companies’ liquidity risk. Finally, regulators 145 Abstract
may have to consider whether standard investment funds (of the UCITS 
category) should be subject to stricter controls of their portfolios’ liquidity. 
The recent turmoil has evidenced that prudential supervision and aggregate 
liquidity management are two closely related functions which might best 
be assigned to a single institution: the central bank. It has also shown that 
the degree of transparency that well functioning markets require will not 
always coincide with that which makes it easiest to cope with a situation of 
stress in the banking sector. This provides arguments for organising financial 
supervision along the lines of a “twin peaks” model: one institution (the 
central bank) being responsible for the prudential supervision of all types of 
financial institutions, while another institution supervises good practices in 
financial services markets.146
1. Introduction
Since the summer of 2007, the world has been undergoing a prolonged period 
of turbulence in financial markets. Its origins lay in a particular segment 
of a national market: that of sub-prime mortgages in the US. However, the 
effects spread rapidly across the global financial system. 
The main diffusion channel has been structured product markets. A large part of 
sub-prime mortgages were securitised: sold by credit institutions to off-balance 
sheet vehicles which financed those purchases by issuing securities. These 
securities were sold to institutional investors located worldwide, or at times to 
other vehicles which issued higher-rated instruments backed by packages of 
the original securities, normally with additional credit enhancements. The risk 
entailed by sub-prime mortgages was therefore distributed among a wide variety 
of international investors. The substantial increase in defaults experienced last 
summer, and the failure of some entities (monolines) to bear the losses they were 
supposed to cover generated write-downs in the balance sheets of a number of 
institutions exposed to structured products linked to sub-prime mortgages. 
However, not all the impact of the sub-prime crisis on global financial markets 
can be explained in terms of the widespread exposure to bad quality mortgages 
originated in the US. The crisis has also hit markets in financial instruments 
without any linkage to the US sub-prime mortgage markets. 
In addition to a significant depreciation of some classes of financial instruments, 
the turmoil has generated a substantial and generalised reduction of activity 
in several primary and secondary markets. The result was a failure of pricing 
mechanisms that limited the funding available to financial institutions with or 
without exposure to sub-prime assets, and this, in turn, occasioned a serious 
distortion in the regular real-sector financing mechanisms of many economies 
around the world. 
Those developments have opened a rich debate on the aspects of the global 
financial system which may have helped generate or intensify the turmoil. 
Four areas at least deserve special attention. 
The first issues to focus on are those related to market transparency. The 
significant contagion effects on a wide range of markets can only be explained as 
a confidence crisis. The stress faced by holders of sub-prime related instruments 
led some market participants to suspect that other instruments and/or other 147 Introduction 
financial institutions apparently unaffected by the sub-prime crisis could in fact 
be exposed to the same or similar problems. When a confidence crisis erupts, it 
is normally the consequence of a transparency deficit. This deficit could refer to 
information on the real situation of relevant institutions, on the nature of some 
of the instruments traded in financial markets or on the supply and demand 
conditions of the markets where those instruments are traded. 
The effects of the crisis have spread to the global financial system by way 
of structured product markets. Since those markets rely heavily on the 
assessments made by credit rating agencies (CRAs), the work undertaken by 
those agencies also merits careful scrutiny. They play a key role as translators 
of available financial information into the language of investment decisions. 
Both transparency issues and the role of CRAs are key inputs to any analysis 
of the causes of the confidence crisis that has swept global financial markets. 
And given that an important direct consequence has been a drought in 
interbank and some private bond markets, a third element that merits analysis 
is the supervision and regulation of liquidity conditions in wholesale markets 
and on the balance sheets of financial firms. 
Finally, the episode of market turbulence has affected the activity of several 
public agencies –including central banks, security markets and banking 
supervisors – and a number of international organisations and financial forums. 
This makes it a good scenario against which to test the effectiveness of different 
organisational arrangements for financial regulation and supervision. 
This paper attempts to provide an overview of what the author believes are the 
main lessons from the crisis. This overview takes due account of the proposals 
put forward by relevant international bodies such as the Financial Stability 
Forum (FSF), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the International 
Organisation of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) or the Basel Committee 
on Financial Supervision (BCBS). However, it takes issue with some of the 
initiatives put forward and adds some reflections of its own, in most cases 
from the perspective of a securities markets supervisor. 
Following the list of analytical priorities outlined above, the paper is 
organised around four key words: i) transparency, which is covered in section 
2; ii) credit rating agencies, the subject of section 3; iii) liquidity, dealt with in 
section 4; and iv) organisational arrangements, dealt with in section 5. These 
are followed by a final section with concluding remarks. 148
2. Transparency
2.1. Transparency of issuers: the fair value debate
Most analysts concur that the losses stemming from the sub-prime crisis have 
not yet been fully reported by financial institutions. In particular, the IMF 
speculated last April that at least one third of estimated subprime-related 
losses remained unreported. (see IMF, 2008).
It is clear that a prerequisite for the restoring of market confidence is a rigorous 
calculation and full disclosure of the write-offs associated to instruments 
affected by the market turmoil. This constitutes a relevant challenge for 
firms, auditors and supervisors. But, whatever the scale of losses, a cause for 
concern is that they were largely the result of exposures which were not easily 
identifiable ex-ante by investors, or even supervisors. Specifically, financial 
institutions’ exposure to vehicles like conduits or Special Investment Vehicles 
(SIVs) was not fully recognised in their published financial statements. 
Indeed, contingent liquidity obligations vis-à-vis those vehicles were often 
poorly recognised or absent..
There is now broad consensus that the full implementation of the new capital 
accord (Basel II) will provide more control on exposures to these vehicles 
(through Pillar 1) and also more information (through Pillar 3). Yet, a more 
forceful enforcement of current consolidation rules for SIVs might be 
warranted
2. In any event, additional efforts are needed to improve disclosures 
on exposure to off-balance-sheet vehicles. In this connection, the FSF’s call 
to financial institutions to release exposures to sub-prime related instruments 
and to the International Accounting Standard Board (IASB) and the US 
Financial Accounting Standard Board (FASB) to adopt more convergent an 
complete disclosure standards must be viewed as a welcome development.
A more controversial issue in this domain is that of a possible reform in 
the valuation rules for financial instruments. Accounting principles require 
instruments in the trading books of financial institutions to be stated at fair 
value: i.e. at market prices when the market is active or using a model in which 
market inputs are maximized when there is no active market. Some claim that 
fair value accounting may not be a sound approach when markets are under 
2  See, in particular, IAS 27,28 and 31 SIC 12 in IASB (2008). 149 Transparency
stress. Two arguments have been put forward to substantiate this position. 
First, when trading is thin and security prices are not aligned with their 
fundamental values, the application of current fair value rules can give a false 
picture of the firm’s economic reality. Second, in today’s circumstances, fair 
value measurement promotes “dramatic write-downs of sound assets that 
adversely affect market sentiment, in turn leading to further write-downs, 
margin calls and capital impacts in a downward spiral …(that) worsen 
liquidity problems and contribute to the conversion of liquidity problems into 
solvency problems.” (IIF, 2008)
In relation to the first argument, it is clear that the dearth of activity in 
some markets –particularly for structured products – represents a challenge 
to the application of the fair value principle. At the same time, a possible 
misalignment of prices with fundamental values can hardly constitute a strong 
argument to propose a discontinuation of the mark-to-market approach.
Fair value is defined by the IASB as “the amount for which an asset could 
be exchanged or a liability settled between knowledgeable, willing parties in 
an arm’s length transaction
3”. Despite its name, then, fair value is not meant 
to express an instrument’s fundamental or equilibrium value, but is rather an 
estimate of the price at which it could normally be sold in the market. Unless 
observed market prices are heavily contaminated by distressed sales – e.g. 
liquidation of companies – they represent the best measure of fair value, even 
though markets may at times overreact to positive or negative news. And 
even if asset prices are considered excessively high or low by the preparers 
of financial statements, they will still be consistent with a fair representation 
of the current economic reality of the firm.
The possibility that fair-value-based accounting rules could be unduly 
procyclical has been long debated in the literature. The starting point for analysis 
of this issue should always be that accounting systems are simply information 
devices that help managers communicate their company’s economic reality in 
a faithful manner. An accurate evaluation of a firm should take into account 
not only current business conditions but also expected future cash flows, 
possibly in different cyclical situations. Fair value is perfectly consistent with 
this approach, in that the market prices of assets are supposed to represent the 
present discounted value of the expected income streams associated to each 
instrument. The discount factor to be applied to future cash flows incorporate 
a number of elements, including the willingness of market participants to take 
3  See IAS 39.9 in International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) issued by the IASB.150 Transparency
on risk. As this willingness is typically procyclical, fair values, like market 
asset prices, tend also to be procyclical. Consequently, the intrinsic value of 
firms’ assets will normally be positively correlated with economic activity. 
One would then expect firms’ financial statements to be consistent with that 
structural feature of the economic reality they are meant to represent.
It is true, however, that the reporting of capital losses due to adverse market 
conditions may trigger reactions that could eventually contribute to amplifying 
market corrections. In particular, we have seen in the recent crisis how 
incipient declines in asset values have been followed by margin calls and asset 
sales that have generated subsequent price falls and, in some cases, detracted 
from market liquidity. Yet it is by no means clear how accounting principles 
– a set of conventions aiming at facilitating a systematic communication on 
firms’ financial situation – could themselves generate destabilising spirals. 
Indeed, margin calls are typically the result of private contracts in which the 
parties acquire commitments that are contingent on market prices. Moreover, 
asset sales are sometimes triggered by companies’ internal decision rules 
aimed at limiting capital losses in an adverse market situation. Although this 
phenomenon could represent a coordination failure in capital markets and 
serve to aggravate market turbulence, the blame can hardly lie with norms 
designed to inform outsiders about a firm’s economic reality.
It could be argued, finally, that, due to regulatory capital requirements, fair 
value accounting can place undue pressure on banks’ capital when markets 
are falling, triggering either asset fire sales or a desperate search for additional 
equity. While it is hard to deny that such destabilising effects may occur in 
stressed markets, the right response is not to call for changes in accounting 
rules -i.e. to shoot the messenger- but to employ adequate prudential policies. 
The latter could perhaps incorporate features to mitigate the procyclical 
effects of minimum capital requirements, for instance by establishing capital 
buffers that could be fed in good times and expensed in bad times, in the 
spirit of Spain’s system of dynamic provisions. Using prudential policy tools 
would seem a more efficient way to address financial stability concerns than 
distorting the criteria used to report financial information.
In any event, the most powerful argument for the fair value measurement 
of the instruments in bank trading books is the absence of a reasonable 
alternative. There have recently been some proposals to adjust fair value 
measurement to make it less sensitive to short-term movements in market 
prices. One idea is that financial statements should value instruments at their 
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on the corresponding reporting date (see Zielve et al., 2008). This proposal 
is seriously misguided. It essentially means that the information provided by 
issuers would no longer represent their financial situation at a specified date, 
but an arbitrary combination of different situations at different moments over 
the more or less recent past. Although, by definition, this approach could 
smooth out the effects of market volatility on financial statements, it would 
be at the heavy cost of underreporting the actual impact of relevant market 
developments.
A more sophisticated proposal has recently being made by a set of financial 
institutions (see IIF, 2008). The idea is to temporarily adopt a “refined 
valuation methodology” for instruments traded in markets which seem 
illiquid or dislocated. This consists essentially in allowing firms to measure 
some illiquid eligible financial instruments at the lower of book value at the 
time of application or amortised cost. What the IFF is proposing basically is to 
prevent a chain of revise-downs in the value of certain instruments – typically 
structured products – by setting a floor level equivalent to amortised cost. In 
addition, the IIF calls on accounting standard setters to adopt a more flexible 
reclassification of instruments from the trading book category (measured at 
fair-value) to the held-to-maturity (or banking) book (measured at amortised 
cost).
This proposal would help issuers to avoid hefty write-downs of devalued 
assets. However, it entails a significant rupture with the spirit and letter of 
IFRS. If accepted, it would imply consolidating an asymmetric procedure 
of financial reporting: when the market is booming or even bubbly, market 
prices remain a good reference for the valuation of instruments and the 
reporting of capital gains; however, when markets are under stress, managers 
can avoid reporting the impact of that stress on their capital and profits. This 
bias could severely undermine the faithfulness of financial statements and 
threaten the integrity of capital markets. Moreover, the proposal would not 
actually remove the stress from banks’ portfolios, it would just make it less 
explicit for investors and supervisors.
Notwithstanding the above, the current turmoil has made it clear that some 
aspects of financial reporting principles require a thoroughgoing review. This 
review should touch basically on two aspects: specific valuation techniques 
and disclosure practices. 
The IASB has admitted that valuation principles are, at present, unduly 
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categories of instruments subject to different valuation methodologies, and 
there is an evident need for some form of streamlining.
As stated, IFRS require firms to use market prices to estimate fair value in 
the presence of an active market. It no such market exists, they have to fall 
back on a valuation technique. It may be worth providing firms with added 
guidance on the concrete criteria they should use in deciding to use one or 
other procedure to calculate fair value. Some additional references to help 
assess the suitability of specific market inputs for valuation techniques, 
particularly proxies for the credit risk of structured products without an active 
market, would also be welcomed by the industry
4.
But probably it is in the field of disclosure where there is most room for 
substantive improvements. Financial statements should, as a rule, contain 
more information on the techniques used to value financial instruments, 
including market references, the structure of models, assumptions, inputs and 
risks arising from model uncertainty. 
2.2. Product transparency
Another element which has contributed to the geographical extension and 
intensity of market distress has to do with the uncertainty surrounding the 
risks of structured products.
There is now little doubt that structured financial products have contributed to 
the efficiency of the global financial system. On the supply side, securitisation 
has allowed banks to more flexibly manage their credit risk exposure, as well 
as enhancing their ability to obtain funding at a time when deposits were more 
dynamic than the demand for loans. From investors’ point of view, asset-
backed securities give them access to banks’ credit risk while enlarging their 
choice of instruments. Moreover, as credit risk exposure has become more 
spread out across different types of investors, structured finance may also 
have had some positive effects on overall financial stability. Therefore, from 
a social welfare point of view, the emergency of structured financial products 
is unquestionably a favourable development. It has helped complete markets 
4 At the time of writing this paper, banking supervisors (BCBS and CEBS) and securities 
supervisors (CESR) are working on procedures and associated disclosures. However official 
guidance can only be provided by the IASB itself. Following a request by the FSF, this issue has 
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and has opened the door to a more efficient distribution of credit risk across 
the whole financial system.
Despite these benefits, there is growing evidence that the phenomenon 
may have gone too far, too quickly. Although there is little official data on 
these markets, the available information indicates that the issuance of main 
structured products – such as asset-backed securities (ABS), mortgage-
backed securities (MBS) and collateralised debt obligations (CDO) – in the 
US and Europe reached USD 2,500 billion in 2007, despite the deceleration 
of the last quarter. This is more than five times the equivalent figure for the 
year 2000. (see graph 1)
Graph 1: European and US Structured Credit Issuance (USD bn)
Sources: Inside MBS & ABS; JPMorgan Chase & Co.; and European Securitization Forum.
Interestingly, this rapid increase in the issuance of structured products is 
not only due to the securitisation of commercial loans but, especially, to 
the significant acceleration of CDOs. These are securities issued against 
already existing securities, normally ABS, typically with additional credit 
enhancements. By diversifying riskier tranches of ABS, CDOs generate larger 
volumes of the investment grade securities eagerly demanded by institutional 
investors due to regulatory or internal portfolio constraints. However, they do 
not represent new investment opportunities; just the repackaging of already 
existing risk-return profiles. In this sense, the pace that structured product 
issuance has reached cannot be entirely rationalised as a welfare-improving 
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Indeed, there are signs that behind that phenomenon lurk some spurious 
reasons that have pushed issuance volumes to excessive highs.
Specifically, an important driving force behind securitisation has been 
regulatory arbitrage. The Basel I Capital Accord allowed banks to free 
regulatory capital when they moved commercial loans to off-balance-sheet 
vehicles, even if the originator retained substantial exposure to the transferred 
assets. Moreover, the very processes of securitisation and structuring 
generate income – in the form of fees – which is often partly appropriated 
by the originator itself. Finally, as we know now, rating agencies contributed 
significantly to the boom by failing to properly assess the underlying default 
risk. Particularly dubious was the practice of generating investment grade 
securities through CDOs, as it relied on estimates of the pay-off correlations 
of the underlying loans which were downward biased.
It seems likely that regulatory reforms will contribute to more sustainable 
dynamics for structured products. The full implementation of Basel II will 
ensure that off-balance-sheet exposures are subject to commensurate capital 
requirements. At the same time, the new accord implies higher capital 
requirements for holdings of below-investment-grade paper. Moreover, the 
BCBS is currently studying raising capital requirements for highly rated 
complex instruments, such as CDOs of ABS. These regulatory changes may 
significantly reduce banks’ incentives to hold structured products on their 
balance sheets, as well as induce a rebalancing of their preferred funding 
routes in favour of more traditional instruments like covered bonds. 
At the same time, wherever credit risk transfer through securitisation continues 
to be pursued, its buyer public will increasingly comprise institutional investors 
outside the heavily regulated banking sector. As a consequence, a larger range 
of investors may become directly or indirectly exposed to instruments which 
are currently owned by credit institutions. This strengthens the need for 
greater transparency on the risk-return characteristics of structured products; 
something that can only be achieved through more exacting disclosure 
obligations and the further standardisation of complex instruments. In most 
countries, the prospectuses of securities issued by securitisation vehicles 
offer fairly comprehensive information on the nature and historical default 
records of the underlying loans. However, they do not always give enough 
information on originators’ willingness to retain credit risk by purchasing the 
risky tranches issued by the vehicle. The recent sub-prime crisis has shown 
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part of the underlying credit risk, the institution’s due diligence procedures on 
the securitised loans will be more reliable.
Another relevant deficiency is the scant information that originators typically 
transmit on the performance of securitised assets. Existing regulations 
are fairly lax about originators’ reporting commitments in respect of 
the securitised assets they administer. In most jurisdictions, they are not 
even obliged to directly notify impairments of the securitised loans to the 
corresponding special purpose vehicles. Information requirements for vehicle 
managers are also relatively limited and unsystematic. And though they notify 
significant developments that may potentially affect securities, they are not 
legally required to present regular financial statements.
The solution to this transparency deficit in structured products will require 
a joint effort by securities market supervisors and the industry. The 
strengthening of information requirements for originators and vehicles will 
probably necessitate direct regulatory action. There is however some scope 
for self-regulation as regards the harmonisation of prospectuses, including 
information on originators’ intentions.
Another area which the industry can usefully work on is that of standardisation. 
The development of a small number of standard products – or categories of 
products – would facilitate due diligence by investors, asset managers and 
rating agencies. This would also help promote more liquid markets for those 
instruments, increasing their attractiveness for institutional investors. Finally, 
standardisation may aid asset managers and securities market supervisors 
in assessing the suitability of each specific instrument for different types of 
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2.3. Market transparency
The transparency deficit refers not only to the financial situation of relevant 
parties or to the nature of financial instruments, but also to the conditions 
under which securities are actually traded on the market. 
The amount of information available on market conditions differs widely 
across instruments and countries. In general, equity markets are subject to 
stringent transparency requirements, including access to bid-ask quotes (pre-
trade transparency) and to the volumes and prices of transactions effectively 
conducted (post-trade transparency).
The situation regarding non-equity markets is much more heterogeneous 
across countries. In general, for transactions conducted outside exchanges – 
a large majority of the involving private bonds and derivatives – the extent of 
pre and post transparency is very limited indeed.
A relevant exception is the US markets where a Trade Reporting Publication 
System (TRACE)
5 provides detailed post-trade information on a wide range 
of fixed-income securities. This system covers both on-market and off-market 
transactions.
The current EU regulation introduces demanding criteria for pre and post-
trade transparency in regulated stock markets, but establishes no requirements 
for other instruments
6. Moreover, most Member States have not imposed 
additional disclosure obligations, although some regulated bond and derivates 
markets do publish some, usually limited, post-trade information.
Behind the absence of regulation on the transparency of non-equity markets 
lie a number of arguments of differing strength. It has been contended, for 
instance, that participants in non-equity markets are sophisticated institutional 
investors. Such investors often have access to the information provided by 
dealers, so may not be too concerned about the lack of public disclosures. 
Another argument is that trading intentions in certain non-equity markets, 
such as those of corporate bonds, have traditionally been based on internal 
valuations of the traded instruments. In this situation, the actual transaction 
prices or volumes may not be that relevant. 
5  The system was established in 2002.
6  See the Directive on Markets in Financial Instruments (MiFID), Articles 44 and 45.157 Transparency
Yet the most effective argument which has been made against regulating 
transparency is that good public knowledge of market conditions could 
eliminate the information advantage on which dealers’ business is based. 
According to this view, a high degree of transparency may kick market 
makers out of price-driven markets, thereby reducing liquidity.
The European Commission used those arguments to conclude in a recent report 
(see EC, 2008) that “there does not seem to be at this point of time, a need 
for regulatory intervention at Community level in terms of an expansion of 
the current transparency provisions of MiFID to financial instruments other 
than shares”. However, this report was produced using inputs from different 
sources that were mostly submitted before the sub-prime crisis. Indeed, recent 
developments make some of the arguments wielded against tighter regulation 
of transparency requirements in non-share markets a lot less forceful. In 
particular, although most participants in private bond and derivative markets 
are institutional investors, they do not all have sufficient capacity to value 
the complex structures which are now traded on those markets. Timely 
information on the prices and volumes of concluded transactions is therefore 
useful for both investment decisions and accurate fair-value reporting. At the 
same time, although direct participation by retail investors is at present very 
limited, they may still have a natural interest in monitoring the management 
performance of the intermediaries through which they indirectly participate in 
the market. Also, supervisors are charged with monitoring investment firms’ 
compliance with the due diligence provisions of current regulations. For both 
purposes, the availability of timely information on market conditions is of 
considerable import.
There remains however the concern that transparency could damp down 
market activity if it excessively reduces dealers’ role and reward. The strength 
of this effect is arguably far from clear from either a conceptual or empirical 
point of view. In principle, market activity does not primarily depend on the 
benefit that dealers obtain from their market-making activity. If markets are 
more transparent, investors (even retail investors) will be more willing to 
participate, and this could itself contribute to boosting issuance and trading 
activity.
The empirical evidence on the link between transparency and liquidity is 
inconclusive at best. The launch of TRACE in the US has clearly helped 
reduce transaction costs and bid-ask spreads, although there has been no 
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In the light of the deficient degree of transparency in non-equity markets and 
the evidence of how this deficiency has adversely impacted on the markets 
worst affected by the recent turmoil, it makes sense to promote additional 
disclosures of prices and volumes in these markets. This is indeed one of 
the recommendations of the FSF report. At the same time, although the 
risk is limited, some caution is probably warranted when designing and 
implementing transparency requirements, in view of their possible impact 
on market liquidity. Specifically, the regulator should concentrate on post-
trade transparency, since pre-trade transparency provides lower value-added 
for investors and places more impediments on the counterparty-search job 
conducted by dealers. In addition, a gradual approach may be helpful – as in 
the case of TRACE in the US. Transparency requirements should be imposed 
on markets in relatively liquid instruments – such as some corporate and 
covered bonds – and subsequently applied to other more complex assets. And 
a reasonable lag should be envisaged in transaction reporting, on a transitional 
basis at least. Although the goal must be to bring reporting as close as possible 
to the trading date, provisionally allowing a few days’ delay will help dealers 
adjust more smoothly to the new information requirements.
Ideally, regulators should work closely with market participants throughout 
this process. But they should also remain keenly aware that the interests of 
institutions, who act as dealers and therefore profit from the absence of easily 
available information, may not fully coincide with those of investors.
Al European level, in line with the gradual approach suggested above, it 
may be premature to amend the relevant Directive, which only came into 
force in November 2007. One option would be for the Commission to issue 
a recommendation to Member States to go beyond the minimum requirements 
of the MiFID by extending post-transparency conditions to some non-equity 
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3. Rating  Agencies
Credit rating agencies (CRAs) performed a key role in the developments 
following the sub-prime crisis in the US. As we have seen, the effects of 
the crisis spread across the entire financial system and affected many large 
financial institutions worldwide through the medium of structured product 
markets. These markets rely heavily on rating agencies, which offer investors 
a credit risk evaluation of the different tranches of sometimes highly complex 
structured products. And it now looks certain that without investors’ confidence 
in the accuracy and due diligence of rating companies, the popularity of 
instruments like ABS, MBS, CDOs etc. would have been considerably less.
The emerging signs of deterioration of securitised sub-prime loans in the summer 
of 2007 triggered an intense downgrading wave that affected a wide range of 
structured products. As graph 2 shows, a large majority of sub-prime-exposed 
securitisation instruments rated single A or below were revised down, normally 
by three or more notches. Moreover, as much as 10% of AAA instruments 
were also downgraded. The wave of rating revisions also significantly affected 
securitisation instruments backed with prime loans. For example, more than 
a quarter of sub-prime-free securitisation bonds rated A or below suffered some 
degree of downgrade, usually three or more notches. This process undoubtedly 
exacerbated the confidence crisis and contributed to the abnormal behaviour of 
prices and volumes in several wholesale financial markets.
Graph 2:  Graph 3:
U.S. RMBS Q12005-Q32007 period issues downgrades from original rating
 Prime  Subprime
Source: Standard and Poor’s160 Rating Agencies
The work conducted by different international forums (FSF, IOSCO, CESR...) 
and, to some extent, the self-examination performed by agencies themselves (see 
CRAs, 2008) have revealed a certain consensus on the deficiencies affecting 
the work of CRAs. These can be classified into four categories: methodology, 
organisation, transparency, and misperceptions of agencies’ role.
On methodology, CRAs do not normally perform a thorough analysis of the 
data submitted by issuers. Moreover, calculations of expected losses – on 
which ratings are based – often use models which have not proved robust to 
recent events. In particular, estimates of the payoff correlations of securitised 
assets were clearly set too low, thereby exaggerating the scope for risk 
diversification and triggering an excess of investment grade instruments. 
On procedures, CRAs have long been criticised for not adopting sufficiently 
effective measures to control internal conflicts of interest. In particular, 
CRAs typically provide issuers with consultancy services which may come 
into conflict with their core business of providing accurate credit quality 
assessment. These conflicts become more acute when dealing with structured 
products. Many structured product issuers have, as an objective, the generation 
of a sufficiently large volume of highly rated instruments. This places 
pressure on CRAs that may distort the rating process. Finally, the generalised 
downgrading of instruments in the last few months suggests CRAs have not 
been diligent enough in revising their initial ratings when conditions change. 
This may be partly because agencies are reluctant to modify ratings so as not 
cast doubts on the accuracy of their initial assessments. 
On transparency, while admitting that CRAs have made an effort in recent 
years to inform about their valuation models and performance record, there 
is still considerable room for improvement. In particular, performance 
indicators may not be readily comparable from one CRA to another. Also, 
more information on assumptions made and on the uncertainty surrounding 
credit analyses would give investors a better understanding of the scope of 
the credit assessments. 
On agencies’ role, one widely shared conclusion from recent developments is 
that investors may have attached too much weight to credit ratings. Investors 
have tended to consider ratings a sort of sufficient statistic on the underlying 
quality of the rated instruments. Highly rated assets are often perceived as 
carrying not only low credit risk but also low market or liquidity risk. Moreover, 
the fact that ratings are based on a specific, partial measure of credit risk – 
expected loss – has been given little consideration in investment strategies. 161 Rating Agencies
Regulation may have contributed to this widespread misunderstanding of the 
meaning of ratings. In particular, new capital requirement rules – Basel II – 
make intensive use of ratings without discriminating much between equally 
rated instruments of differing liquidity or complexity. 
This agreement on the main shortcomings of the work done by CRAs has led to 
a general consensus on the key avenues for reform. These include a tightening 
up of the code of conduct – produced by IOSCO –   to which all leading CRAs 
voluntarily subscribe. Indeed, IOSCO has recently released a new code of 
conduct which incorporates more stringent requirements on CRA methodology, 
transparency and organisation (see IOSCO 2004, 2008). It also makes sense 
to revisit Basel II, and develop a more fine-tuned treatment of different types 
of instruments with the same rating. In this connection, the Basel Committee 
on Banking Supervision (BCBS) is studying a possible increase in capital 
requirements for holdings of highly rated complex products.
However, some of the ideas put forward are a lot more controversial. For 
example, the FSF has suggested using specific rating codes for structured 
products. The reasoning behind this idea is, in principle, sound. The rating 
of a structured product is technically a more difficult job than that of more 
standard fixed-income securities. Moreover, as the importance of low 
probability high-impact events (the so-called tail risk) is probably higher 
than for regular instruments, ratings provide a less robust measure of credit 
risk. Another suggestion is that CRAs should also assess the liquidity of the 
markets where rated instruments are traded and modify their current rating 
codes accordingly. 
Although those proposals would provide investors with more complete 
information on the quality of rated instruments, they could also add to the 
confusion about what ratings really mean. As a minimum, ratings should help 
investors compare the credit risk of different types of instruments. Therefore 
different credit rating codes for different types of instruments would sooner 
or later invite the industry to establish code-to-code conversion tables. And 
that would be a tortuous route to come back to where we started. Further, if 
CRAs enlarged on the risk concepts to be assessed, they would inevitably be 
faced with new methodological challenges. And in the meantime, investors 
would perceive, more strongly than now, that CRAs provide a comprehensive 
assessment of instrument quality, so would have even less incentive to seek 
out complementary information or analysis.162 Rating Agencies
An alternative to expanding the taskload of CRAs is to make them focus more 
clearly on what they are supposed to do well. In other words, they should 
concentrate on providing accurate estimates of the expected loss of instruments 
of differing complexity. They should also strive to get across as clearly as 
possible the risks surrounding their assessments, giving some indication 
of how ratings would change in the presence of specific circumstances. 
Differentiation between complex and non complex instruments should come 
through risk analysis rather than through different codes which may become 
confusing. This, together with a more nuanced use of ratings by regulators 
and educational actions by private and public bodies, would help investors 
understand what ratings actually mean, reducing their somewhat excessive 
role in today’s financial markets. 
Probably the most contentious issue in the debate on credit rating agencies 
concerns the regulatory approach to controlling their activities. At present, two 
different models coexist. In the US, the SEC has powers to set specific rules – 
besides the IOSCO code of conduct – for agencies and assess compliance with 
the same. On the basis of this assessment, the SEC issues a quality certificate 
conferring the status of Nationally Recognised Statistical Rating Organization 
(NRSRO). In the rest of the world, CRAs are subject to few regulatory 
requirements and little official supervision
7. In Europe, for instance, the 
Committee of European Securities Regulators (CESR) conducts a relatively 
informal annual assessment of compliance with the IOSCO code.
The recent turmoil, as well as past financial crises, provides ample evidence 
that the self-regulatory approach has not performed well. Moreover, there 
are reasons to believe that pure self-regulation or soft regulation (around 
the IOSCO code) may not be a sensible approach from a social welfare 
standpoint. There are at least four types of arguments to justify this claim:
•   First, this industry satisfies many of the conditions of a natural oligopoly. 
CRAs need to be widely recognised in the market for their work to be 
appreciated by investors and regulators. This implies strong barriers to 
entry that impede competition. Without sufficient competition there is 
normally little incentive to improve quality standards and pursue effective 
methodological innovations.
•   Second, even if CRAs had to compete among themselves to capture 
higher market share, it is not necessarily true that this would imply an 
7  In the banking regulation area, national authorities may determine the eligibility of ratings 
from some CRAs in the computation of capital requirements.163 Rating Agencies
improvement in average quality. As CRA clients are typically issuers rather 
than investors, more intense competition could actually put more pressure 
on them to satisfy issuers’ desire to obtain good ratings. 
•   Third, although the review of the IOSCO code will mark an important 
step forward, it is clear that the rules need to be more detailed in order to 
make CRAs’ work sufficiently reliable. In particular, the code does not go 
far enough in providing methodological guidelines and templates for the 
disclosure of performance data and the detailed reporting of conflict of 
interest controls. The problem is that the more detailed the rules the more 
complex their design and the more frequently they will need revising. And 
this task lies beyond the current IOSCO remit.
•   Fourth, effective rules need effective enforcement mechanisms. It is hard 
to imagine that this could be done by the industry itself – comprising only 
a handful of relevant players. Enforcement should be the responsibility of 
entities with the means, powers and incentives to penalise non compliance 
with existing rules.
True, a system of official CRA regulation and supervision (by a securities 
markets supervisor for example) is far from problem free. Official agencies 
do not normally have the means and expertise to supervise complex 
assessment methodologies. This may partly explain why the SEC has long 
focused its supervision on CRAs’ fulfilment of organisational requirements. 
More recently, it has also begun assessing performance on the basis of input 
provided by the CRAs, but little effort has been made so far to supervise 
methodological approaches (see Dittricht, 2006).
At the same time, excessive monitoring by a public agency may generate 
the perception of public responsibility for the accuracy of the work done 
by CRAs. In extreme cases, investors may be tempted to believe that an 
instrument possessing a high rating from a closely supervised CRA is free of 
all default risk. And more generally, a tight supervisory system may distort 
incentives for investors to factor the technical uncertainty surrounding ratings 
in their own analysis of investment opportunities. 
Finally, a standard system of official regulation of CRA activity would 
typically be country-specific. Since most CRAs are global operators, this 
would imply a number of national supervisory agencies performing essentially 
the same task – a wildly inefficient setup that would also entail the risk of 
gross inconsistencies across jurisdictions. 164 Rating Agencies
Given the limitations of the self-regulatory regime and the shortcomings 
of a system of standard official regulation, it may worth exploring mixed 
solutions that could be applied at the global level. One possibility, for 
example, would be to establish independent bodies to conduct the work that 
in the US is performed by the SEC. This could involve a format such as two 
committees of technical experts. The first would set, and regularly revise, 
principles of good rating practices. The second would be responsible for 
monitoring compliance and administering a status of suitability process, with 
powers to name and shame non compliants. These committees would report 
to an oversight body made up of interested parties (investor associations, 
auditors, issuers), including national supervisors and relevant international 
organisations. This oversight body would appoint the members of the two 
technical committees, ensure that they work efficiently and comply with 
established due diligence procedures, and seek funding from public and 
private sources. CRA monitoring would thus come under a single global 
solution based on the work of groups of highly qualified professionals 
appointed, supervised and financed by a suitable mix of private and public 
sector representatives. This approach finds part of its inspiration in the 
working of the boards which currently design international accounting 
standards (IASB), international audit standards (IAASB) and international 
asset valuation standards (IVSB). 165
4. Liquidity
After transparency and credit rating agencies comes a third key word, 
liquidity, introducing another set of lessons from the recent turmoil. In fact, 
among its most singular features was the slump in activity affecting various 
primary and secondary markets. Available measures of liquidity in financial 
markets show a marked decline since summer last year. For example, the 
synthetic indicator produced by the Bank of England (see graph 3) signals 
a substantial reduction in financial market liquidity after a period of around 
five years in which liquidity conditions were highly favourable.
Graph 3:
Sources:   Bank of England, Bloomberg, Chicago Board Options Exchange, Debt Management Office, 
London Stock Exchange, Merrill Lynch, Thomson Datastream and Bank calculations.
In particular, the amount of transactions in interbank markets worldwide 
beyond the very short term has been extremely low since August last year. 
Moreover, issuance and trading activity in markets for structured products 
like ABS, MBS and CDOs remain notably subdued. 166 Liquidity
This lack of market activity is the result of a quantity rationing which has 
pushed interest rates to very high levels. As we can seen from graph 4, three-
month interbank spreads over repo rates have touched 150 b.p. in the US and 
100 b.p. in the eurozone, compared to normal intervals of between 10 and 20 
b.p.. Market malfunctioning is even more evident in the case of structured 
products. Indices of ABS prices – such as ABX – have fallen sharply in 
the last few months (see graph 5). And the spreads corresponding to AAA 
securities have soared to around 12 p.p., substantially higher than those of 
lower rated standard corporate bonds.
Graph 4: Depo-repo spreads  Graph 5: Credit risk spreads
Source: Datastream Credit risk spreads  Source: Reuters and CNMV
These adverse liquidity conditions in wholesale markets coincided with 
the heightened funding needs of various financial institutions, particularly 
institutions exposed to conduits. These vehicles – which lie outside the 
consolidation perimeter of financial groups – were used by banks to issue 
securities backed by their commercial assets. Typically conduits would acquire 
banks’ assets and finance their purchases by issuing short-term commercial 
paper. They also enjoyed an implicit guarantee from the originating banks 
to cover liquidity needs in case of adverse market conditions. As the market 
for these instruments virtually disappeared following the sub-prime crisis, 
financial institutions had to rescue their conduits either by providing them 
with liquidity or, more often, by repurchasing their assets. As a consequence, 
not only have liquidity risks become larger in the current turmoil, but banks’ 
exposure to those risks have increased significantly. It was left to central 
banks to mitigate the problem by making their funding more accessible to 
institutions struggling to raise liquidity in wholesale markets.167 Liquidity
These developments suggest at least three areas for reflection. First, the 
possibility for regulators and managers of market infrastructures to improve 
liquidity in wholesale markets; second, the limits on central bank support; and 
third, the treatment of liquidity risk in current regulations.
4.1. Market liquidity 
Market liquidity is normally defined as the ability by participants to liquidate 
(or issue) an asset in the market with little price impact. Thus defined, market 
liquidity depends on two elements: i) the ability of potential investors to 
understand the nature of the transactions (either a loan or the exchange of 
a financial instrument) taking place on that market; and ii) the existence of 
mechanisms (trading platforms, market makers..) to effectively match up 
supply and demand.
The first element is linked to the existence of reliable information – provided 
by issuers, analysts, CRAs, etc – on all the relevant variables investors need 
to calculate the expected return and risks entailed by purchasing a financial 
instrument or granting a loan at prevailing market prices. From this angle, 
liquidity is related to other variables, like the transparency of issuers, products 
and markets and the conduct of CRAs, which have been covered in previous 
sections.
The second element is more directly linked to the functioning of the markets. 
At present, regulated markets tend to have limited liquidity requirements. 
In Europe, the Consolidated Admission Requirements Directive (CARD) 
establishes quantitative references – in terms of minimum volumes and free 
float – for shares to be admitted to trading on stock markets. However, no 
such formal requirements exist for the admission of non-equity instruments. 
In specific fixed-income markets, like those of public debt, the present trading 
platforms typically provide a satisfactory degree of liquidity. Moreover, 
covered bond markets in some countries –notably the jumbo-Pfandbrief 
market in Germany
8– are fairly liquid thanks to the work of market makers 
specializing in each listed instrument. Still the fact is that bond market turnover 
is always significantly lower than that of equity markets (see graph 6).
At this stage, it may be excessive to legislate tighter liquidity requirements 
for non-equity markets, as this could cause the expulsion of a number of 
8 Other examples are the markets of obligations foncières in France and of letter de page in 
Luxembourg. See Mastroeni (2001)168 Liquidity
instruments that can hardly be traded on a frequent basis. Also, there is scope 
to pursue the development of pan-European markets for specific non-equity 
instruments such as covered bonds or some ABS. These pan-European 
markets could be equipped with reasonable liquidity by means of electronic 
platforms or market makers, though this would demand an important effort 
to harmonise the nature of instruments, issuance practices and the relevant 
national legislation.
Graph 6: Monthly turnover of the equity and bonds listed in developed country 
exchanges
Source: World Federation of Exchanges
4.2. The role of central banks
Action by central banks has helped financial institutions to mitigate the 
effects of the abnormal functioning of interbank and other wholesale markets. 
This action has not generally consisted of providing specific emergency loans 
to illiquid banks. Nor has it implied, of itself, a net injection of liquidity 
significantly exceeding normal volumes or a relaxation of the policy stance. 
The action has rather consisted in ensuring that liquidity injection operations 
reach a sufficiently large range of financial institutions, given the inability of 
the market itself to distribute available liquidity with sufficient speed. 
This task has required central banks to make some adjustments to their 
regular operational procedures. In the case of the Eurosystem this has only 
meant conducting ad hoc tender operations to offer loans at other-than-
standard maturities (see González-Páramo, 2008). However the US Federal 169 Liquidity
Reserve and the Bank of England have also had to modify, albeit to differing 
extents, more substantive aspects of their respective operational frameworks, 
such as the range of counterparties in their tender operations and the list of 
assets accepted as collateral for central bank loans
9. 
It is therefore clear that the Eurosystem’s operational framework have proved 
more robust than that of other central banks. In particular, the policy of 
accepting a wide range of collateral – both public and private – has enabled 
many banks to obtain financing that was difficult to find on the market. 
Indeed the Eurosystem accepts instruments, such as highly-rated ABS and 
RMBS, whose markets – never very liquid – are currently particularly 
inactive. Note that with stricter eligibility criteria central banks could do little 
more than the private repo market to compensate the dearth of activity in the 
uncollateralised interbank market. 
It could be argued that by accepting relatively complex instruments, the 
Eurosystem is taking on too many risks and buoying up the valuation of 
assets which would otherwise be less attractive to investors. However, 
provided credit risk is properly assessed, these instruments’ peculiarity vis-
à-vis other eligible assets is only their higher liquidity risk. In principle, 
central banks are best positioned to bear this type of risk. At the same time, 
market neutrality can be assured if central banks value illiquid instruments 
on a sufficiently frequent basis and following accurate and transparent 
procedures. In this regard, there could be some scope for the Eurosystem to 
improve the transparency of their valuations and the methods they follow to 
price relatively illiquid instruments. 
Although their actions have been instrumental in preventing the abnormal 
market situation from deteriorating into a solvency crisis, there are obvious 
limits to what central banks can achieve in the current market circumstances. 
Financial institutions, in any event, have to undertake more complex liquidity 
management, as central banks cannot reasonably offer the range of financing 
facilities that a well-functioning market provides. Moreover, even by increasing 
the frequency of their operations and the range of eligible collateral and 
counterparties, central banks could do little to combat the frictions in money 
markets. In effect, as graph 3 shows, the spread between interbank deposit 
rates and repo rates remained very high even after extraordinary liquidity 
9 The Federal Reserve has introduced three new facilities: the Primary Dealer Facility, the 
Term Auction Facilities and the Term Securities Lending Programme. The BoE enlarged the list 
of eligible collateral for the three-month tenders. Moreover, in April it introduced the Special 
Liquidity Scheme which establishes swap facilities to increase the availability of treasury bills to 
credit institutions in exchange for a wide variety of private fixed-income instruments.170 Liquidity
injections. Furthermore, frequent direct intervention by the central banks may 
be counterproductive in restoring market activity, as it may actually reduce 
incentives for borrowing institutions to pay the high premiums required by 
lenders. That is why actions by central banks outside their regular operating 
procedures should remain as limited as possible in scope and duration. 
4.3. Regulatory issues
At present, the regulatory treatment of liquidity risk is significantly less 
stringent than for other types, notably market risk and credit risk. 
In the banking sphere, the capital accord (Basel II) does not factor any 
liquidity risk measurement in the calculation of minimum capital requirements 
(Pillar 1). Moreover, there are no specific limits on exposure to non liquid 
instruments in trading books or on maturity mismatches. The supervisory 
approach tends to rely on the fulfilment of good liquidity management 
practices (see IIF, 2007 and BCBS, 2008). In this connection, what seems to 
be required is the strengthening of liquidity risk oversight, at least under Pillar 
2. The BCBS’s plans to issue guidance on the management and supervision of 
liquidity risk, as required by the FSF, are also a necessary step forward. 
Nor is liquidity risk efficiently represented in financial reporting requirements. 
For example, the concept is not explicitly listed in IFRS among the factors 
preparers should incorporate in their valuation techniques (IAS 39.AG 82). 
Moreover, disclosure requirements (IFRS7) make only scant references to 
variables related to liquidity (see IASB, 2008). Preparers are supposed to 
disclose information on the maturity of their liabilities, but there is no similar 
requirement for the maturity of financial assets, making it hard for analysts 
and investors to assess the liquidity situation of firms. Some reflection by 
the IASB on these issues would seem warranted in view of recent financial 
markets events.
Finally, an area which has received insufficient attention in the ongoing debate 
on the implications of the market turmoil is the regulation of investment 
funds. In Europe, current regulation is based on the UCITS Directive. 
Investment funds covered by this Directive are meant to publish net asset 
values on a frequent basis and to redeem shares within a short period. For 
this reason, the Directive limits (to 10%) the share of the portfolio that can be 
invested in instruments which are not traded on regulated markets. However, 
there is no limit on investment in instruments which are listed on regulated 171 Liquidity
markets but are not in practice actively traded. This is the case of many 
RMBS, ABS and CDOs. Through lower-rank norms, national regulators have 
introduced additional safeguards of a relatively general natural. In Spain, 
for instance, managers are required to monitor the depth of the markets on 
which the instruments they hold are traded. In general, however, there is 
little regulatory protection against a large part of a UCITS’ portfolio being 
invested in fairly illiquid assets. As such, EU securities supervisors should 
collectively assess the possibility of more direct liquidity controls on at least 
certain types of investment funds. This could entail establishing intermediate 
categories (between current UCITS and hedge funds) with different liquidity 
requirements depending on the flexibility of their redemption policies. 172
5. Supervisory  Arrangements
Several features of the current market turmoil provide useful input regarding 
the role of the different public bodies with responsibilities in the financial 
domain:
–   First, as we have seen in the previous sections, the large spill-over effects 
from the US sub-prime crisis have revealed a number of deficiencies in the 
functioning of the financial system which have a genuinely global character. 
The problems identified, relating to the transparency regime of firms, products 
and markets, the role of CRAs or the regulatory treatment of liquidity risk, are 
common to all jurisdictions.
–   Second, the turmoil illustrates an intense interaction between real and financial 
sector developments. Lax financial conditions generated imbalances in the real 
sector –particularly the US housing market – which, in turn, caused distress in 
first local and then global financial markets. This distress distorted the ability 
of financial institutions to obtain funds in wholesale markets, making them less 
willing to satisfy credit demand. And the credit supply adjustment is already 
intensifying the downward correction of economic activity.
–   Third, recent experience shows that the line between financial institution’s liquidity 
problems and insolvency risks is relatively thin, and that failure to manage the 
former may trigger the latter in a short period of time. 
–   And fourth, since much of the financial market turmoil arising from the 
sub-prime crisis has to do with a lack of confidence among market players, 
transparency emerges as a relevant ingredient of financial stability. At the same 
time, the policy debate in the heat of the turmoil has shown that not all involved 
parties have the same sensitivity towards the need to strengthen transparency 
requirements – including valuation and disclosure practices – for financial 
institutions. 
The global nature of the problems identified in the functioning of the 
international financial system calls for global solutions. And the international 
community has reacted in a timely manner. Particularly promising is 
the work being conducted by the FSF on the basis of input from several 
international organisations – such as IOSCO, IASB, BCBS, etc. The FSF has 
set a demanding work agenda involving all relevant public and private parties 173 Supervisory Arrangements
which should deliver concrete actions before the end of this year. However, 
it is also clear that national authorities must move quickly to adopt common 
approaches in some specific areas. In particular, the proper functioning 
of the world financial system requires faster convergence on the financial 
information standards applied in different jurisdictions. And there is also 
clear scope for reducing regulatory differences vis-à-vis CRAs and non bank 
financial intermediaries. Finally, market transparency requirements should 
become more homogeneous across financial instruments and jurisdictions. 
The interaction between the real and the financial sector invites central 
banks and financial regulators to enlarge their policy framework. First, it is 
increasingly clear that central banks should not base their interest rate actions 
on narrow approaches consisting of minimising the gap between expected 
consumer price inflation and a concrete target over a specified policy horizon. 
Central banks cannot only consider the most likely outcomes extracted from 
a standard macroeconomic model. They must factor the potential impact 
on macroeconomic stability of abnormal financial developments triggering 
significant imbalances, and the links between the latter and the policy stance. 
At the same time, regulators and risk managers must make proper allowance for 
macroeconomic developments affecting the solvency of financial institutions 
through the correlation of risks associated with different exposures. Moreover, 
while safeguarding the accuracy of public financial information, regulators 
should seek ways to ensure that capital requirement regulations do not unduly 
exacerbate financial market stress during cyclical downturns
The links between liquidity and solvency risks pose doubts about an 
institutional model which entrusts responsibility for prudential oversight 
and the system’s liquidity management function to two separate agencies. 
Coordination failures between those two agencies may actually trigger 
a solvency crisis which could be avoided by prompt liquidity support. As the 
latter function is performed by monetary authorities, coordination failures 
would be minimised by assigning prudential responsibilities also to central 
banks. Moreover, recent experience, particularly in the eurozone, shows that 
a situation of liquidity stress in the banking sector can be handled without 
altering the policy stance or even the operational framework. In addition, the 
lesson that financial stability considerations should remain cleanly separate 
from monetary policy making weakens the standard argument regarding 
conflicts of interest between these two functions. Indeed, if the internal 
organisation of central banks is sufficiently sound, the combination of both 
responsibilities may generate useful synergies. 174 Supervisory Arrangements
Finally, on the priority to be attached to transparency, everyone would agree 
that the optimal degree of transparency does no imply the immediate release 
of all conceivable information. However, it is clear that the amount and 
accuracy of the information that market participants require to make informed 
investment decisions may not coincide with what some issuers or borrowers 
are willing to supply in a situation of stress that they may consider transitory. 
For example, in the ongoing debate on the fair value measurement of illiquid 
instruments, some financial institutions have advocated a flexible interpretation 
of the accounting standards that would have helped them reduce the impact 
of the turmoil on their balance sheets. Naturally, this would have damaged the 
ability of potential investors to assess the real situation of financial firms. 
As such, we cannot rule out specific circumstances in which the degree 
of transparency required for the adequate functioning of financial markets 
clashes with the management requirements of a situation of distress in the 
banking sector. This may give rise to a conflict between two desirable social 
objectives.
This example endorses the idea of assigning responsibilities for market 
conduct and prudential oversight to two different, albeit well co-ordinated, 
institutions (twin peaks). This is, in essence, the regime now in place in 
countries like Australia and the Netherlands and seems to be very much the 
way the US is heading (see US Treasury, 2008). The main virtue of this system 
is not to eliminate potential conflicts between transparency and financial 
system stability, but to make them explicit. This should increase incentives for 
authorities to find solutions that properly target both social objectives, without 
imposing artificial hierarchies like those that may appear if a single institution 
is entrusted with supervising prudential as well as conduct aspects.175
6. Concluding  Remarks
Whenever a financial crisis arises, the international financial community 
initiates a debate on regulatory changes that may reduce the likelihood 
a similar crisis happening in future. And concern is often voiced that, in the 
heat of a crisis, regulatory authorities tend to overreact to events and strengthen 
existing prudential rules to an extent that may hamper the efficiency of the 
financial system. At times, the argument goes as far as to suggest that ensuring 
a permanently stable financial system is an impossible task, and any attempt to 
accomplish that goal by means of regulatory adjustments is not only ineffective 
but may be counterproductive. This line of thinking normally leads to the 
proposal of a minimal regulatory system, possibly accompanied by the ex-post 
provision of aid to those vulnerable savers most affected by the crisis. 
The recent turmoil is not a good fit with these terms of reference. Many of 
the lessons of the crisis are not directly linked to a perceived inability of 
prudential regulation to ensure financial stability, but to the identification of 
market failures which impede the efficient functioning of financial markets 
and can cause serious distress.
Specifically, this paper has stressed that market mechanisms do not guarantee 
an adequate degree of transparency. In particular, available information on 
issuers’ financial situation, on the nature of some of the products offered 
in the markets and on actual market conditions are often not sufficiently 
comprehensive. Credit rating agencies, on whom participants rely heavily in 
making their investment decisions, have failed to provide an adequate service, 
due mainly to the adverse incentives generated by the oligopolistic regime 
in which they operate. These are examples of important deficiencies which, 
as the recent turmoil shows, may impede the proper functioning of market 
pricing mechanisms, thereby preventing an adequate allocation of resources. 
The corollary is that there is scope for regulatory action aimed at correcting 
the market failures identified. 
The paper has also drawn some lessons for the conduct of public authorities 
when there is evidence that markets are not working correctly. The best 
example is the role of monetary authorities when interbank markets fail 
to distribute liquidity in an effective manner. Our discussion has shown 
that, in this situation, central banks have a role to play in preventing major 
disruptions in the banking sector. We have seen also that this can be done 176 Concluding Remarks
without altering the policy stance, and without generating too much distortion 
in the functioning of regular market mechanisms. 
It is argued that the concept of liquidity risk should feature more prominently 
in the regulation of bank and non-bank financial intermediaries. This is the 
issue which comes closest to the standard debate on the pros and cons of 
financial regulation. Like any proposed strengthening of prudential rules, this 
suggestion may generate some sort of inefficiencies. As always, it is up to the 
political authorities to weigh such drawbacks against the potential benefits in 
terms of financial stability. However, it seems likely that the liquidity risks 
of credit institutions can be effectively controlled without modifying capital 
requirements and, therefore, without too large an impact on their income. 
A system of enhanced management and supervision of liquidity through 
internal models and reliable stress tests may suffice. Regarding investment 
funds, the question is simply for regulation to reflect more accurately – e.g. 
when establishing categories of funds – the logical link between the liquidity 
of both sides of their balance sheets. 
In any event, a fruitful way to facilitate a socially acceptable balance between 
financial stability on one hand and efficiency on the other, is to assign oversight 
of the adequate functioning of all financial markets to an institution separate 
from the prudential supervisor, along the lines of the twin peaks model.177
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Synopsis
The US housing bubble was the main cause of the financial crisis and should 
not be regarded as merely a trigger. A typical “bubble mentality” emerged, 
which meant the downside risk for house prices was seriously under-
estimated, leading to mistakes by borrowers, lenders, rating agencies, security 
structuring firms, investors and regulators. Also the rapid growth in mortgage 
borrowing was an important source of the general excess liquidity prior to 
2007 and is implicated in the shortage of liquidity since the crisis began. 
The collapse of the housing bubble will continue to play a crucial role in the 
fate of both the financial sector and the economy. It is slowing the economy 
through the collapse in house-building, tighter credit availability and via 
wealth effects, though the latter are very small so far. The Fed has responded 
well, providing liquidity as needed, avoiding a disorderly collapse of Bear 
Stearns and cutting rates rapidly once it became clear that GDP growth was 
threatened too. House prices look set to fall significantly further from the 17% 
recorded as of March 2008 (Case-Shiller index), since inventories are very 
1  The views expressed here are personal and are not necessarily shared by Standard Chartered 
Group or its affiliates.182 Synopsis
high and mortgage availability is tight. But the scale of the eventual fall and 
the extent to which the personal savings rate will rise are major uncertainties. 
The potential for limiting the house price decline is limited, though there is 
a case for trying to prevent a huge undershoot on the downside (just as there 
was a case for trying to limit the bubble on the upside in this author’s view). 
But monetary policy can do little on its own.183
1. Introduction
The financial crisis beginning in August 2007 was triggered by the collapse 
of the US housing bubble and the sub-prime crisis. The word “sub-prime” is 
now in common parlance, though it was known mainly by consumer lending 
insiders before February 2007.
2 But the full importance of the US housing 
bubble for the shape of the 2005–8 world economic boom, and subsequent bust, 
sometimes now seems to be under-estimated. Many analyses treat housing as 
merely a trigger, with the implication that, even if house prices had remained 
stable, another trigger for the crisis would have emerged in due course. These 
analyses put the emphasis on a variety of factors including excessive liquidity 
creation, the originate and distribute model, mistakes by rating agencies, pro-
cyclical leverage, de-regulation and lack of transparency.
3
While these are all relevant contributory factors, this paper argues that it was 
the particular pathology of a bubble, in this case the housing bubble, which 
allowed the mistakes to happen. Moreover the rise in liquidity (to be defined 
later) was in part linked to the housing bubble. The housing bubble was 
sustained by the view that house prices were highly unlikely to fall, since they 
had not fallen in the US on a national level since the 1930s. If people had 
recognized that house prices could fall significantly (and were more likely 
to fall given how far they had risen), borrowers would not have borrowed 
so much, lenders would not have lent so much, rating agencies would have 
been more cautious in ratings and investors would have been less willing to 
buy housing-backed securities. Sometimes the crisis is attributed to a failure 
of risk analysis and indeed it was. But the particular failure was the under-
estimate of the risk inherent in house prices and mortgage lending during 
a housing bubble.
The focus on the housing bubble is important, not just in understanding 
the origins of the crisis, but also in anticipating how bad it may become, in 
designing policies to alleviate it and also in the debate about how to prevent 
something similar recurring. It may also be relevant for other countries 
though that is outside the scope of this paper. For investors, the course of 
2 The sub-prime crisis first hit the headlines in February 2007 when HSBC announced huge 
write-downs on its Household Finance Corporation business in the US, which is largely focused 
on sub-prime lending.
3 See for example Willem Buiter, Lessons from the North Atlantic financial crisis, paper 
presented to the New York Fed and Columbia Business School conference on the “Role of Money 
Markets”, May 29–30
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house prices and the response of consumers to reduced wealth will remain 
a crucial determinant of the course of the US economy, at least for several 
more years. It will continue to have implications for related bonds and stocks, 
where some see amazing value and others see worse to come. But it will also 
help determine the course of markets in general.
The paper is organized as follows. First it briefly documents the housing 
bubble itself. Then the effects of rising prices are examined, outlining the 
linkages between the housing bubble, confidence, debt and liquidity which 
created a virtuous circle of rising wealth, rising liquidity and a strong 
economy. In section 4 the linkages to liquidity are further examined using 
a distinction between bankers’, investors’ and market liquidity. Then the 
paper looks at the effects of falling home prices, where the circle goes into 
reverse, before asking whether the authorities should attempt to limit the 
decline in house prices. The final section concludes.185
2.  The housing bubble
US home prices rose 106% from January 2000 to the peak in July 2006 
and have since fallen back 17% (as of April 2008), returning to August 
2004 levels. This is  according to the S&P Case Shiller CS-20 index. The 
government’s OFHEO index rose a lesser 70% and has since fallen back 4%. 
The CS-20 index measures the price changes for all recorded deals in the 20 
largest cities, with or without a mortgage.
4 The OFHEO index covers the 
whole country but includes only those deals with a mortgage provided or 
guaranteed by the Agencies, (e.g. Freddie and Fannie).
5 The OFHEO index 
therefore excludes deals with sub-prime mortgages, jumbo mortgages (loans 
above the agencies’ USD 417,000 limit) and also houses bought without 
a mortgage. During the bubble years these were the most common methods 
of financing in areas where prices rose the most.
 Prices rose the fastest in the largest inner cities and inner suburbs, where 
space is at a premium, while increasing much more slowly in less dense areas 
where new supply is easier to create. The difference between the two indices 
is further widened because the CS-20 index weights by value, thus boosting 
the importance of the jumbo sector and, more broadly, the east and west coasts 
where prices are highest. Which is the best index? By excluding so much of 
the market the OFHEO index understated the bubble and is now understating 
the bust, while the Case-Shiller index may be overstating both. However, 
neither index includes condominiums, which is one of the worst affected 
types of property and the CS-20 also excludes foreclosed properties. Overall 
the Case-Shiller index is probably the best indicator of what is happening to 
housing wealth. At the time of writing it is widely expected to go lower.
The bubble reached its height during 2004–2005. The number of states with 
house prices rising 10% or more in the year to the fourth quarter was 8 in 
2002, 14 in 2003, 22 in 2004, 25 in 2005, 8 in 2006 and 0 in 2007. (Note 
this is calculated using OFHEO data which understated the bubble). In the 
year to Q4 2005, five states plus Washington DC had gains of more than 
20% - Arizona 34.9%, Florida 26.8%, Hawaii 23.8%, Washington DC 22%, 
Maryland 21.5% and California 21.1%. It was during 2005 too that many of 
4 See  www.homeprice.standardandpoors.com
5 See www.ofheo.gov OFHEO stands for Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight 
and is the regulator for the government-backed mortgage providers Fannie and Freddie.186 The housing bubble
the other characteristics of a bubble became increasingly evident, including 
massive media attention and highly speculative buying (see table 1).
Table 1: Checklist: Typical characteristics of a Bubble
•   Rapidly rising prices 
•   High expectations for continuing rapid rises
•   Overvaluation compared to historical averages
•   Overvaluation compared to reasonable levels 
•   Several years into an economic upswing
•   Some underlying reason or reasons for higher prices
•   A ‘new’ element – e.g. technology for stocks or immigration for housing 
•   Subjective ‘paradigm shift’
•   New investors drawn in
•   New entrepreneurs in the area
•   Considerable popular and media interest
•   Major rise in lending
•   Increase in indebtedness
•   New lenders or lending policies
•   Consumer price inflation often subdued (so central banks relaxed).
•   Relaxed monetary policy
•   Falling household savings rate
Source: John Calverley, Bubbles and how to survive them, Nicholas Brealey, 2004, p 13. 
Exactly how big the bubble became is a matter of much debate. The IMF 
recently concluded that US home prices were only 11% overvalued as of mid 
2007.
6 This would imply about a 15% overvaluation at the peak and, with the 
fall in house prices since then, prices should be approximately in equilibrium 
now. However in comparison to past cycles the ratio of house prices to 
consumer prices became much more elevated this time (see chart 1). On this 
metric, the decline so far looks to be less than half the decline needed to 
bring prices back to equilibrium. Those who doubt such a bad outcome focus 
primarily on lower real and nominal interest rates than in past cycles.
6  IMF World Economic Outlook April 2008187 The housing bubble
Chart 1: US House Prices in Real Terms
However, the financial crisis has significantly tightened mortgage availability. 
The market for jumbo mortgages seized up almost entirely for a while though it 
is now open again. The market for sub-prime mortgages remains largely closed. 
For all borrowers, borrowing criteria have tightened, mortgage appraisals are 
much tougher and documentation now has to be exact. Meanwhile mortgage 
rates are little different from those prevailing before the crisis despite the big 
fall in the Federal Funds rate and in long-term Treasury bond yields.
Moreover, given the overshoot in house prices on the way up (by almost 
everyone’s reckoning) there is a real risk of an overshoot on the way down, 
even if the equilibrium ratio for real house prices or house prices to rents can 
legitimately be higher than in the past. At this point, there remains a huge 
inventory of houses for sale, both new and existing, which points to further 
price declines for the remainder of 2008. Much will depend on the course of the 
economy and particularly of unemployment in the next year or so. But it would 
seem brave to assume that we are near the bottom for house prices at this point.
Why did house prices rise so much? Low nominal and real interest rates 
clearly played a key role. Some blame the Fed for keeping rates too low during 
2003-5. Others focus more on low world interest rates, due to “excess savings”, 
particularly in Asia as the aftermath of the Asian crisis led to a collapse in 
investment in Asia (outside China). There were also factors particular to 
housing including faster rates of immigration, more foreign purchasers (partly 188 The housing bubble
linked to housing bubbles elsewhere), a widening distribution of income 
which probably spurred investment property purchases and a change in capital 
gains tax which made gains on housing subject to less tax. 
Once the spiral began, there were two key reinforcing mechanisms to keep 
it going. One was financial innovation, always a feature of bubbles. Partly 
because the risk was deemed low, (“safe as houses”), and partly because of 
strong demand there were several innovations, or in some cases a much more 
widespread use of techniques that were used narrowly before. These included 
sub-prime lending, adjustable rate mortgages (previously most US mortgages 
were long-term fixed rate), interest only mortgages, option mortgages, the slice-
and-dice approach to bundling mortgages (to enable tranches to be highly rated) 
and the increased role of the Rating Agencies and the Monoline insurers. 
The other key reinforcing mechanism was the so-called “bubble mentality”. 
This manifested itself in the strong belief that house prices could never fall and 
that easy money could be made. Some home-buyers rushed to buy out of fear, 
rather than greed, fear that prices would rise even higher. But many chose to buy 
larger houses than they needed or simply bought rather than rented, convinced 
that it was a sure-fire investment. This was facilitated by very high LTVs with 
100% easily attainable and sometimes more. Others bought property to “flip”, to 
rent out or as a vacation or retirement home. By 2004–5 the “bubble mentality” 
became widely held among buyers, lenders, rating agencies, mortgage security 
structurers, investors and apparently also regulators.189
3.  The effects of rising house prices
During the boom years, roughly 2003–6, rising US home prices formed part 
of a virtuous circle with rising confidence, rising borrowing, rising economic 
activity and rising liquidity (to be defined later). Any one of these five links 
in the circle can be taken as the starting point, though once begun the cycle 
had strong positive feedbacks. We might posit the very low Federal Funds rate 
during 2003–4 as the original cause, and indeed it may well have been crucial 
in starting the circle. 
I want to start from rising house prices, not because this was necessarily the 
starting point but because, in my view, it became the driver of the circle, as 
prices moved increasingly into bubble territory in 2004 onwards. The rise in 
home prices led through rising confidence to increased borrowing as home-
buyers and investors sought to cash in on the boom. The rise in borrowing of 
course fuelled the rise in home prices, especially as loan-to-value ratios rose 
and new buyers, who conventionally relied on renting, entered the market. 
But the rise in borrowing also permitted mortgage equity withdrawal (MEW), 
also sometimes called Home Equity Withdrawal. 
The conventional concern of those analyzing MEW is the extent to which it 
fuelled spending in the economy. Estimates vary from 5-10% of the amount 
withdrawn. Without doubt there was a stimulus too, from higher rates of 
home-building. Residential investment rose from 4.5% of GDP in Q1 2000 to 
a peak of 6.3% in Q4 2005. It made a significant contribution to GDP growth 
particularly during 2003-5 adding respectively 0.41%, 0.53% and 0.39%. 
In 2007 it subtracted 0.98% from GDP growth and 2008 is on course for 
a similar decline.
67 
However MEW is also interesting for two other important roles. One is in 
boosting house prices further by providing the down-payment for purchase 
of investment, vacation and retirement homes. This of course fuelled the 
bubble. Another is in adding to money balances (or liquidity in one sense). 
A significant portion of MEW was used to purchase financial assets or held 
on deposit.
7  US Department of Commerce. Bureau of Economic Affairs. GDP release190 The effects of rising house prices
Table 2: How the housing bubble affected consumer balances in 2005
Height of the bubble. (Disposable income = $9092bn)
•    Saved $44 bn (NIPA defn, excludes consumer durables)
•    Invested $202 bn net in consumer durables
•    Invested $423 bn in housing (new building, extensions)
•    Borrowed $1702 bn (of which $1096bn in mortgages)
•   Acquired $909 bn net in financial assets
•    Net worth rose $3688 bn (of which $2219 bn housing)
A snapshot of how the housing bubble affected consumer balances in 2005 is 
given in Table 2. Personal disposable income was a little over USD 9 trillion, 
but personal savings was only USD 44 billion or just 0.5% of income. This 
is the NIPA definition, which excludes net investment in consumer durables 
of USD 202 billion. There was a further USD 423 billion of investment in 
housing, including new buildings and extensions etc. Adding all these up 
would give a total savings rate (i.e. not spent on perishables), of 7.3%, still 
relatively low. Meanwhile households borrowed a whopping USD 1,702 
billion of which USD 1,096 billion was in mortgages, which allowed them 
to add USD 909 billion to financial assets. But crucially, despite heavy 
borrowing and very little savings, net worth rose USD 3,688 billionn (over 
7%) of which USD 2,219 billion was higher housing values. The latter would 
include the USD 423 billion new investment but still leaves home price 
appreciation amounting to around 20% of disposable income. Overall then, 
the virtuous circle brought higher spending, higher asset prices, higher debt 
and higher liquidity.191 The effects of rising house prices
Chart 2: US Household Credit/GDP
The rise in mortgage debt during the bubble is striking (see chart 2). Between 
2000 and 2007 mortgage debt rose from 49% of GDP to 79%. In the 1980s 
house price cycle it rose by less than half that proportion, from 32% to 45%. 
(The housing boom in the 1980s was more narrowly confined, affecting 
mainly a few states in the North East and California.) While mortgage debt 
rose rapidly consumer credit fell slightly as a proportion of GDP. Consumers 
realized that it was cheaper to borrow against their house than to use credit 
card or installment debt. For comparison, US commercial mortgages also 
rose after 2000, but by only 6 percentage points of GDP to 16.6% (chart 3). 
Some problems are emerging now in the commercial real estate market with 
the tightening of credit and slowdown in the economy but housing is the main 
event in this cycle.192 The effects of rising house prices
Chart 3: US Commercial Mortgages/GDP
It is interesting to compare the growth in mortgage debt with the rise in the 
debt of the financial sector of the economy (chart 4). Financial sector debt has 
grown explosively since the 1970s but in this decade it increased from 77% of 
GDP to 110% of GDP, a 33 percentage point rise, just slightly more than the 
rise in mortgage debt. Of course financial sector debt has played a major role 
in the expansion of liquidity as we shall see in the next section.
Chart 4: Mortgages and Financial Sector Debt to GDP193
4.  The linkages to liquidity
Practitioners use the word liquidity in three senses, what I will call the 
bankers’ view, the investors’ view and the market-makers’ view. For bankers, 
liquidity means plentiful deposits and/or low interest rates. The practical 
banker may face “too many” deposits, and struggle to find a use for them in 
lending. In this situation, provided that she is comfortable with the risk and 
can raise sufficient capital, she may well go out to find new areas of lending. 
Banks’ balance sheets, credit growth and money supply are constrained 
only by capital in the modern system. The housing bubble mentality spread 
to banks as well, with management seemingly not recognising the risks. 
Bankers’ liquidity was high until August 2007, as evidenced by low lending 
spreads and the growth of bank lending. 
For investors, liquidity is the part of their portfolio held in instruments which 
are both low risk and easily realizable in the short term. This usually means 
short term bank deposits or securities such as Treasury Bills and money 
market funds, though for a while during the boom some other assets were 
seen as equivalent, notably asset backed commercial paper and even the 
auction bond market. It excludes investments such as TIPs (unless they have 
a very short maturity) as their value can change substantially in the short run 
even though they are the lowest risk investment for a long-term investor.
Investors usually hold plenty of liquidity in three circumstances – when they 
are active in illiquid assets such as houses, (and therefore have funds waiting 
to invest or following capital gains), when they have just drawn down a loan, 
or when they are deliberately holding lots of liquidity waiting for a lower 
entry point in risk assets. 
The latter condition has held to a high degree in late 2007/early 2008 as 
investors have stood on the sidelines waiting for an opportunity to invest. 
But during the boom times it was the first two conditions which boosted 
liquidity. Home buying transactions surged with existing home sales up 
from 5.2 million in 2000 to 7.1 million at the peak in 2005 and new home 
sales up from 1.6 million to 2.2 million. At the same time, remortgaging 
and home-equity-lines-of-credit (HELOCs) surged. As already noted, there 
was substantial mortgage equity withdrawal in this process, a large part of 
which added to investors’ liquidity. In time, some went into stocks and bonds 194 The linkages to liquidity
and other investments. Some probably also went into other assets such as 
antiques, collectables etc.
HELOCS played an important role. In fact, stretching the concept of investors’ 
liquidity here, there is little doubt that many Americans saw themselves as 
being not only wealthier but also enjoying more liquidity simply through higher 
house prices. Since late 2007 many banks have withdrawn previously agreed 
HELOC lines as home prices fell. This seems to have left many Americans 
feeling vulnerable as they had regarded these lines the same way many people 
regard deposits in the bank as a safeguard against a “rainy day”. 
For professional investors liquidity rose too, partly as home-owners MEW 
came their way, but also because of increased leverage. The expansion of hedge 
funds, as well as the liberalization of the rules for mutual funds allowing them 
to use more derivatives and increase leverage, gave professional investors 
access to more liquidity. By 2005–6 the LTCM debacle had been largely 
forgotten and the stock market crash was dwindling in memory too. 
Finally, market liquidity increased as well. Here it was the increased flows 
into hedge funds that were probably the main driver. This was reinforced by 
strong confidence about the economy and financial system, as markets were 
pricing risk so low. If markets should be regarded as efficient, then in 2006–7 
they were saying that credit risk generally was very low and liquidity risk 
could be ignored.195
5.  Liquidity during the crisis
In August 2007, with the sudden emergence of the financial crisis, bankers’ 
liquidity tightened sharply as placers of funds in wholesale markets became 
reluctant to place funds with banks other than very short term while takers 
of wholesale funds found they had to pay substantially more. In the most 
extreme cases, where institutions relied particularly heavily on wholesale 
markets or where doubts existed, at least in the minds of some, as to their 
solvency, liquidity dried up altogether bringing the failure of IKB Deutsche 
Industriebank, Sachsen LB bank, Northern Rock and later Bear Stearns. Placers 
of funds were reluctant to take any risk. Even some “household name” large 
banks, normally regarded as “too big to fail”, faced difficulties at first.
8
As the credit crisis continued, banks increasingly realized that some off 
balance sheet vehicles (SIVs, conduits etc) would need to be brought back 
on balance sheet while some warehoused assets, e.g. LBO loans could not be 
sold off in the market, at least for a while. That meant the banks would need 
more liquidity in time. In the first half of 2008 the overnight liquidity markets 
were clearing more easily but the availability of longer term placements 
remained very difficult, forcing banks to rely more on very short term lending 
and thereby raising tensions. The various central bank schemes helped, and 
ensured that money went to the weakest institutions but banks reliant on 
wholesale funding still felt vulnerable.
Fully restoring bankers liquidity will likely require not just this liquidity 
provision but sufficient new capital for banks to once again feel comfortable 
in extending loans to leveraged counterparties. This will take time for several 
reasons. First, losses are continuing and, especially if the economy performs 
poorly, they can be expected in the whole range of credit outstanding, 
consumer and business lending, not just in sub-prime mortgages. Secondly, 
the final extent of mortgage losses is highly uncertain, depending heavily on 
how far house prices eventually fall but also the proportion of borrowers who 
“walk away”. Finally, new capital is needed not merely to replace losses but 
also because banks are likely to deliberately operate their balance sheets with 
8 It was reported to me in conversation that lending to such institutions was not worth the 
extra spread because, even though there should be no losses in the event of a failure, placed funds 
might be locked-in for a time i.e. become illiquid. To paraphrase “If we wake up one morning to 
find a major institution intervened by the authorities, nobody wants to have to tell their boss or the 
Board that they had short term placements there”.196 Liquidity during the crisis
higher ratios going forward, under pressure from regulators, management and 
investors. 
The shortage of bankers’ liquidity from August 2007 onwards quickly spread 
to market liquidity, as players de-leveraged. Banks tightened up on margin 
lending to hedge funds, as they tried to reduce their overall asset base and 
also cut risk in very volatile markets. In early 2008, after the Bear Stearns 
collapse, prime brokers (i.e. the large investment banks) sharply tightened 
their margin requirements, forcing many hedge funds to reduce leverage. This 
drop in market liquidity contributed to a reduction in volumes and a widening 
of spreads.
Finally, the third type of liquidity, investors’ liquidity, did not change as fast as 
bankers liquidity at least for non-leveraged investors. Indeed some investors 
sold risk assets to hold more cash (liquidity).
9 Repeatedly, during the crisis 
we have heard that investors are “liquid”, or there is a “lot of liquidity on 
the sidelines” waiting for sufficient comfort to invest. Investors’ liquidity 
was naturally boosted by regular savings contributions such as pension and 
insurance funds. It was also buoyed by money accruing to oil producers, some 
of which came back into markets via Sovereign Wealth Funds. For the typical 
US household, however, the fall in house prices will imply a fall in liquidity 
over time as the virtuous circle outlined before goes into reverse.
9 Of course, selling a security does not increase overall liquidity since the purchaser sees 
a corresponding fall in liquidity. But declining securities prices (stocks and credit instruments etc) 
raises the proportion of everybody’s portfolio that is in liquid assets.197
6.  The effects of falling house prices
As already noted, the extent to which house prices will fall is very uncertain. 
At present the overhang of inventories suggests that the direction will be down 
at least for a while (see chart 5). However affordability is improving with the 
combination of the fall in prices and continued rise in earnings (see chart 6). 
Much will depend on how bad the economy becomes and, in particular, how 
much unemployment rises. However house prices will also be influenced by 
the extent to which the reverse of the bubble mentality takes hold. Often, 
following a bubble, a market reaches a state of “revulsion” where nobody 
believes it can ever possibly be a good investment again. When prices first 
retreat from the top there are often willing buyers, but after a while repeated 
disappointment makes buyers very cautious. Meanwhile sellers may resist 
lower prices at first but later, after persistent price declines, they despair and 
become desperate to sell. Hence there is a serious risk of an overshoot.
Chart 5: Huge Inventories - Months Supply198 The effects of falling house prices
Chart 6: Housing Affordability - Back to Good Levels
Overall then, it seems safe to conclude that the national house prices indices 
have substantially further to go. But within the averages for the national price 
index there are wide variations between different regions and even between 
different neighbourhoods within the same region. Hence a 30% fall in the 
overall index may have little impact in some parts of the country which see 
only a 5–10% decline, while other areas are seeing a devastating 40-–50% 
decline.
The effects of the housing bust are already evident in the performance of the 
US economy. The slowdown in US GDP growth in Q4 2007 and Q1 2008 
to 0.6% pa and 1% pa respectively is attributable to three factors. First, the 
collapse in house-building continued to subtract more than 1% pa from growth 
(as it had in Q3 as well, following subtractions of 0.75% in H1). Secondly, Q4 
saw a substantial cut-back in inventories as fears over the economy prompted 
a production cut-back by firms, which was also linked to a slowdown in 
hiring. Inventories were more stable in Q1 2008 but then the third factor, 
a sharp slow-down in consumer spending, held back GDP growth. Consumer 
spending grew 2.3% in Q4 2007, only slightly below the 2.6% average of the 
first 3 quarters of 2007 but then slowed to only 1.1% in Q1 2008.
It would be convenient for this paper if the slowdown in consumer spending 
could be entirely attributed to the fall in house prices. However, there is 
another contender - higher oil prices. In Q1 2008 consumers paid out an extra 
USD 24 billion in oil and fuel costs compared with Q4 2007, due to higher 199 The effects of falling house prices
oil prices. This came out of an overall gain in income of USD 137 billion. 
About another USD 50 billion of the total gain in income was needed to cover 
core inflation of just over 2% pa. That left about USD 60 bn for consumers 
to spend on “real” spending growth. In fact they spent only about USD 20-30 
bn and saved the rest. This is a “back-of-the-envelope” calculation but it 
illustrates that the US downturn is partly attributable to the oil shock and 
partly to housing. 
Another approach is to look at the personal savings rate since negative 
wealth effects should show up in a higher savings rate. The savings rate did 
indeed rise from 0.2% in Q4 2007 to 0.6% in Q1 2008. This is still very low 
but represents a sizeable move for one quarter. However we cannot simply 
attribute the rise to lower wealth. The low savings rate of recent years is 
partly due to heavy borrowing, since saving is simply the residual of income 
after subtracting spending (some of which is paid for with borrowings). 
Consumers might have chosen to borrow less because of reduced wealth but 
it is also possible that the sudden tightening of lending markets due to the 
crisis acted as a constraint on borrowing. If this constraint proves temporary, 
and mortgage markets have already opened up again after freezing for a time, 
then the savings rate could go back down again. But the savings rate may also 
have been influenced by general fears of an economic downturn and weaker 
jobs market, given the pervasive gloom about the financial crisis.
So it is too early to conclude that the housing wealth effect is already operating. 
Wealth effects are generally thought to operate over a time horizon of several 
years rather than months or quarters. In time, however, it does seem likely 
that the housing bust will bring a rise in the savings rate. From the low levels 
of recent years there is the potential for a rise of several percentage points, 
though this expectation is shrouded in uncertainty. Household wealth dropped 
sharply during the collapse of the stocks bubble in 2001–3 yet, despite falling 
wealth as well as high unemployment and a war, the savings rate only rose 
slightly (chart 7). Also much will depend on the performance of the stock 
market. Housing at the peak accounted for about 40% of wealth with stocks 
around 35%. If the stock market is weak too, overall wealth could be reduced 
substantially, not least because, given the leverage in housing, a 25% fall in 
house prices translates to a nearly 50% fall in housing equity.
10
10  In the second half of 2006 home mortgages equalled 45% of the value of housing, up from 
38% in Q1 2000. The latest figure, for Q4 2007 is 47%. Source : Federal Reserve Flow of Funds 
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Chart 7: US: Rise in Household Savings?
Chart 8: US corporate bond yields
A rise in the savings rate could finally allow the world economy to find a more 
sustainable balance. It would imply slow growth in US consumer spending 
for an extended period, which in turn means relatively low US interest rates 
and therefore, probably, the dollar remaining undervalued. This should mean 
that the current account deficit continues to contract. From the peak of 5.4% 
of GDP in 2007, our forecasts suggest the current account deficit will decline 
to the 4–5% range in 2008 and into the 3–4% range in coming years. For the 201 The effects of falling house prices
US, there is a danger that if net export growth is not sufficient to make up 
for slow consumption growth, GDP growth will be low and this will mean 
a worsening of the fiscal deficit. In contrast to the 2000-3 period, when the 
US started from a fiscal surplus and so a massive fiscal stimulus to deal with 
the collapse of the stocks bubble was easily accommodated, the US entered 
this crisis with a Federal deficit of about 2% of GDP. With considerable 
background concern about long-term fiscal sustainability the US fiscal deficit 
is likely to be a major issue in coming years.
The other main danger is that the rest of the world is unable to absorb rising 
net exports from the US and so slows down too. Until now, the investment 
boom in Asia and many oil producing regions has kept world growth relatively 
buoyant, helping in particular US, German and Japanese capital goods 
exporters. If the Asian investment boom drops off, the whole world will be in 
for a period of slower growth. High oil prices are a major problem in all this. 
To contain inflation expectations central banks have little choice but to react to 
higher prices with stable or tighter policy, depending on the domestic situation. 
Yet high oil prices are deflationary as well as inflationary, so the economy 
will tend to slow. The combination of the US slowdown, high oil prices and 
over-tight monetary policy could easily create a severe world slowdown later 
in 2008 and 2009. This would undoubtedly make the US adjustment more 
difficult and mean that the 2% Fed Funds rate and 3.3% 10 year bond yield 
(seen in March 2008) are not, after all, the lows for this cycle.
Overall then just as rising home prices contributed to increased borrowing, 
debt, GDP growth and liquidity, falling home prices will have the opposite 
effect on the way down. However, a crucial difference is that it is harder to 
reduce debt than to increase it. In part the process will happen through slower 
debt growth. But there may also be a reduction in debt itself, which can be 
a difficult and deflationary process. If the debt is repaid by borrowers they 
have less to spend, so GDP is reduced. If the debt goes into default or is 
forgiven the lender faces a loss and is likely to be cautious in future lending, 
while the lender’s stock-holders and possibly employees suffer. Another 
alternative is that the debt is bailed out by the tax-payer, which probably has 
the least deflationary impact. But although the government has introduced 
a number of schemes to help the housing market, it looks unlikely they will 
be substantial because of strong political resistance to any bail-out of either 
the banks or of marginal borrowers. The final alternative is that the debt is 
transformed into a lower rate debt, with the help of government guarantees. 
Already this is happening with, for example, the rise in the “conforming loan” 
limit for the government-backed agencies, bringing many jumbo loans into 202 The effects of falling house prices
their ambit for the first time. Because of the implicit government guarantee 
for the Agencies, the interest rate can be lower. However, if house prices fall 
sufficiently far, this could still end up with a government bail-out given how 
thinly capitalized the Agencies are.203
7.  Should the authorities attempt to limit house price 
declines?
The debate continues as to whether the authorities should attempt to limit 
a bubble on the upside, or even deliberately prick it. But what about on the 
downside? Is there a case for trying to put a floor under the market? The 
case for action rests on four arguments. First, the greater the slide in house 
prices the greater the risk of a particularly bad outcome for the US economy 
and perhaps the world economy too. Secondly, the more home prices fall, 
the greater the damage to the banking system, directly via greater losses 
on mortgages and also through worse losses in other areas, if the economy 
overall is weaker. For the government, there is also the risk of a significant 
fiscal cost later if they need to bail out the Agencies. Thirdly, there might be 
a case for trying to limit the downside to prevent an overshoot of prices below 
equilibrium (wherever that may). Finally, there are political arguments (and 
pressures) for helping the individuals and banks worst affected.
There are essentially three arguments on the other side. First, there is the 
simple argument that it can’t be done. The government is not likely to be able 
to put a floor underneath a collapsing USD 20 trillion housing market and 
USD 10 trillion mortgage market without taking on an unacceptable fiscal 
burden or fiscal risk. Secondly, there is the moral and political argument that it 
would not be fair to artificially limit the downside in prices. Not fair to renters 
and young people hoping to buy at a lower price, nor, if tax-payers funds are 
used, to the “silent majority” of home-owners who pay their taxes and meet 
their mortgage obligations. It would probably also be difficult to implement 
in a fair way some of the proposals to re-structure mortgages. Some people 
might gain from it, perhaps by “gaming” government schemes, while others 
miss out. The final argument is that it is much better to let markets find their 
own level, ensuring they give the correct price signal. This also reduces the 
risk of moral hazard next time round.
In practice the authorities have limited options for influencing the housing 
market so limiting the overshoot seems to me the only hope anyway. With 
prices falling fast at the moment it would be wise to let them fall some more 
first before attempting very much. So it may not matter that measures could 
take a long time coming. The political side will doubtless play out during 
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of Congress to be controlled by Democrats and with a strong chance of 
a Democratic President, an interventionist approach next year is quite likely.
There are perhaps three broad types of policies to consider. First, the Fed could 
keep the Federal Funds rate low for an extended period, in a way analogous to 
those who argue for “leaning against the wind” during a bubble. However, this 
is open to the same objections as on the upside, if conditions in the economy 
do not otherwise warrant low rates. Indeed many argue that keeping rates 
too low after the collapse of the stock bubble was the mistake which allowed 
the housing bubble to inflate. And some argue now that commodities are in 
a bubble because of the current low Fed Funds rate. It is also true that a low 
Federal Funds rate would not necessarily keep mortgage rates low. With most 
borrowers now reverting to long-term fixed rate mortgages, it is the level of 
the 30 year US Treasury yield which matters most and that is only loosely 
related to the Federal Funds rate.
Some argue that the Fed should follow a low interest rate policy to deliberately 
foster consumer price inflation.
11 High inflation would allow the house price 
adjustment to proceed with less of a nominal house price fall and therefore 
less stress for debtors. It is extremely doubtful whether the Fed or any central 
bank is willing to give up the anti-inflation orthodoxy of the last two or three 
decades, but even if they were, bond markets would sell off taking mortgage 
rates up anyway. Overall, then it would seem that monetary policy alone can 
help little more when a bubble bursts than when it is inflating, though a gentle 
“leaning against the wind” may still be worthwhile contemplating. 
The second approach is to work to keep mortgage markets open by 
ensuring spreads are low and terms not too onerous. This approach has been 
enthusiastically embraced by both the Fed and the Government, with the 
Federal Home Loans Bank stepping up to buy mortgages from commercial 
banks and the Agencies (Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae) effectively guaranteed 
by the government which is keen to encourage them to expand their operations. 
In recent months the government-backed mortgage sector has accounted for 
the huge majority of new mortgages, up from a little less than 50% historically. 
However this approach may have a limited effect on restraining the collapse in 
home prices. First, the terms of these mortgages are naturally more conservative 
than during the bubble when sub-prime and Alt-A mortgages were widely 
available at high LTVs and with limited documentation. Secondly, just as it is 
argued that few people will be deterred from buying a house in a bubble period 
11 See for example John Makin, The Inflation Solution to the Housing Mess, article in Wall 
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by slightly higher interest rates, so, during a bust, slightly lower interest rates 
may have only a limited effect. Finally, despite government efforts to shore up 
Fannie and Freddie they may yet struggle to maintain the level of mortgage 
lending desired by the government, simply because it may not be in their 
share-holders’ best interests.
The third broad approach to supporting the housing market is to try to limit the 
flood of foreclosures. Both the government and the Federal Reserve have urged 
banks to show forbearance, giving home-owners better terms to encourage 
them to stay in their homes rather than proceeding to foreclosure. However 
banks face serious practical problems in negotiating a deal satisfactory to all, 
not least lack of experienced staff. Moreover, borrowers who find themselves 
with negative equity of 10-–30% may naturally walk away unless banks are 
prepared to forgive as much. But banks cannot routinely forgive large amount 
to some borrowers without facing a clamour for help from others.
Barney Frank, Chairman of the Financial Services Committee of the House 
of Representative has been leading the way to develop a structured approach, 
where banks agree some forgiveness in return for a guarantee on the new 
mortgage. This looks like an attractive compromise where banks take some 
losses but less than they might through foreclosure, the government takes on 
some contingent risk and homeowners accept some loss of equity but keep 
their home. However, again, if home prices fall too much homeowners may 
prefer to walk away while, if they don’t the government could be exposed 
to loss. At the end of July 2008 this was enshrined in new legislation due to 
be implemented in October. Most observers believe these measures will help 
a little but not very much. They may be expanded next year if home prices 
are still weak and the political landscape has changed.206
8. Conclusion
The US housing bubble was the main cause of the financial crisis and 
should not be regarded as merely a trigger. A typical “bubble mentality” 
emerged, which meant the downside risk for house prices was seriously 
under-estimated, leading to mistakes by borrowers, lenders, rating agencies, 
security structuring firms, investors and regulators. Also the rapid growth in 
mortgages was a crucial source of the excess liquidity prior to 2007 and is 
implicated in the shortage of liquidity since the crisis began. The collapse of 
the housing bubble will continue to play a crucial role in the fate of both the 
financial sector and the economy. 
The Fed has responded well to the financial crisis, providing liquidity as 
needed, avoiding a disorderly collapse of Bear Stearns and later of Freddie 
and Fannie, whilst cutting rates early and rapidly once it became clear that 
GDP growth was threatened too. The situation has been complicated by the 
surge in oil prices which is also contributing to the economic slowdown. 
Bankers’ liquidity has stabilized though is not back to pre-crisis levels, market 
liquidity has fallen significantly with the deleveraging of hedge funds, while 
investors liquidity has fallen less so far. But the big decline in mortgage 
equity withdrawal will show up here eventually too.
The housing bust is slowing the economy through three main channels. First, 
there is the collapse in house-building which has been subtracting around 1% 
from GDP growth over the last year. Secondly, credit availability has been 
severely curtailed – to consumers as collateral values have fallen but also to 
all but the best risks in every area as banks cut back their exposures due to 
the crisis. Thirdly, wealth effects from falling home prices may have begun 
though they are likely small so far. It is too early to be sure whether the small 
rise in the savings ratio in 2008 is due to wealth effects or due to concerns 
about the economy, jobs or oil prices. Longer term wealth effects could be 
very significant and take the household savings rate ups considerably. While 
this will keep the US economy slow and risks setting off a global slowdown, 
it will nevertheless contribute to a correction of the international imbalances. 
But get ready to worry again about the budget deficit!
House prices look set to fall significantly further from the 17% decline 
recorded as of March 2008 (Case-Shiller index), since inventories are very 
high and mortgage availability is much tighter than before the crisis. But 207 Conclusion
the size of the eventual house price fall and the extent to which the personal 
savings rate will rise are major uncertainties. The author’s expectation is that 
the savings rate will rise slowly in the next few years, constraining domestic 
demand in the US economy. This will be offset to some extent by buoyant net 
export growth, depending on how well the rest of the world is doing.
The potential for limiting the US house price fall is limited though there is 
a case for trying to prevent a huge undershoot on the downside (just as there 
was a case for limiting the bubble on the upside in this author’s view). But 
monetary policy can do little on its own.209
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